

# The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor



VOLUME V

Department of Defense  
United States of America

# **THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR**

**VOLUME V**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402 (8-part set; sold in sets only)

Stock No. 008-000-00233-9

## PART A—THE HULL-NOMURA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

## CHAPTER V

	Page
<b>PART A.—THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS</b>	<b>1</b>
1. Iwakuro Urges That Japan Accept an Agreement	1
2. Iwakuro Advises That Japan Hasten the Agreement	1
3. Chief of Staff Learns of Hull-Nomura Talk (May7)	1
4. Japan Must Aid Nomura with a Broad Policy	2
5. Report to War Minister on Japanese-American Relations	2
<b>PART B.—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD</b>	<b>3</b>
6. Japanese Intelligence Reports from U.S.	3
7. The Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact	3
8. Japanese-Russian Commercial Relations	3
9. The Japanese Establish Contacts with Axis Aviation	4
10. Japanese Seek German Manufacturing Rights	4
11. Japanese Seek Italian Manufacturing Rights	4
12. The Yamashita "Tour"	5
13. The Japanese Seek Intelligence about Russia	5
14. Japanese Intelligence Reports from Axis Nations	5
15. Japanese Intelligence Reports from Middle East	6
16. Japanese Relations with Thailand	6
17. Miscellaneous Messages	6
<b>PART C.—APPENDIX V</b>	<b>8</b>
a. The Hull-Nomura Conversations	8
b. Japanese Activities Throughout the World	11
c. Additional Messages Found in 1977	37
<b>PART D.—SPECIAL STUDIES</b>	<b>51</b>
1. The "Winds" Code	51
2. The "Stop" Code	55
<b>PART E.—SUMMARY PARTS A—ALL FIVE VOLUMES</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>PART F.—INDEX</b>	<b>77</b>

3. Chief of Staff Learns of Hull-Nomura Talk (May 7).

When Foreign Minister Matsukata finally communicated with his representatives in Washington on May 4, he avoided mention of the proposal and the four points. Instead, he asked that Nomura offer, as a suggestion coming from the Ambassador, a neutrality pact similar to the one Matsukata had just signed with Russia. The Ambassador obeyed, but on May 7 his offer was refused by Secretary Hull. The Secretary, insisting upon broad principles as the basis for the negotiations, complained that the actions and speeches of Matsukata could not be reconciled with the principles embodied in the proposal.

This conversation of May 7 was reported on that day to the Japanese Chief of Staff in an incisive Military Attaché dispatch. According to the sender, an unidentified member of the Washington Embassy (probably Iwakuro), Foreign Minister Matsukata was not ready to return a formal text of the Japanese-American agreement. He had therefore instructed

## OUTLINE OF VOLUME V

This volume contains 1941 Japanese military attaché messages which were processed by American communications intelligence in 1945 and which supplement the 1941 messages in the first four volumes. These supplementary messages are arranged in two groups, like the arrangement in the first volume of the series.

Two special studies are included regarding the "Winds" and "Stop" code messages.

Additional Japanese messages of interest have been located recently and are included in Volume V.

A summary was made, originally, of all of Parts A of all Volumes. This material is limited to the Hull-Nomura conversations.

Finally, an index is included in Volume V which covers all the Volumes.

Department of Defense  
1978

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## PART A—THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

(Five supplementary messages)

April 16—May 11, 1941

### 1. Iwakuro Urges That Japan Accept an Agreement.

On April 9, 1941, the first proposals toward settling Japanese-American differences were presented to the United States State Department by "private American and Japanese individuals". Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura discussed the proposals on April 14.

In a second meeting, April 16, the two men discussed further the original proposals of April 9. Secretary Hull favored the proposals with some modifications but wished also to include four principles or points (which were to prove stumbling blocks throughout the negotiations). Ambassador Nomura at once reported this discussion to Tokyo, recommending that the proposals be adopted.

The same recommendation was made by Col. Hideo Iwakuro whom Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had recently appointed as an adviser to Ambassador Nomura. Sending a personal message on April 16, Iwakuro urged Major General Shinichi Tanaka in Tokyo to press for the conclusion of a Japanese-American agreement. He regarded this as a realistic measure and even compared it enthusiastically with Hitler's Russian Pact.

### 2. Iwakuro Advises That Japan Hasten The Agreement.

The urgent requests of Ambassador Nomura and Col. Iwakuro that their government speedily conclude an American agreement based upon the April 9 proposals and upon Secretary Hull's four points met a cool reception in Tokyo. The Japanese leaders awaited the return of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was absent on a diplomatic mission in Europe. In the course of this mission he signed the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact in Moscow on April 13. Although he returned to Tokyo April 22, Matsuoka delayed his reply to Washington until May 3.

Meanwhile Ambassador Nomura had sent numerous messages pressing for a settlement and was greatly embarrassed by Tokyo's evasive delays. Col. Iwakuro, in a report of April 26 to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in Tokyo, revealed that he too was annoyed by the delay, the excuse for which had been given as Matsuoka's need for two weeks of rest. Though resigning himself to the delay, Iwakuro reported two circumstances that necessitated haste. First, popular support for aid to Britain was growing; if concrete steps in this direction were taken, they would impede a Japanese-American agreement. Second, there was increasing danger that the negotiations might become public if they were delayed, and publicity would ruin the undertaking. Ambassador Nomura, the report concluded, was exerting his utmost and had even confided to Col. Iwakuro that if the Japanese-American negotiations should fail, "he would take the honorable course".

### 3. Chief of Staff Learns of Hull-Nomura Talk (May 7).

When Foreign Minister Matsuoka finally communicated with his representatives in Washington on May 3, he avoided mention of the proposals and the four points. Instead, he asked that Nomura offer, as a suggestion coming from the Ambassador, a neutrality pact similar to the one Matsuoka had just signed with Russia. The Ambassador obeyed, but on May 7 his offer was refused by Secretary Hull. The Secretary, insisting upon broad principles as the basis for the negotiations, complained that the actions and speeches of Matsuoka could not be reconciled with the principles embodied in the proposals.

This conversation of May 7 was reported on that day to the Japanese Chief of Staff in an incomplete Military Attaché dispatch. According to the sender, an unidentified member of the Washington Embassy (probably Iwakuro), Foreign Minister Matsuoka was not yet ready to return a formal text of the Japanese-American agreement. He had therefore instructed Ambassador Nomura to apologize for the delay, to indicate the intentions of the Axis leaders,

and to propose a neutrality pact. The sender feared that the Ambassador's compliance with the second instruction—mention of Axis intentions—was unnecessary and perhaps harmful. He agreed with the Chief of Staff that Matsuoka's recent public attacks on President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were badly timed. They increased the feeling in America that the Japanese "are trying to put something over on the U.S.". The sender concluded that "trickery and bluff" would not speed a settlement. The Ambassador himself, reporting to Tokyo on this day, said much the same thing, that this was no time for "propaganda, bluffing, and feeling out each other".

**4. Japan Must Aid Nomura with a Broad Policy.**

Not until May 9 did Foreign Minister Matsuoka return to Washington a formal text of the proposed agreement. A series of discussions ensued, in the course of which much wrangling arose over the wording of the text. The author of the May 7 Attaché Message sent another on the 13th., also addressed to the Chief of Staff. As he had deplored "trickery and bluff" in the former message, so now he warned against trivialities such as questions of phraseology. The Japanese Government must, he said, adopt a wide outlook to help the Ambassador obtain a favorable settlement.

**5. Report to War Minister on Japanese-American Relations.**

The same observer sent another dispatch on May 11 to the War Minister in Tokyo. The plan to convoy ships to Britain had hitherto been delayed, he reported, in consideration of the Japanese-American negotiations. But on May 8 the U.S. Cabinet had decided to put the plan into operation. President Roosevelt would announce the decision on Wednesday May 14. Therefore unless the negotiations were concluded before that date, the announcement, coupled with rising public opinion, would ruin them for the present. Japan's answer must arrive by Monday, May 13, at the latest, or all hope of improving relations at this time would be lost.<sup>a</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>Ambassador Nomura had already received Matsuoka's answer but did not complete presenting it to Secretary Hull until May 12. Previously Nomura had similarly warned Matsuoka of rising opposition and urged speed.

**PART B—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD**

(Sixty-Three Supplementary Messages, April 4—Dec. 8)

**6. Japanese Intelligence Reports from U.S.**

On April 4 a circular Attaché dispatch was sent from Tokyo to Washington (other addressees were England and countries of South Eastern Asia). The head of the General Affairs Department in Tokyo requested intelligence upon two points: (1) the effect of Japanese aggressions in South China upon the commerce of third powers (i.e., nations other than those of the Axis) and (2) any change in their attitude toward China. Apparently no intercept was ever made of a dispatch replying to this request.

On July 24 an unnamed official in the Washington Embassy reported plans to strengthen the Japanese intelligence network in America. Japanese-American relations were growing worse (the Japanese had invaded French Indo-China late in July). The official feared that the activities of Japanese personnel might be restricted and that their evacuation might be prohibited. He asked that a total of six observers remain in the United States (Cols. Iwakuro and Shinjo and four others). He asked that those of the six who did not possess diplomatic privileges be appointed as Aides, so that they might perform intelligence services with immunity.

On December 1 the same Japanese official in the Washington Embassy described to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo current opinions on possible American strategy in the approaching conflict with Japan. First, cooperating with the British, Chinese, Dutch and Russians, America would blockade Japan, destroying her communications (shipping) with air power. She would then build up her military forces for a decisive blow, which, the observer thought, could not possibly come before the end of 1942. In order to employ air power against Japanese communications, she would seek bases in Australia, India, China, and would advance bases along the Aleutians even into Siberia, besides utilizing her own islands in the South Pacific together with the Philippines and Guam. Hoping that the Japanese fleet might early be drawn into a decisive battle, America felt a decision might come sooner than expected. In any case she was not worried lest the war last long. She would heavily reinforce the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the Malay States in order to hold them. Being certain of victory, she would not be greatly concerned when the fighting started.

**7. The Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact.**

Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Moscow after his tour of the Axis nations. There, on April 8, he told Laurence Steinhardt, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, that the Tripartite Pact was intended to restrict the war and prevent American participation. Germany would not attack America, he added, neither would there be war talk in Tokyo if President Roosevelt would ask Chiang Kai-shek to make peace with Japan. On April 13 Matsuoka signed the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact.

On April 14 Tokyo released a circular Attaché dispatch explaining that negotiations leading toward the pact had been pressed since early in 1940 by Ambassador Togo and, after his departure from Moscow in September, by his successor, Ambassador Tatekawa. Russian demands had delayed the conclusion of the pact until Matsuoka arrived in Moscow. The neutrality Pact, essentially a non-aggression agreement, was expected to lead to fishing and commercial treaties between the two countries.

**8. Japanese-Russian Commercial Relations.**

After signing the Neutrality Pact with Russia, Japan sought to improve trade relations. A secret trade agreement which had already been made in March 1941 was unsatisfactory. Japan particularly desired unimpeded exchange of goods with Germany by way of Russian railroads. But in May Russia prohibited the transit of machine tools adapted for the pro-

duction of military equipment. However, the Japanese hoped to evade the prohibition. On June 5 a message from the Military Affairs Bureau in Tokyo informed a Japanese official in Berlin that the Russians would consider permitting the passage of machine tools, ordnance, and possibly airplanes if the Japanese would accept a secret verbal arrangement rather than a documented agreement.<sup>6</sup>

#### **9. The Japanese Establish Contacts with Axis Aviation.**

The Japanese strove for closer contacts with Axis nations for the exchange of information and for the acquisition of manufacturing plans.

A dispatch from Tokyo on May 12 informed the Berlin Embassy that an Army Air Attaché had been appointed to work under the Japanese Army Attaché in Berlin. Another dispatch addressed to Rome on May 24 stated that the War Office in Tokyo was exchanging foreign air intelligence each week with Italy.

#### **10. Japanese Seek German Manufacturing Rights.**

Considerable exchange of military and technical personnel between Japan and Germany met with irksome negotiations in the matter of visas. Against the resulting delay the Japanese Embassy in Berlin protested to the War Ministry in Tokyo on April 11, fearing that much time would be lost in future exchanges. These exchanges would be frequent, the dispatch added.

Throughout these months the Japanese strove to obtain designs and samples of German military equipment and products. They desired certain IG (I.G. Farben) patents in return for exports to Germany of tungsten and molybdenum. They sought to purchase certain manufacturing rights and to obtain the assistance of German technicians to build factories. They were interested also in German airplane equipment and in German tanks.

Early in May 1941 Japanese military representative Yoshida and technical expert Kino-shita left Tokyo for Berlin to purchase IG patented processes and fuel equipment. Early in June Yoshida was in Italy studying the synthetic oil industry there. A month later another official, Col. Otani, was negotiating in Berlin for certain manufacturing rights, while the War Office in Tokyo was informed that representatives of Junkers would be sent to Japan and contacts would be established between Junkers and the Manchurian Airplane Co.

The Japanese were also purchasing samples of German teletype machines and ultra short wave electrical apparatus, samples of German armor plate, considerable quantities of optical glass, and machines for the manufacture of cog wheels.

On July 19, according to an incomplete dispatch from Berlin dated July 22, Col. Otani and Major Yoshida began formal negotiations (apparently to secure manufacturing rights) with officials of the German Economic Ministry.

#### **11. The Japanese Seek Italian Manufacturing Rights.**

Italian manufacturing rights were also sought by the Japanese. In particular, the rights to the Italian 21 (210?) howitzer were requested, and were granted through the Italian War Department, according to a dispatch of May 1 sent from Rome to the Vice Minister of War in Tokyo. However, complications seem to have retarded the actual transfer of the rights, according to a second dispatch sent from Rome May 14. A reply from Tokyo dated June 6 requested, in addition to the plans of the howitzer, a quantity of its ammunition as a sample and the right to manufacture the powder. But apparently still more complications arose, for a dispatch to the War Ministry from Rome dated November 26 revealed that the purchase of rights to this artillery piece had not yet been completed.

---

<sup>6</sup>An extensive trade agreement was signed, however, on June 9.

#### **12. The Yamashita "Tour".**

Lt. Gen. Tetsujo Yamashita toured Europe in May and June of 1941 to observe the progress of the war and particularly to promote Japanese trade with the Axis nations in war materials and manufacturing plans. The second part of dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo dated May 15 names the German officials conducting Yamashita's party. Goering, Brauchitsch, and Keitel were among them.

A later dispatch from Berlin to Moscow, dated May 22, revealed that Yamashita would also "tour" Italy and finally Russia, where the Japanese hoped to interview the Russian Army Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Air Headquarters. Evidently Yamashita's efforts were highly regarded in Tokyo, for a dispatch to Rome dated June 6 stated that an appointment to the Supreme War Council was being considered for him.

However, the Lieutenant General fell into trouble in Russia, where he arrived shortly before the German attack on June 22. A garbled message, Moscow to Tokyo June 23, mentions Yamashita, whom the Russians, it seems from a later dispatch (Tokyo to Moscow June 28), had forcibly detained for a time.

Following the industrial liaison established by Yamashita, a dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo on July 23, relayed to the members of his "tour" information on one of the latest German bombers.

#### **13. The Japanese Seek Intelligence About Russia.**

Both before and after the Germans turned against Russia on June 22, 1941, Tokyo was extremely interested in Russian strength, equipment and tactics. Scandinavian countries, particularly Finland, served as observation posts. An incomplete dispatch from Helsinki dated May 26 estimated Russian strength and discredited the rumors of impending war between Germany and Russia. Another incomplete message sent from Stockholm on May 30 and addressed to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo gave information on Russian tactics.

Finnish sources provided much data and requested that the Japanese respond with reports on Russian activities in the Far East. One such report Tokyo sent September 26, not to Finland but to Istanbul, Turkey. Tokyo reported that the Soviet Far Eastern Army had completed mobilization about August 10 and that the army was estimated to contain about one million men, but that up to September 10 the equivalent of eight divisions had been diverted to European Russia.

Japanese observers in Helsinki reported on August 6 that the Russians were increasing the use of trench mortars. A two-part report of August 15 described new Russian automatic weapons. Another dispatch from Helsinki on August 24 described Russian airplanes. Russian forces were exceedingly weak and were declining further, according to the report, September 13, of a Japanese attaché in Hungary. A message from Helsinki dated October 10 listed captured Russian equipment which was being forwarded to Tokyo.

#### **14. Japanese Intelligence Reports from Axis Nations.**

A number of varied intelligence reports involved Japanese relations with the Axis nations of Europe. The Germans requested in a dispatch of May 8 that the Japanese report to them data on British food supplies and on the extent of rationing, also data on the effect produced by air raids upon British production.

On May 12 a Japanese in Berlin reported to Tokyo the rumored military strength of Germany, 9 to 9½ million men in 270 to 275 divisions and 35,000 planes. Compare this with a report of June 3 estimating 10 to 12 million men and 60 to 65 thousand planes.

Berlin requested information on May 24 from the Japanese Army commander in Hsinking on the activities of a Ukrainian Nationalist leader who had been sent from Berlin to Harbin, Manchuria.

On May 25 a Japanese observer in Rome informed Tokyo of the German air attack on Crete. Other Japanese diplomatic messages describing this event had been read in 1941.

On May 26 a Japanese agent in Helsinki noted from "intercepted wireless messages" that thirty submarines had been sent from the Baltic area to the Black Sea.

A Japanese observer in Sweden reported to Tokyo on June 11 that the Germans were setting up an agency to gather Russian intelligence. The work was centered in Konigsberg, Latvia, under the leadership of a Latvian named Alps. Konigsberg was also the location of the German Supreme Command at that time, according to a Japanese spy report sent from Rome June 20.

A report sent from Rome to Tokyo on May 8 stated that Italy had decided to aid Iraq with four of five squadrons of airplanes.

#### **15. Japanese Intelligence Reports from Middle East.**

The Japanese watched the Middle East, Iran in particular. On September 14 an official in Teheran gave Tokyo information about a Mohammedan leader. On September 22 the same official reported to Rome the size and activities of the Russian and British armies invading Iran.

#### **16. Japanese Relations with Thailand.**

While Tokyo was pressing French Indo-China and Thailand to accept Japanese influences, the British and Americans were countering Japanese pressure. A Japanese message from Bangkok dated May 3 reported the contents of an American telegram to Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok. The telegram stated that the Governor General of French Indo-China was en route to the Philippines to take over a consignment of American munitions.

The Japanese were active in cryptanalysis. On May 17 Tokyo notified Bangkok that it was sending Major Aoyama, an army cryptanalyst, accompanied by several assistants, to intercept and decrypt British and American codes in the South Seas area.<sup>2</sup>

An intelligence report of May 22 from Bangkok informed Tokyo that small forces of British, Indian, and Chinese troops were stationed in Burma.

A later dispatch, July 26, from Tokyo instructed Bangkok to report on the condition of the railroads in Thailand. A few days later, after the Japanese aggression in French Indo-China, Bangkok reported the reaction of the Thais and quoted the policy announced by Thais leaders July 20, a policy of friendliness, non-intervention, and business as usual. But by November, while Japanese agents reported detailed information on Thais airfields and highways, Thais friendliness had evidently declined, according to a message from Bangkok dated November 12.

#### **17. Miscellaneous Messages.**

On April 21, 1941, a Japanese official in Budapest sent a report to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo discussing the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. Hungary was demanding the return of several areas and in particular the Banat district.

Mexico served as a convenient post for observation and espionage in the Americas. An undated dispatch from a Japanese official in Washington informed the Mexican office that, as a result of the Japanese-American negotiations, the code clerks in the Washington Embassy were overwhelmed with messages. The Mexican office was therefore requested to transmit in code the outline only of matters concerning the Washington Embassy.

A dispatch from Mexico to Berlin dated April 28 stated that on the previous day a certain person had sailed from that country. His last name had been garbled in this transmission, but a second message from Mexico dated May 1 and addressed to Tokyo identified the man as Karl Pekowski, a German espionage agent, who had sailed with some fifty other Germans from Acapulco on the *Heiyo Maru*.

---

<sup>2</sup>By October Aoyama was busy in Bangkok working with Japanese naval cryptanalysts upon codes used in Burma.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On June 5 a dispatch from Hsinking to Moscow dealt with border troubles between Japan and Russia. The border between Manchuria and Mongolia had been in dispute. After the Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, negotiations began for a settlement. According to the June 5 dispatch the Japanese and Russian representatives, Miyakawa and Tsalapkin (who had met previously to settle matters of fishing rights), had conferred on May 26 regarding the border problem. The problem was settled by June 15 according to a message of that date.

As Japanese-American relations deteriorated, the flow of Japanese returning home increased. A dispatch from a Japanese official in Rio de Janeiro dated September 6 gave the schedules of two ships, the *Noto Maru* and the *Toa Maru*, sailing from South America to Japan in the autumn of 1941.

A dispatch from Bucharest to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo September 9 pressed a Romanian request for raw rubber.

On December 8 a Japanese attaché in Hungary addressed a dispatch to the Chief of Staff. The attaché informed him that the Hungarian government and the people were sure of a Japanese victory—a faith which, he added, "is a great boost to our spiritual morale".

## PART C—APPENDIX V

### a. Hull-Nomura Conversations.

(supplementary messages)

April 16—May 11

No. 1

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (Winter (Head, General Affairs))

April 16, 1941  
# 83.

Personal message from IWAKURO to Major General TANAKA SHINICHI:

I feel the matter reported by the Attaché to the Minister and Chief of staff is a realistic measure for the Empire to take, like HITLER'S German-Russian accord. Since my arrival at my post on 2 April I've been working literally without a moment's rest to rush this plan to completion, and I feel that it's my baby. Please get (the agreement) concluded immediately and as far as possible without modification (The way I've managed it, an easy "out" is left open for Japan.).

Trans. 6-3-45

No. 2

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN (War Office. Sen Adjutant.)) # 094.

April 26, 1941  
# 094.

4 Parts complete.

Part 1—Personal wire from Col. IWAKURO to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

According to a wire which Minister WAKASUGI received today from the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, at least two more weeks will be required before instructions can be sent on the matter in hand, because of the Foreign Minister's need for rest.

We realize that before deciding on an affair of this importance, very cautious study and all sorts of preliminary moves are necessary, and that there is something to be said for the policy of getting your man flustered with impatience so that he'll do something rash which may redound to your benefit. So, we have resigned ourselves to some delay. But please observe these facts about the immediate situation here:

Part 2 (a) Popular anticipation of increased aid to England, of U.S. entry into the war and of a Japanese-American War, has not diminished in the least, despite the public's desire to avoid war. On the contrary, serious consideration is being given to the formulation of concrete measures for increasing aid to England. Should this trend develop rapidly and these measures carried out in the near future, we should have to postpone the matter in hand indefinitely, because the general situation would be such as to preclude its consideration.

(b) The Americans are handling this matter with the greatest secrecy. Only the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretaries (? of War and of the Navy?) and 2 others are permitted to have anything to do with it. (Part 3) I have frequently been warned that if this affair were made public the situation would become hopeless, and, of course, the longer the delay the greater the danger of that happening.

Because of these two points, all of us here who are concerned with this matter earnestly desire that the instructions be sent as soon as possible. Therefore we request you to do what you can to speed up the Government people.

Incidentally, all I know about the Army's viewpoint on this matter is what I learned indirectly from a recent Navy wire. (?!) have been ordered to assist the Ambassador, direct

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

intelligence activities and certain inside moves, and interview Cabinet Ministers and other officials secretly. (Part 4) If you want me to direct my activities in any specific direction, please let me know about it.

The Ambassador has a strong sense of responsibility about this matter, and never slackens his efforts, day or night. He has told me that if the affair ends in failure he will take the honorable course.

(What I say about the Ambassador's statement may create some misunderstanding if noised about, so please keep it to yourself.)

Trans. 9-1-45

## No. 3

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (PRINTEMPS) (Chief of Staff)

May 7, 1941  
# 98.

Parts 1, 2, and 3 of 5-parts.<sup>a</sup>

### Part 1:

I should like to bring to your attention the following further details on the plan for a Japanese-American Understanding.

A wire from the Foreign Minister informed the Ambassador that several more days would elapse before the formal text of the proposed Understanding could be sent, and directed him to call on HULL and make an oral statement addressed directly to HULL, and through HULL, to the President, in order to keep the situation in hand during the interval. These instructions the Ambassador carried out this morning. The main points of the statement were an apology for the long time being taken to consider the proposal for a Japanese-American Understanding, (Part 2) some explanation of the intentions of the German and Italian leaders, the statement that American participation in the war would mean the destruction of civilization, and an indication of the absolute necessity of German and Italian friendship to Japan's position. In the same wire the Ambassador was directed to sound out the possibility of a Japanese-American Neutrality Pact (of the same tenor as the Japanese-Russian Agreement). (For details consult the Diplomatic Wire.)

What you say about Mr. MATSUOKA in your wire is quite correct. His recent journalistic attacks on the President and HULL were most unfortunately timed, serving to augment the current feeling here that we are trying to put something over on the U.S.

### Part 3:

The Ambassador's mention of the intentions of the German and Italian Leaders during his interview with HULL, and especially in his verbal statement, was really extraneous to the matter in hand and may have undesirable results. (The Ambassador was afraid that his conference with the Secretary of State might end in failure, and, therefore, made some preliminary inside moves on the 6th as a result of which he was only barely able to keep from going beyond the point indicated in his wire.)

The trend of today's conference as well as the atmosphere in America during the last few days convinces me that at this time trickery and bluff will serve no purpose between Japan and America. Unless some instructions on the proposal for an understanding are sent immediately and negotiations begun, a solution of the difficulties in Japanese-American relations -----<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Parts 4 and 5 not available.

<sup>b</sup>Sentence concluded in next part.

Trans. 8-29-45

No. 4

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (PRINTEMPS) (Chief of Staff)

May 13, 1941  
# 105.

If, at the commencement of these talks on Japanese-American relations, in which we're trying to settle by agreement such thorny problems as the oil question, we become involved in questions of phraseology and suchlike trivialities, we'll succeed only in preventing the conference making any progress. I think it of supreme importance at present that we adopt as wide an outlook as possible as the basis of our policy, in order to facilitate the Ambassador's activities, so that we can reach a perfectly satisfactory settlement and obtain all those real benefits which will accompany such a settlement. I fervently hope that the Government will take such action as will best achieve these goals.

Trans. 6-4-45

No. 5

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUN DAIJIN-War Minister)

May 11, 1941  
# 101.

Parts 1, 2, and 3 complete.

Part 1.

As I have previously reported, America's attitude on the European war has recently become very much stiffer. In a Cabinet meeting the day before yesterday, i.e., on the 8th, it was decided to put the Convoy plan and similar measures into operation; and it is almost certain that the President will make an announcement to that effect in his speech on next Wednesday, the 14th. I fear that should the situation actually develop in this fashion, America would probably not agree, and the Empire would find herself in a difficult position, to take up the question of a Japanese-American understanding. Therefore, I have been trying to gauge, through reliable channels, the opinions of American leaders on the relationship between the matter of giving aid to England and the question of a Japanese-American understanding,—and have learned the following:

Part 2.

1. The execution of the Convoy plan and related measures was, I learn, secretly decided on about a month ago, but was postponed, by Presidential decision, in consideration of this matter of a Japanese-American understanding.

2. Present circumstances make it impossible to delay the Convoy plan indefinitely for the sake of a Japanese-American understanding, when no one can tell when such an understanding may be reached. This fact, and pressure from STIMSON and his fellow supporters of "a strong stand" resulted in the Cabinet meeting which took place the day before yesterday, i.e., on the 8th.

3. It is quite possible that, if the talks on Japanese-American relations were under way, they would be given some consideration in the drafting of the President's speech which is to be spoken on the 14th. (They are waiting for an answer from Japan before forming a final decision. HULL and his associates are standing by right now, i.e., the evening of the 10th.)

Part 3:

4. I am told that if the negotiations are not started before the draft of the President's speech has been given its definitive form, it will become next to impossible to bring up the subject of a Japanese-American understanding, unless American public opinion undergoes some absolutely miraculous change, (and I think this statement is more than an empty threat).

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The situation being as I have described it, if we receive the instructions on Monday at the latest (I am taking into consideration the time which will be allotted for last minute changes in the draft of the speech, and for printing and distributing it) we will be able to get in under the dead-line, but if they come any later than that we shall have lost all opportunity of improving Japanese-American relations at this time. As a matter of fact these relations will very probably become much worse, America will go on taking a harder and harder attitude, and we shall have become unable to effect a change in the situation.

Trans. 6-7-45

## b. Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World.

### No. 6

FROM: Tokyo (TIXNS) (Head, General Affairs Department) April 4, 1941  
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN) # 310.

Please report on the following by about April 20th.

1. Subsequent to our invasion of French Indo-China, the effect produced upon commerce of third powers and —1G— movements, by the landing operations recently carried out on the South China coast.

2. Change in the attitude of third powers toward China subsequent to the enforcement of our blockage of China.

From the Chief of the General Affairs Dept.

Addressed to England, America, India, Siam, Batavia, French Indo-China, Burma.

Trans. 3-14-45

### No. 7

FROM: Washington (UAWRK) July 24, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (Summer (Vice-Chief, Gen. Staff)) # 140.

Parts 1-4 complete.

(Secret.)

1. We intend to hold out in the United States to the very end, and we do everything in our power, no matter what the difficulties, to effect the transfer of attachés and subordinates (in) Mexico and Central and South America. However, this last may well prove impossible. For as Japanese-American relations near a crisis, this sort of transfer becomes increasingly difficult. When the crisis has really come, such transfers will probably be prohibited except in special cases such as exchanges of personnel. This is certainly indicated by the measures taken in the recent evacuation of German and Italian consulate personnel etc.

### Part 2.

Step by step with the increasing momentum of the European, especially the German-Russian, war, American-German relations have become more critical, and at present it is very possible that the two nations may fall into a state of actual warfare (without a declaration of war) or something closely resembling it. At the same time Japanese-American relations are growing steadily worse. In view of all this and of the real problems which face and will face us in the matter of transfers, I am certain that this is the time to put our intelligence network on a completely war-time footing.

Part 3.

2. At this time, when the Imperial Navy is sending home all of its Resident Personnel and most of its Resident Supervisory Personnel because of suspicions of espionage and the great decrease in purchasing functions, the Army could not keep on sending in additional personnel without running a great risk of rousing the suspicions of American officials, especially those of the Army and Navy, and eventually of having the activities of our personnel severely restricted. Therefore, I think it would be more advisable to keep the number of our personnel resident in America down to the minimum and to utilize this personnel to fill out and strengthen our intelligence network.

Part 4.

3. The personnel I should like to have remain in the United States to the end are:  
The Attaché, Col. IWAKURO,  
2 Aides (These in Washington)  
1 Technical Resident Official,  
1 Technical Resident Supervisor and Col. SHINJO.  
(These in New York.)

I have in previous wires stated my views on the matter of appointing those of the above who do not enjoy diplomatic privileges to the position of Local Aides. Until this is done, it will be next to impossible to ensure their personal security.

Trans. 8-28-45

No. 8

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, Gen, Staff)

December 1, 1941  
# 259.

Parts 1-4.

Part 1.

Opinions on American strategy in a war with Japan are somewhat as follows:

1. With the opening or hostilities, America in close cooperation with the ABCD and with Russia would attempt to blockade Japan's economy by destruction of her communications and by air raids. With this she would carry on ideological warfare calculated to reduce our national defense by destroying the people's will to fight. In the meantime she would throw everything she has into preparing her military forces, particularly her warships, planes and bombers, and achieving absolute supremacy in these fields. Then she would watch for the right moment to strike a decisive blow at Japan.

Part 2.

At the very earliest this would not take place before the end of next year (1942).

2. In order to destroy our communications, (including the interruption of traffic to the continent), the Americans would seek bases in Australia, India, and in the American owned islands of the South Pacific. Furthermore, in order to bomb important industrial cities in Japan, America would make use of Chinese territory under CHIANG KAI SHEK's jurisdiction, and would also gradually advance her bases from the Aleutians area along the Siberian coast.

The possibility that America might make use of the Philippines and Guam for paratroop (attacks) at the outset of the war (particularly if America opens hostilities) must not be discounted.

Part 3.

In such a case, no forward naval base would be sought in Australia nor would her main strength be sent there. Indeed, there is a feeling that through some skillful maneuver the

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Japanese fleet might be lured into a position for a decisive battle between the main strength of the American and Japanese navies much sooner than anyone expects.

### Part 4.

3. With the object of holding the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Malaya, and in order to try for a decisive battle with the Japanese forces, America will send large numbers of troops to these places. America, however, expects certain victory in a war with Japan and is not greatly worried about the war's lasting a long time. Therefore, she does not attach great importance to the fighting when the war first starts.

Trans. 7-3-45

### No. 9

FROM: Tokyo (TIXNS) (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.) April 14, 1941  
TO: Circular—Rio de Janeiro, Washington, Mexico, Bangkok # 386.

2 Parts complete.

### Part 1.

The circumstances leading to the concluding of the Russo—Japanese Neutrality Pact are as follows:

The pact was begun in the spring of last year. In July and October Ambassador TOGO and Ambassador TATEKAWA respectively made proposals whose essential point was the respecting of neutrality and territorial sovereignty. The demands of the Russians in the negotiations were excessive so from the end of last year for some time negotiations were at a standstill.

### Part 2.

However following repeated discussions handled by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on his return trip from Germany, the neutrality pact (essentially a non-aggression pact) was finally concluded.

With the conclusion of this pact there is a good prospect, that in the near future we will also settle the fishing and commercial treaties, etc., which have been under negotiation for some time.

Trans. 3-21-45

### No. 10

FROM: Tokyo (BMXRY) (Chief, Military Affairs Bureau War Office) June 5, 1941  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) # 542.

2 Parts complete.

### Part 1.

Military affairs wire # 30.

1. The Japanese-Russian commercial treaty will be settled in a short time, and during the negotiations concerning it, MIKOYAN, the Russian representative, promised Ambassador TATEKAWA that, in view of Japanese-Russian friendly relations<sup>a</sup>.

### Part 2.

They would investigate and permit the (? transit ?)<sup>b</sup> of machine tools, some types of machinery and other ordnance. He added further that they would give careful thought to the matter of airplanes. He asked that we be satisfied with this arrangement here.

2. In view of the above circumstances in this matter, this is for your own secret information. Please transmit it to the naval attaché.

---

<sup>a</sup>Continued in Part 2.

<sup>b</sup>As in the text TORANJITUTEKI.

Trans. 2 21-45

#### No. 11

FROM: Tokyo (TIXINS) (Head, General Affairs Dept.)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

May 12, 1941  
# 710.

This is to report that, in accordance with the suggestion made in Berlin wire # 933<sup>a</sup> (February 1941), we are appointing an Army Air Attaché to function in the area of, and under the authority of, the Army Attaché attached to the Imperial Embassy in Germany (he will formally go to Germany on official business). He is to unify control of the affairs handled by agencies concerned with air matters. Please report this to the German authorities concerned.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not Readable.

Trans. 4-25-45

#### No. 12

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY) (War Office, General Affairs)  
TO: Rome (RIKUGUN)

May 24, 1941  
# 427.

Air Headquarters Wire.

Owing to the wishes of the Italian Air Force Deputy-Attaché and with the approval of the War Ministry and General Staff Headquarters, this department has begun the weekly exchange of foreign air intelligence here. We will communicate essential intelligence to you.

Trans. 2-17-45

#### No. 13

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War.)

April 11, 1941  
# 115.

Committee wire # 13.

Re: Army China Secret Wire # 65 (Committee wire # 15)<sup>a</sup>.

Although the formalities for entrance into Germany are as stated in your wire, it is also true that the Japanese Foreign Ministry requires the same sort of procedure for entrance into Japan. Consequently, if the Japanese Foreign Ministry, as you say in your wire, does not give permission for the Germans from Junkers, the visas will not be given and the negotiations being carried out by the embassy will end in the establishment of still worse formalities. If this happens, it is greatly to be feared that time will be lost due to difficulties arising from complicated formalities which will have to be carried out in the frequent exchange of personnel with Germany hereafter. Therefore, the ambassador (?) has wired that he wishes (?) to negotiate with the German Foreign Ministry so that (?) both governments (?) will reach a final agreement on the proposal that the formalities he handled by guarantors in whom both governments repose their confidence —3G—.

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Accordingly, we would like to have you, too, negotiate with the Foreign Ministry and try to have this plan realized.

We have already discussed this matter with the Navy.

---

\*Not available.

Trans. 4-27-45

## No. 14

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN Vice Minister of War)

April 15, 1941  
# 125.

Parts 1-4 complete.

Committee wire # 15.

The 'IG' problem has become very involved. Although we are doing our best to speed up things, success cannot be achieved if you rely solely on our efforts here. The way things are going now, not only is the realization of our policy of national self-sufficiency being delayed, but we can't guarantee that in the long run we will ever be able to purchase the "IG" patents.

Consequently, we believe that the following steps should be taken, apart from these negotiations.

### Part 2.

1. "IG" (—5G—).

Re: the acquisition of large numbers of retorts and high-pressure steel pipes:

Judging from the results of previous negotiations and in view of Germany's productive capacity and the tremendous amounts of tungsten and molybdenum she wants from us in return for manufacturing these retorts and pipes, the acquisition of these items has become a very difficult matter. Consequently, it would be advisable to select the best plant in Japan and Manchukuo and (—3G—) the retorts we may be able to obtain by future effort.

### Part 3.

To this end, we believe that it would be most advisable as a national policy to take some establishment like the FUSHUN liquefaction plant, quickly expand it, convert it to army use, and supply it with the necessary retorts and machinery.

3<sup>a</sup>. In connection with the foregoing paragraph, (? please?) send us orders immediately for materials connected with the retorts we expect to obtain from the Germans.

In this connection, you must decide promptly on the number of the necessary retorts you want and the manufacturing method.

### Part 4.

As far as deciding upon the manufacturing method is concerned, it is necessary to consider especially the FUSHAN type and the MANCHUKUOAN PETROLEUM (COMPANY) IYAGU (sic) process. In either of the above cases, it will be necessary to supply the Germans with a considerable amount of tungsten and molybdenum.

Please be good enough to give your consideration to the amount of tungsten and molybdenum it will be possible to supply, and on this basis, decide promptly on your general policy, and let us know your decision.

---

<sup>a</sup>2 appears to be missing.

Trans. 5-9-45

No. 15

FROM: Tokyo (BMXRY) (Chief, Military Affairs Bureau War Office)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

April 22, 1941  
# 362.

3 parts complete.

Part 1.

Military affairs wire.

Re: your wire # 123<sup>a</sup>.

1. As the result of a conference with the authorities concerned, it has been decided to facilitate trial manufacture henceforth and to settle pending questions at a stroke by adopting the proposals in paragraphs one and two of the appendix in your wire # 42<sup>b</sup> as a final plan. Moreover, since we are making preparations to pay 1,000,000 marks during July, please make arrangements so that we can receive all the drawings during July.

2. According to a wire from HOKKESU, preparations for purchase are being made so that it will be possible to get a 250,000 mark discount on the price of 1,500,000 marks. His conclusions are that, if the sum were 2 million yen, the FW Company would agree, and that the factory can be set up by the end of the year.

3. Please make sure that the contract provides for the unconditional cancellation of the former contract, the transfer of manufacturing rights, the setting up of the factory by technicians, and the free procurement of machinery and finished products. Moreover, please negotiate so that the setting up of the factory by technicians can be carried out during the 6 months from October to March, at the latest.

4. It is necessary for the MITSU BISHI COMPANY to (? indicate ?) the types of drawings which it is to receive immediately, and to be able to receive —1G— drawings steadily. Although we will pay 1,500,000 marks we would like you to do your best to help us avoid additional payment for manufacturing rights.

Part 3.

5. When preliminary conferences have taken place, our agents will begin formal negotiations. About 4 advance men should be sent within 6 months, at the latest. Moreover the new contracts —3G— based on the MITSUI and MITSUBISHI contracts. Please make arrangements for concluding the contract, sending the advance men, and formal signing of the contract.

6. This wire has been shown to the Plans Board, the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Air Bureau, and the Companies.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-21-45

No. 16

FROM: Tokyo (Hszry, War Office, Senior Adjutant)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

April 26, 1941  
# 341.

3 parts complete.

Answer to your wire # 124<sup>a</sup>.

1. We have sent you instructions, regarding the policy of having the Japan Musical Instrument Co. (NICHIGAKU) purchase the Junkers propellers, in our wires # 423<sup>a</sup> and # 583<sup>a</sup> —5G—.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. The importation of propeller technicians under this policy will have an important bearing on the activities of Japanese aeronautical technicians.

Part 2.

If the agreement with the Manchurian Airplane Co. (MANCHI) is renewed it will be a hindrance to the speedy importation of technicians and the future development (?) of the industry (?). There are good prospects for the future development of the production of propellers in Japan, which would be sufficient and we see no need for an increase in the facilities of the propeller manufacturing companies.

As soon as this is settled let us know.

Part 3.

3. Please let us know immediately what the German authorities think of the conditions we proposed in paragraph 2 of Army Secret wire # 123<sup>a</sup> regarding the concerted action between the Manchurian Airplane Co. and the Junkers Company.

(The same is also given in 6 in paragraph 2 of Army Secret wire # 123<sup>a</sup>.)

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-29-45

No. 17

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice Minister of War)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

April 28, 1941  
# 157.

Army Secret Wire. (Reply to) your wire # 19<sup>a</sup>.

Although our purchases of tanks under our plan to import German techniques have been limited to one each of the light tanks Models "A" and "B", we would like to purchase other tanks being used in combat. Please send us the types and your opinion of the prospects (for the purchases).

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-14-45

No. 18

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUN JIKAN) (Vice Minister of War)

May 12, 1941  
# 219.

3 Parts complete.

Part 1.

Reply to committee wire # 19<sup>a</sup>.

Following is our opinion, and if there needs to be any change please let us know by return wire.

1. As far as the sample ordnance is concerned, we plan to finish up with the light tanks "A" and "B" as in part 5 (5) of the schedule (?) about which we have Major General HARA'S opinion (?). We plan to proceed with negotiations too, for the purchase of the # 4 and # 2 tank beside the # 3 tank which is a standard tank of the German Army, and for armored infantry cars. (Matter reported in German technical chief's wire # 995<sup>a</sup>.)

Part 2.

2. Re: The importation of techniques as mentioned in part 1 of the schedule. It is planned to concentrate on the # 3 tank which has been the main strength of the German Army armored units and which has played a large part in the European operations recently.

3. Following are the principal details about the # 3 tank.

Weight—20 tons.

Maximum horsepower—265 with 2600 revolutions.

Maximum speed—40 kilometers.

Armament—One 50 mm. gun (These are gradually replacing the former 37 mm guns.)

Machine guns—3.

Armor—A maximum of more than 50 mm.

Crew—5.

Each tank has wireless equipment.

Part 3.

4. The # 4 tank which is the largest tank manufactured on a large scale as a standard tank for the German Army has a 75 mm. gun and weight 22 tons. The 30 ton tank has not appeared in the operational areas. For your reference.

5. We will wire you later concerning negotiations for the purchase and the like, but please let us know of transportation as mentioned in wire # 18<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-22-45

No. 19

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice Minister of War)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

May 8, 1941  
# 084.

Army China Secret Wire.

In order to purchase patent rights to the "IG" process as well as to purchase fuel equipment, Major YOSHIDA and Engineer KINOSHITA, both of the Army Fuel Depot, left here on the 4th of this month and are expected to arrive at your office on about the 21st. Please give them every aid in accomplishing their mission.

Trans. 4-23-45

No. 20

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice-Minister of War)

June 6, 1941  
# 287.

We are studying the synthetic oil industry in Italy and are awaiting the arrival of the Army-Navy inspection mission. As a result of Staff Col. YOKOTA's inspection of the NOBARA testing laboratory of the ANIC Corp. which forms the foundation of the Italian hydrogenation industry, we confirmed the interesting fact that they have achieved excellent results in hydrogenation of Albanian oil distillation sediment (PETEROREN<sup>a</sup> grade) at 300 atmospheres pressure and 500°. We are making arrangements with the Naval authorities in regard to an inspection of the LIVORNO and BARI plants which are actually doing this work and shall have Army Fuel —IM—<sup>b</sup> YOSHITA and technician HANAOKA make an inspection together with Staff Col. YOKOTA.

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Please transmit this to the Chief of the General Affairs Dept. of Air H.Q. and to the Chief of the Army Fuel Ministry.

<sup>a</sup>Petroline, perhaps.

<sup>b</sup>Col., Lt. Col., or Major.

Trans. 3-2-45

## No. 21

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN) (War Office, Senior  
Adjutant)

July 6, 1941  
# 513.

Parts 1-6 complete.

Please communicate to Air Headquarters General Affairs Chief.

Reply to Air Headquarters Wire # 516<sup>a</sup>.

1. Re: The joint designing of airplanes under the negotiations for the importation of air techniques.

(a) In regard to cooperation with the Junkers Company, along with the setting up of discussions for concerted action between Junkers and the Manchurian Airplane Company we think that negotiations for sending Junkers representatives to Japan have been completed for the present. Please let us know if there are any details for further negotiations in carrying (this) out.

(b) The negotiations with the Messerschmitt Company for a joint design are now in progress. Refer to Committee Wire # 37<sup>a</sup> for the details.

### Part 2.

(c) The negotiations with the Focke-Wulf Company for a joint design have not been undertaken as yet. However before we begin the negotiations please let us know immediately, along with the Japanese Company, the type of plane that will be jointly designed and the terms of the request. We think it would be best to use the "Condor" as a design for a super-bomber but it is felt that this type of plane will meet with the refusal of the German Air Force to sell the manufacturing rights at present. However if we set forth the terms of the request separately and ask for a joint designing of similar items, we surmise that it will not be necessary to obtain the approval of the German Air Force nor will it be a difficult undertaking.

### Part 3.

2. Re: negotiations for purchasing the Junkers propeller.

The Japanese Musical Instrument Company officials arrived in Berlin with the purpose of buying the manufacturing rights for the Junkers "VS" model # 5 propeller. However later investigations indicated that "VS" model # 11 of an improved design had made its appearance and it became clear that the old model would be no longer used by the German Air Force. Accordingly disregarding the old model, they have undertaken to purchase this new model.

### Part 4.

However the Germans, especially the companies and the authorities concerned with the direction and control of economic interests, recommend that we purchase the old models and furthermore that we buy, in addition, the manufacturing rights for the new model. They balked at our desire to buy only the (?new model?). The important people in the Air Force have been very busy so we have not as yet obtained their approval on the export permit.

Admittedly negotiations are not progressing and in view of the fact that the above authorities have not yet approved of the export (permit) isn't it haggling altogether to come to an agreement in the present negotiations? These (Air Force) people have been fully occupied since the outbreak of the Russo-German war and they still have not grasped the actual situation.

Part 5.

At present we are making strenuous efforts to hasten the purchase (of the propeller). However we are having the Japanese Musical Instrument officials investigate carefully to what extent it will be necessary to buy such manufacturing rights as will be essential to the manufacture of this propeller, namely, those for the "IG" Company (?wood hardening (process?)) and for the binder material and those for the Schwartz Company wooden propeller blade. On the other hand the Junkers officials are faced with the great problem of German-Manchukuoan cooperation; they have displayed a friendly attitude toward us and will work diligently for the solution to this problem. Therefore we feel that, with reference to the smooth progress in the negotiations on the problem of cooperation between Germany and Mongolia (sic), a sudden change of affairs in Germany will effect a settlement (of this problem).

Part 6.

3. Re: the purchase of manufacturing rights from the Ruhrstahl Company.

In accordance with instructions from Japan, this problem has been entrusted to Naval Engineer OTANI however since OTANI is still carrying on investigations we have not obtained a decision (from him). After two or three weeks, at the very latest, we intend to —6G— with Engineer OTANI.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 4-20-45

No. 22

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY) (War Office Senior Adjutant)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

June 7, 1941  
# 354.

2 Parts Complete.

Part 1.

From the Technical Headquarters General Affairs Department Chief.

Technical Headquarters wire 59.

Reply to Germany technical air wire # 286<sup>a</sup> and Germany technical wire 92<sup>a</sup>.

1. Teletype machines—1 each of the following:

"SH" manufacture FELD FERN SCHREIBER.

"SH" manufacture STREIFENSCHREIBER.

LORENZ manufacture BLATT FERN SCHREIBER.

LORENZ manufacture STREIFEN LOCHER.

LORENZ manufacture LOCHSTREIFENSENDER.

If there be any surplus in the purchase estimate we would like two each.

Part 2.

2. Ultra short wave experimental sending apparatus—One "SH" manufacture PRUFSEN-DER-RELSENDER.

3. Ultra short wave voltmeter—1 each of the following:

"SH" manufacture SPNNUNGSMESSE (sic)—RELMSE—126 A.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

"SH" manufacture SPNNUNGSMESSE-RELMSE—128A.

Please continue negotiations on the ultra short wave electric field intensity measuring apparatus.

---

\* Not available.

Trans. 3-18-45

No. 23

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice Minister of War)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

June 11, 1941  
# 112.

3 Parts complete.

Part 1.

Army China Secret wire. Committee wire 31.

Reply to Committee wire 30<sup>a</sup>.

1. Armor plate 1 meter square:

2 sheets each of the following thicknesses: 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 MM.

Part 2.

2. Optical glass:

"BK"—7-10 tons.

"BJ"—95, 95, 85, -4.5 tons.

"SF"—2-3.6 tons.

"SK"—5-1.5 tons.

Part 3.

"F"—1-4 tons.

"F"—2-2 tons.

"F"—5-2 tons.

"PK"—4-2 tons.

"FK"—5-200 kilos.

KF-2-100 (sic)

"BF"—4-100 kilos.

3. We will send you more details later.

---

\* Not available.

Trans. 3-21-45

No. 24

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY) (War Office, Sen. Adjutant)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

June 14, 1941  
# 005.

2 Parts complete.

Part 1.

Chief of Ordnance Headquarters wire to TATENO MOTASADA. We would like you to obtain the following machines for the manufacture of cog-wheels from the KLINGEN-BERG Company as per German technical air wire # 256<sup>a</sup>. We want you to contract for them as a supplement to German technical wire # 641<sup>a</sup>.

We have already informed the main office of the OKURASHOJI concerning the details of the accessories and the like.

#### Part 2.

Following.

Item: 3 "AFK" 101 spiral bevel gear hobbing machines.

Item: 3 of the same "AFK" 201. 1 each to SAGAMI, KOKURA, and NANMAN<sup>b</sup> arms manufactories. We would like to distribute the following material in Army Ordnance Headquarters Technical German wire # 4<sup>a</sup>.

Item: 1 projectile weighing machine. POLTE company 410 "G".

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

<sup>b</sup>South Manchuria.

Trans. 3-22-45

#### No. 25

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)

July 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNIJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War)

# 580.

Parts 1—3<sup>a</sup>.

#### Part 1.

Committee wire # 40. Following is a summary of the negotiations inquired about in part 5 of military affairs wire # 667<sup>b</sup>.

1. A summary of the first formal negotiations with the officials of the German Economic Ministry.

(1) Date and place.

19 June. Economic Ministry Conference room. Conference about one hour.

#### Part 2.

(2) Persons in attendance.

Japanese officials. Colonel OTANI and Major YOSHIDA.

German Economic Ministry officials. MINISTERIALRAT IM RWM, K. JANKE, F.K.H.ROTH, PEFERENT IM RWM, JARBOT, DIPL TNG IM RWN, F. OBENWUS.

German "OKW" officials. JKW WI RUE AMT, Army Major RADKE, senior super-numerary, representative of the director of the department, (absent because of illness).

#### Part 3.

(3) 1. Major RADKE presented the Japanese officials in Berlin to Colonel BECKER<sup>c</sup> and said that concerning the transfer of materials for liquification (processes) and the "IG" manufacturing rights, there is no objection as far as "OKW" is concerned, and that therefore the Economic Ministry would give this matter special consideration.

2. Colonel OTANI expresses the Japanese officials' desires as follows.

<sup>a</sup>Parts 4-8, 11 not readable; parts 9 and 10 not available.

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

<sup>c</sup>Imperfect text permits "Major RADKE, as Colonel BECKER's representative presented the Japanese officials -----"

Trans. 3-25-45

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 26

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUN JIKAN) (Vice-Minister of War)

May 1, 1941  
# 260.

Re the 21 Howitzer<sup>a</sup> of Army "China" (SI) wire #98<sup>b</sup>.

As the Italian War Department has given its consent regarding the manufacturing rights and also supplying us with several guns (KAHŌ), I am planning to have the business firms carry this into effect upon the conditions laid down in Army "China" wire # 47<sup>b</sup>.

---

<sup>a</sup>Meaning unknown.

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-29-45

No. 27

FROM: Rome (Itrrk)  
TO: Tokyo (Rikugunjikan, Vice Minister of War)

May 14, 1941  
# 270.

The 21 howitzer<sup>a</sup> of Army "China" (SI) wire #98<sup>b</sup>. Although as stated in our former wire Hsinking (SHINKYO) says that even though the sanction of the Italian War Department is obtained, the permission of the (?bureau chiefs?) (?must be obtained?), and that they are now working to speed things up. However, the Company officials desire to have the following conditions apply:

1. Interval (KANKAKU)

Same as given in our wire # 232<sup>c</sup> (check 232)

2. Time of delivery

End of this present year.

3. Other items.

The various interests wish to have the following raw materials furnished:

- (a) Scrap iron 118 (check 118) tons
- (b) Pig iron 50 (check 50) tons
- (c) Nickel 1.63 (check 1.63) tons
- (d) Chrome 930 (check 930) kilograms
- (e) Molybdenum 270 (check 270) kilograms

While "e" can be substituted for "a" and "b", "c" and "e" are absolutely necessary.

To aid us in negotiating for the above we would like to have the following items settled immediately.

1. Will the above date of delivery and the amounts of raw materials to be furnished be acceptable?

2. In obtaining the technicians for the manufacturing processes, we would like to know the number needed, —1G— and the period of service.

3. The kinds of ammunition you wish to purchase and also the manufacturing rights (?desired?).

In case of inability to furnish the raw materials, we are negotiating regarding (?what will be done?)

---

<sup>a</sup>Meaning unknown.

<sup>b</sup>Not readable.

<sup>c</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-30-45

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo (Jtqry, Vice Minister of War)  
TO: Rome

June 6, 1941  
# 109.

Part 5<sup>a</sup>.

Army "China" secret wire.

3. (?We would like?) a considerable quantity of ammunition as a sample. We would not only like to purchase the powder, but would like also to obtain the manufacturing rights.

In the problem of supply of —1/2G— and raw materials, the difficult problem concerns the 21 howitzer<sup>a</sup> manufacturing (?plans?). The main aim is the purchase of manufacturing plans, and we would like to have you carry on the negotiations assigning the purchase of cannon (KAHO) ammunition to second place.

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 1 same number. No other parts available.

<sup>b</sup>Meaning unknown.

Trans. 3-30-45

No. 29

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept)

May 15, 1941  
# 248.

Part 2<sup>a</sup>.

6th, Chief in charge of guiding the Yamashita touring party, Lt. Col. FRIEDRICH WILHELM SCHOLL; 7th, Officer in charge of guiding the YAMASHITA touring party, Maj. ERNST RIEDEL; 8th Air force Commander in Chief Reichsmarshal HERMAN GOERING; 9th, Army Commander-in-chief General Field Marshal WALTER VON BRAUCHITSCH; 10th, Inspector General of National Defense General Field Marshal WILHELM KEITEL; 11th, Army Chief of Staff—General FRITZ HALDER; 12th, Air force Chief of Staff—General HANS JESCHONEK; 13th, Commander-in-Chief of Army Replacement Training—General FRITZ FROMM.

---

<sup>a</sup>Only part available.

Trans. 4-25-45

No. 30

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Moscow (RIKUGUN)

May 22, 1941  
# 277.

Unless there is some sudden change YAMASHITA TETSUJO will leave Berlin 20 June (ck 20-6).

In Moscow he desires to meet the Russian Army Minister, the Chief of Staff and Chief of Air Headquarters. As he intends to (?transact considerable business?) during his stay, please wire the result of your negotiations.

He will be in Italy until 8 June (ck 8-6). As soon as he knows the day and hour of his arrival he should wire us. According to Army Staff wire #834 (ck 834)<sup>a</sup> he expects to arrive in Moscow on 6 June.<sup>b</sup>

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

<sup>b</sup>As given in text.

Trans. 2-1-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## No. 31

FROM: Tokyo  
TO: Rome (RIKUGUN)

June 6, 1941  
# 000.

Secret.

Special.

Please communicate this to Lt. General YAMASHITA.

It has been unofficially decided that you will be appointed as a Supreme War Councillor.—3G— this is confidentially reported to you since it is expected that the order will soon be issued.

Trans. 4 23-45

## No. 32

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO)

July 23, 1941  
# 606.

Parts 1, 2.

2 Parts Complete.

Please transmit to Air H.Q. and to personnel of the old YAMASHITA touring party.

Re progress in bombers.

The high speed bomber speculated on at the time of the RECHLIN (REHIRIN) visit seems already to have been put into trial production, now that details have been completed. There is a certain Japanese working for a commercial concern here who went to the JOHAN-NISTNAI (SIC) plant of the HENSCHEL Corp. on some official business. He noticed that they are manufacturing the main wings there.

Part 2. This plane is known as the "HS" 130. It is twin engined and is equipped with JUNKER experimental engines. Its weight is about 1½ times that of the JU 88; projected ceiling is 16000 meters. Tests up to 13000 meters have been completed.

Judging from this, it is thought that this plane will appear in surprise attacks in the future.

Trans. 3-16-45

## No. 33

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Circular: Tokyo (SUMMER Vice-Chief General Staff)

May 26, 1941  
# 318.

Parts 2 - 4<sup>e</sup>.

(B) Russia, with her present strength, (she has about 180 rifle divisions, and even if mobilization is carried out, problems of overhead and equipment would make it difficult for her to organize more than 200. The number of first-line planes is judged to be 6,000) would find beating Germany no easy matter. Therefore, I imagine STALIN is patient and cautious, possibly waiting for a good opportunity. (Russia's attitude is still neutral. That she is not pro-Anglo-American is proven by all available information.)

Part 3.

(C) For the Germans too, going to war with Russia now while Britain is still alive and fighting, would have the very conspicuous disadvantages of making the management of the small European nations more difficult, of prolonging the war, of extending the area of

operations, and consuming her war strength. Therefore I believe that there is little probability of Germany's voluntarily starting a war against Russia.

2. I think that the talk about a Russo-German war which has recently been broadcast over the German radio has been motivated by secret purposes like the following:

#### Part 4.

(A) Possibly to serve as preparatory measures either for preventing Russian interference in measures which Germany is planning against the Near East, or for acquiring from Russia a great quantity of materials to provide for a long holding war. (And, perhaps, for both of these ends.)

(B) Possibly for the sake of having world attention concentrated on German-Russian relations when Germany carries out landing operations on the British mainland. (I think that the propaganda about halting landing operations is being spread for purposes of deception.)

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 1 not readable.

Trans. 2-23-45

#### No. 34

FROM: Stockholm (STOCK)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

May 30, 1941  
# 202.

#### Part 1.<sup>a</sup>

Main points in new methods of defensive tactics of the Red Army. (BU Intelligence)

1. By using small units, they hinder enemy attacks and counterattacks, and the infantry battalions, in the event of an enemy break-through, have the policy of changing to circular defense (KRUGOVAYA-OBORONA).

2. The units charged with defense tactics are the rifle corps. The disposition is the same for a break-through.

a. Front for rifle division—8 to 10 kilometers (6 to 15 kilometers depending on circumstances). Corps are distributed in depth from 12 to 40 kilometers (reserves kept on hand).

b. Depth for a division—7 kilometers; for a corps 13<sup>b</sup>.

---

<sup>a</sup>Parts 2, 3 and 4 not readable.

<sup>b</sup>Imperfect text permits "15".

Trans. 2-6-45

#### No. 35

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

August 6, 1941  
# 442.

The exchange of information with the Finnish authorities being necessary, please submit occasional reports concerning the activities of Russian forces in the Far East—especially concerning their troops on the Manchurian-Soviet border.

Trans. 1-31-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## No. 36

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)  
TO: Beyoglu (RIKUGUN)

September 26, 1941  
#041.

Part 1.<sup>a</sup>

The situation as regards the Soviet Far Eastern army.

*First.* The Soviet Far Eastern army mobilization was completed about 10 August and it is estimated that its strength is about 1 million men. Although military discipline and morale have tended to deteriorate of late, there are as yet no details as to the internal state of affairs.

*Second.* Present total strength. The forces diverted to European Russia up until about 10 September amount to 8 divisions. (4 of these are diversionary divisions.) There are 1,000 tanks and at the very least, 500 planes, and their strength is about 170,000.

---

<sup>a</sup>Only part available.

Trans. 4-26 45

## No. 37

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

August 6, 1941  
#441.

Part 2.<sup>a</sup>

2. Since there is as yet insufficient data on the matter mentioned in the second paragraph specific details are not clear; the (attitude) of the War Ministry, however, differs considerably. For example, there is an order which has the effect of increasing the trench mortar strength of an infantry regiment (see your wire # 440<sup>a</sup>).

The Russian Army is putting up a stiff resistance because it is waging a defensive war, its forte. As a result of this the Finnish Army is now showing compared to its previous (attitude), a tendency to value more highly the potentialities of mobile warfare.

Since we are just beginning, as of this month, to get the practical experience of the Finnish Army in its war against Russia, we will make reports little after studying the data.

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 1 not available.

Trans. 2-23-45

## No. 38

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

August 15, 1941  
#454.

Part 1.<sup>a</sup>

1. New types of automatic firearms used by the Red Army ("B" (OTSU) Intelligence).
  - (a) '40 type automatic rifle.
  - (b) '40 type super automatic rifle.
  - (c) BERGMANN type automatic pistol (PPD).

2. The automatic rifle is 600 grams lighter than the '38 type and (?8.5?) MM shorter in overall length. (Let us know if you want the details on the method of use of this rifle since we can supply that data.)

\*Part 2 follows separately, as V, 39.

Trans. 3-2-45

No. 39

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

August 15, 1941  
# 454.

Part 2.

3. Details of automatic pistol (prisoner's statement).

- (a) Caliber—7.62 mm
- (b) Over-all length—783 mm (sic)
- (c) Weight—3,149 kilograms (sic)
- (d) The magazine holds 25 cartridges

(e) It has been reported that they were going to equip every rifle squad with one of these weapons, but at present there are only between 2 and 3 to a company. 1st and 2nd Lieutenants and (?guerrilla?) leaders also carry them.

Trans. 3-14-45

No. 40

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Circular (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)

August 24, 1941  
# 469.

Red Air Force Intelligence.

("B" (OTSU) Intelligence—prisoner's statements.)

1. The P-2 divebomber type plane is twin-engined and resembles the ME-110. The tail, however, comes to a sharp point. Very few of these planes have appeared on the eastern front.

- 2. The pursuit plane I-17 is called the MIK-1 (MIKOYAN), the I-18 is called the MIK-2.
- 3. A TB-7 type heavy bomber regiment is made up of three companies.

Trans. 3-2-45

No. 41

FROM: WER  
TO: ?

September 13, 1941  
# 323.

To the Chief of the General Affairs Department (SOMUBU).

From the attache in Hungary.

Re Tokyo wire # 349<sup>a</sup>.

1. The 1st people's defense division and the 1st National Army Division seem to be in the 48th army; however, they are probably last-ditch reserves.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. The Russian army rifle divisions regulation war strength is 18,500; however, now it has declined to between 1,500 and 2,000; at best, it is 3,000. There are 72 full divisions.

<sup>a</sup>Not readable.

Trans. 4-25-45

### No. 42

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) October 10, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.)) # 538.

We have received the following materials from the Finnish General Staff and will send them to you after duplicating them.

1. Complete range tables for the 1938 type 152 MM howitzer.
2. Regulations for Red Army rail transport.
3. Chemical war-fare clothing.
4. 120 MM and 52 MM mortars. (We will copy the range tables if you need them.)
5. A.T. mines "TM" 35 and "TMD" 40 typed.

We are using our allotted funds for this and will ask for more money should we need it.

Trans. 4-21-45

### No. 43

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) May 8, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) # 204.

The German War Ministry has requested us to collect the following intelligence for them as regards Britain. Please report at once any data suitable for use in exchange of intelligence (actual figures as much as possible).

1. Amount of various types of foodstuffs in storage, and degrees of restriction.
2. Degree of decline in production capacity suffered by the various industries because of German bombings.

Trans. 3-8-45

### No. 44

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) May 12, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept.) # 235.

According to what I heard from JAKOBSEN, German military strength (?at present?) amounts to between 9,000,000 and 9,500,000 men. The army has 270 to 275 divisions. From January of this year to the present, 35 new divisions have been organized.

The Air Force has 35,000 planes at present.

Trans. 3 2-45

No. 45

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Hsinking (GUNSANBOCHO)

May 24, 1941  
# 297.

Please send us the gist of the recent activities of BORYS MARKIW and his party, who were sent from a Ukrainian nationalist group here (the KONOVALETZ Party) to Harbin. Also, please let us know the manner in which your army had been treating them. This group is in very close contact with Berlin, and we will act in accordance with your army's plans as far as their activities in the Far East are concerned.

Trans. 2-14-45

No. 46

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Circular (Moscow, Tokyo) (Summer) (Vice Chief General Staff)

May 25, 1941  
# 282.

Part 1<sup>a</sup>.

1. Since the 20th, the Germans have been dropping paratroops on Crete in the area southwest of Canea and south of Candia. These forces at present amount to about 10,000 men and they are at present battling the British troops. The British forces are composed of 2 divisions of Australians and New Zealand troops and some Greek units.

2. On the 20th, the Italian Air Force hit a 10,000 ton cruiser with (a) torpedo(s). On the 21st, the Italian Navy sank a 5,000 ton cruiser, and on the night of the 20th, Italian Navy MASU<sup>b</sup> torpedoed an enemy cruiser. On the 22nd, an Italian destroyer squadron attacked an enemy force composed chiefly of cruisers, and sank a 5,000 ton DIDO class cruiser. Other Italian fleet units sank a 9,000 ton LEANDER class cruiser.

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 2 not available.

<sup>b</sup>Midget subs perhaps.

Trans. 2-2-45

No. 47

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS)  
TO: Circular: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief General Staff)

May 26, 1941  
# 319.

"B"<sup>a</sup> Intelligence.

According to intercepted wireless messages, recently 30 (ck. 30) submarines of the Baltic Sea fleet have been diverted to the Black Sea area.

(Ultra secret.)

---

<sup>a</sup>OTSU

Trans. 1-15-45

No. 48

FROM: Stockholm (STOCK)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)

June 11, 1941  
# 208.

Swedish Intelligence.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

"Germany has recently set up a Latvian National Bureau in Konigsberg. Under the aegis of a Latvian named ALPS, it is making Batavia its base for the development of political activity and an intelligence net directed at Russia.

Although ALPS was very astute in his work against Russia as head of the political police bureau in Riga from 1920 to 1930, he resigned because he was suspected of graft. He then operated in industrial areas which brings us down to the present time. He claims that the number of his followers has already reached 3000.

---

<sup>a</sup>Only part available.

Trans. 1-11-45

### No. 49

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Circular: Bucharest, Moscow (RIKUDUN)

June 20, 1941  
# 303.

According to a spy report German Supreme H. Q. has already been located at Konigsberg for about a week. The source is the same as wire 300<sup>a</sup>.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 2 28-45

### No. 50

FROM: Rome (ITRRK)  
TO: Tokyo

May 8, 1941  
# 265.

1. According to a reliable report from Italian government sources, Italy has decided to give assistance to Iraq by sending (her) 4 or 5 (ck. 4, 5) air squadrons. Prior to this (Italy) has also considered the transfer of Italian planes to Iraq —1G—.
2. It has been confirmed that yesterday, 7 May, HITLER and MUSSOLINI held a conference at a certain place in Northern Italy.

Trans. 4-25-45

### No. 51

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept.)

September 14, 1941  
# 432.

Persia Wire # 41.

KO MOUDDAKKER<sup>a</sup> came to Tokyo around 1939 or 1940 and organized a Mohammedan temple there. At the time of the world Mohammedan Congress, he was appointed as a representative of the Netherlands East Indies.

Presently his picture is appearing on propaganda letters from Tokyo in behalf of the Mohammedan federation.

---

<sup>a</sup>Imperfect text at beginning of name.

Trans. 4 23 45

No. 52

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)  
TO: Rome

September 22, 1941  
# 446.

A. In regard to the Russian Army's invasion of Persia:

- 1st: There are 36 tanks, 52 planes and 1 cavalry brigade at Meshed.
  - 2nd: Northeast Persian and Caspian Sea units combine ordinary and inferior equipment and it appears that with the departure of the 83rd (check 8, check 3) Rifle Division (SIDAN) they are mobilizing new forces.
  - 3rd: Air bases are under construction at Sari, Gurgan and Tabriz.
  - 4th: Communication lines are being laid (1) between Tabriz and Dzhulfa; (2) between Tabriz, Ardebil and Astara.
  - 5th: The Russian Army is confiscating rice, wheat and imported silk within the territory it has occupied and is sending these back to Russia.
  - 6th: It appears that England has thus far sent no material and not more than 10 planes to Russia.
- B. In regard to the Persian Army.
- 1st: On the Russian front Persian forces have all been (?wiped out?).
  - 2nd: On the English front the 6th (check 6) and 16th (check 1, check 6) Divisions (SIDANS) and the Teheran government are falling back to Isfahan.
- Addressee: General Staff Headquarters, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.

Trans. 2-17-45

No. 53

FROM: Teheran (PRSRK)  
TO: Rome (RIKUGUN)

September 22, 1941  
# 447.

Russian forces that entered Teheran:

1 cavalry regiment. 1 tank regiment (about 60).

English forces:

1 armored mechanized brigade (partially Indian troops, such as vehicle drivers; greater part of troops, English).

Addressee: General Staff Headquarters, Germany, Italy, Turkey.

Trans. 2-15-45

No. 54

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD)  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (HEAD, GEN. AFFAIRS DEPT.))

May 3, 1941  
# 822.

1. According to a spy report, CROSBY, the English Minister in Bangkok, has received communications from the American authorities.

Following is a telegram which was dispatched to the French-Indo China Governor-General.

"You (French-Indo China Governor-General) will arrive in Corregidor in the Philippines (?tomorrow, the 13th?). We would like you to take the arms and ammunition America has consigned to you. You will —2G— in accordance with ship sailings to Singapore."

2. After investigating the authenticity of the above, please report. Addressed to the General Staff.

SUMITA

Trans. 9-1-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## No. 55

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)  
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN)

May 17, 1941  
# 796.

(Strictly Secret.) We are sending Major AOYAMA KAZUICHI to Siam to work under your orders in the intercepting and deciphering of British and American Army codes used in the South Seas area. He is expected to leave early in June.

Major AOYAMA will have with him Interpreter KAZAMA RYU, operators SATO JIN JURO and BABA TERUKUNI, and employee NAOMIYA NAOYOSHI. AOYAMA will be attached to your office and the others will have the status of attache office personnel.

Trans. 6-16-45

## No. 56

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD)  
TO: Tokyo (Autumn (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.))

May 22, 1941  
# 861.

Intelligence from Japanese Agents who have infiltrated Victoria Point (at the southeast tip of Burma).

1. About 200 GURKHA and Indian troops are stationed there, and they have some light tanks.
2. Central part. There are two emergency airfields, but no warplanes are in evidence. Furthermore, there are no hangers, and planes land but infrequently.
3. In the bay there are some small ships, two of them being gunboats; also there are two destroyer squadrons on patrol.
4. It is rumored that 1000 Chinese troops are stationed at Moulmein.

Trans. 9-21-45

## No. 57

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) (Vice Chief Gen. Staff)  
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN)

July 26, 1941  
# 016.

1st. We have received Siam Special Message # 54 (check 54) and thank you for the timely and valuable information.

2nd. Please report as soon as possible on the following matters relating to the PHNOM PEN BANGKOK RAILROAD:

1. The degree of completion and future prospects of completion of the ARAZANYA-SISOPHON railroad.
2. Situation on equipment for the SISOPHON MONGKOL BOREY railroad.
3. Is through-service between PHNOM PEN and BANGKOK possible from a technical standpoint?

Trans. 2-13-45

## No. 58

FROM: Bangkok  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice-Chief, General Staff, and Vice-Minister of War)

July 31, 1941  
# 021.

Re enemy aggression against French Indo-China.

On the 29th, the Siamese authorities issued the following declaration concerning their general policy.

1. Maintenance of good neighborly relations.
2. They feel that they will not suffer either militarily or economically at the hands of any nation whatsoever.
3. They believe that they need not fear military invasion from any foreign power.
4. A policy of non-intervention.
5. A desire to continue trade with foreign countries as usual.

Items 1 and 4 above represent not only the stand of the Siamese but are items fervently desired as well.

Trans. 2-24-45

No. 59

FROM: Bangkok

November 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (VICE CHIEF, GEN. STAFF)) # 428.

To Lt. Col. MATSUMAE.

1. It is now the rainy season in southern Thailand and although there was considerable rain (I found that) the places you selected as airfields were, on the whole, as suitable as you had anticipated. I will report successively on further developments.

2. The road, together with the bridge on that road, (the one leading from the old road), which (would be used) in invading the TAPEH (TAPE) airfield, is as shown on the photograph you mentioned.

This is addressed to the Vice Chief of Staff and to Saigon.

Trans. 9-1-45

No. 60

FROM: Bangkok

November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo

# 442.

If war centering in Siam breaks out between Japan and Britain the question of Siam's attitude is so delicate that it cannot be written.

Therefore we are sending Lt. Col. YAHARA to make a report. Please get the facts from him.

Trans. 9-7-45

No. 61

FROM: Budapest (OSTWN)

April 21, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief General Staff) # 168.

Since the 23rd, the countries involved in the disposition of the former Yugoslav territory have been discussing the matter at Vienna. Hungary has requested the districts north of the Drava R., the area between the Danube and the Tisza and also the return of the Banat, previously taken from her. Today on the 21st, the chief of G-2 earnestly asked me how Hungary's sister country, Japan, felt on this matter. He said that the Banat area had been controlled by Hungary for 1000 years and that, as opposed to a Romanian population of no more than 10%, the Germans and Hungarians amounted to 52%, including the section west of the Tisza.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The Hungarians feel very strongly about the return of the lost Banat district.

Trans. 2-1-45

No. 62

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Mexico (RIKUGUN)

No date  
# 249.

The report from the Mexican Attaché's Office to Tokyo has been transmitted to us, and we tender highest regards and unending thanks.

In view of the translation capacity of this office (the wires are jammed with messages from all places as a result of the present Japanese-American negotiations), for the present please carry out the following procedure.

1. Please transmit in code only the outline of important events which directly concern us in Washington.

2. Other matter (magazine and newspaper articles dealing with production capacity and the like) should not be transmitted in code. If there are no objections please transmit by other means.

Trans. 6-12-45

No. 63

FROM: Mexico (MXMRK)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

April 28, 1941  
# 140.

Re your wire # 138<sup>a</sup>.

*KARL RTFDJUEY<sup>b</sup>* (?was?) on the passenger-list? He was sent off by ship on April 27th.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not readable.

<sup>b</sup>As sent.

Trans. 4-28-45

No. 64

FROM: Mexico (MXMRK)  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (Head, General Affairs Dept.))

May 1, 1941  
# 141.

On April 27th about 50 Germans (including KARL PEKOWSKI, for whom the German (?Foreign Minister?) made a special request for a visa) sailed from Acapulco aboard the *HEIYO MARU*. On that day the newspapers here published articles playing up the matter (they reported that the above mentioned PEKOWSKI had been carrying on large scale spy activities in Mexico). Since it greatly to be feared that this will attract the attention of the Anglo-Americans, please make all possible arrangements to avoid an unpleasant incident.

Trans. 4-30-45

On the 29th, the Siamese authorities issued the following declaration concerning their general policy.

1. Maintenance of good neighborly relations.
  2. They feel that they will not suffer either militarily or economically at the hands of any nation whatsoever.
  3. They believe that they need not fear military invasion from any foreign power.
  4. A policy of non-intervention.
  5. A desire to continue trade with foreign countries as usual.
- Items 1 and 4 above represents not only the stand of the Siamese but are items fervently desired as well.

Trans. 2-24-45

No. 59

FROM: Bangkok November 8, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (VICE CHIEF, GEN. STAFF)) # 428.

To Lt. Col. MATSUMAE.

1. It is now the rainy season in southern Thailand and although there was considerable rain (I found that) the places you selected as airfields were, on the whole, as suitable as you had anticipated. I will report successively on further developments.

2. The road, together with the bridge on that road, (the one leading from the old road), which (would be used) in invading the TAPEH (TAPE) airfield, is as shown on the photograph you mentioned.

This is addressed to the Vice Chief of Staff and to Saigon.

Trans. 9-1-45

No. 60

FROM: Bangkok November 12, 1941  
TO: Tokyo # 442.

If war centering in Siam breaks out between Japan and Britain the question of Siam's attitude is so delicate that it cannot be written.

Therefore we are sending Lt. Col. YAHARA to make a report. Please get the facts from him.

Trans. 9-7-45

No. 61

FROM: Budapest (OSTWN) April 21, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief General Staff) # 168.

Since the 23rd, the countries involved in the disposition of the former Yugoslav territory have been discussing the matter at Vienna. Hungary has requested the districts north of the Drava R., the area between the Danube and the Tisza and also the return of the Banat, previously taken from her. Today on the 21st, the chief of G-2 earnestly asked me how Hungary's sister country, Japan, felt on this matter. He said that the Banat area had been controlled by Hungary for 1000 years and that, as opposed to a Romanian population of no more than 10%, the Germans and Hungarians amounted to 52%, including the section west of the Tisza.

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The Hungarians feel very strongly about the return of the lost Banat district.

Trans. 2-1-45

No. 62

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Mexico (RIKUGUN)

No date  
# 249.

The report from the Mexican Attaché's Office to Tokyo has been transmitted to us, and we tender highest regards and unending thanks.

In view of the translation capacity of this office (the wires are jammed with messages from all places as a result of the present Japanese-American negotiations), for the present please carry out the following procedure.

1. Please transmit in code only the outline of important events which directly concern us in Washington.

2. Other matter (magazine and newspaper articles dealing with production capacity and the like) should not be transmitted in code. If there are no objections please transmit by other means.

Trans. 6-12-45

No. 63

FROM: Mexico (MXMRK)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

April 28, 1941  
# 140.

Re your wire # 138<sup>a</sup>.

*KARL RTFDJUEY<sup>b</sup>* (?was?) on the passenger-list? He was sent off by ship on April 27th.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not readable.

<sup>b</sup>As sent.

Trans. 4-28-45

No. 64

FROM: Mexico (MXMRK)  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (Head, General Affairs Dept.))

May 1, 1941  
# 141.

On April 27th about 50 Germans (including KARL PEKOWSKI, for whom the German (?Foreign Minister?) made a special request for a visa) sailed from Acapulco aboard the *HEIYO MARU*. On that day the newspapers here published articles playing up the matter (they reported that the above mentioned PEKOWSKI had been carrying on large scale spy activities in Mexico). Since it greatly to be feared that this will attract the attention of the Anglo-Americans, please make all possible arrangements to avoid an unpleasant incident.

Trans. 4-30-45

No. 65

FROM: Hsinking (KLGNB)  
TO: Circular (Moscow)

June 5, 1941  
# 522.

Reference the subject of the wire 211 of the Attaché to Russia (i.e., requesting the cause of the delay in removing the corpse(s) of the Japanese soldier(s) frozen to death in Outer Mongolia).

Of course, we would like to remove these as swiftly as possible. However, at the MIYAKAWA-TSALAPKIN conference on 26 May, MIYAKAWA noted that there were points involved which required further investigation. TSALAPKIN seems to have agreed to this and at the same time gave MIYAKAWA to understand that whereas the border of the area where the incident occurred was unsettled, it might be fixed in the near future. Therefore, we intended to wait a while and see what happened. Hence, assuming that the three remaining corpses are not discovered, we intend to remove at once only the one corpse which has already been found. Furthermore, the receiving point depends on the forthcoming fixing of the border. To avoid any and all mistakes, we feel that *FURATORINOBO*, which already been agreed upon by both their and our border settlement commissions, is a suitable place. When the receiving location is determined, please arrange for an extra 4 or 5 days at least for the presenting of receivers, data, etc., and other preparations.

(To Tokyo for reference.)

Trans. 4-24-45

No. 66

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (RIOJN)  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

September 6, 1941  
# 025.

Secret.

1. The schedule of available ships to Japan from South America follows.

The NOTO MARU, around 4 October, will arrive at Valparaiso, Chile, and depart for Japan. The TŌA MARU will arrive at Rio de Janeiro 22 October; she will leave on the 24th, arriving at Buenos Aires the 28th; she will sail from Buenos Aires 1 November and proceed directly to Japan. We don't know the prospects for available steamers at later dates.

2. If you have trouble obtaining a stateroom, you could probably book passage on a freighter as well as on one of those later ships. Should you decide to make the trip immediately, please advise us at once.

Trans. 6-22-45

No. 67

FROM: Bucharest (RUMAN)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)

September 9, 1941  
# 175.

I received an earnest request from the Romanian Vice Chief of Staff to the effect that his country would like to get raw rubber, even only 7 or 8 tons, from Japan by some means or other.

This is to inform you that I asked him to negotiate with the Tokyo authorities through the Romanian Legation in Tokyo.

Trans. 4-25-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 68

FROM: (?Budapest?)  
TO: (?)

December 8, 1941  
# 414.

To the Chief of Staff.

Attaché resident in Hungary.

This morning I was informed in the name of the Hungarian Foreign Minister and of the Chief of Staff that they felt sure of Japan's glorious victory and they pray for closer concerted action between our two countries. —3G—.

The feeling of the government and people of this country, with which I have come in contact, is that there will be some vicissitudes before (?Japan's arms win the final victory?) This, I am sure, is due to the great effect of the sudden attack.

At present the government and people in general have great faith in the dauntless (?forces?) of the Empire. This is a great boost to our spiritual morale.

Trans. 2-3-45

## c.—Additional Messages Found in 1977.

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) April 15, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUN SHO FUKKAN) (War Office Sen. Adjutant) # 124.

Parts 1 and 2<sup>a</sup>.

Part 1.

Please communicate to Air Headquarters General Affairs Chief.

SUZUKI and 1 (check 1) other official of the Japanese Musical Instrument Company have come to Germany for the purpose of buying the Junkers Company propeller manufacturing rights. In accordance with the latest conditions, namely, that a joint agreement has already been reached between the Junkers Company and the Manchurian Airplane Company, please take the following circumstances into consideration.

Along with the propeller in question we negotiated for various types of supplementary machinery, semi-manufactured products etc., as the goal of the Junkers and Manchurian Airplane Companies' joint undertaking and we came to an agreement with the Germans.

Part 2.

Furthermore there is no objection to the putting into operation of the propeller manufacturing enterprise by Japanese industry. On 24 April 3 (check 3) officials of the Junkers Company will depart for Japan. They will confer with Japanese officials to try to arrive at a decision on the following question: should we set up the Junkers Company in Manchuria as the main plant or would it be better, acting in conjunction with some Japanese Company, to have it become a subcontracting company which will be (? subsidiary ?) to the Junkers—Manchurian Airplane joint concern? Therefore having the Japanese Musical Instrument officials, who recently arrived here, begin negotiations on the matter has created confusion uselessly. In accordance with the results of the conferences with the Junkers officials in Tokyo I believe that an agreement on a subsequent policy will be reached.

---

<sup>a</sup>No other part available.

Trans. 4-13-45

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN, War Office, Sen. Adjutant)

May 20, 1941  
# 270.

2 Parts complete.

To Air Headquarters and to the Chief of the General Affairs Section.

Reply to Air Headquarters wire # 410<sup>a</sup> —2G— the "DB" 603 type motor.

Negotiations regarding the purchase of this type of new ordnance (HEIKI) was opened on 2 December of last year, and on 21 January of this year we received a written reply from GOERING, which was fundamentally in concordance with our proposal.

Since then we have conferred with the people concerned at Air Headquarters and the Air Force, concerning the carrying out of this transaction, but they fear there is danger of this new weapon falling into the hands of the enemy during its transport to Japan. So unless there is an absolute safe means of shipping these to Japan, they will not give their consent and hence it is now impossible to conclude the contract.

Part 2. Therefore as we stated in our wire # 162<sup>a</sup> (Committee wire # 18) and # 221<sup>a</sup> (Committee wire # 23) we wish you also to press for a settlement of this problem of transport between Europe and Japan.

Unless this is done, even though we conclude a contract and pay over the money, if the Army office concerned will not permit the goods to be shipped out of the country, we are simply spending foreign currency in Germany to no purpose.

Please give the above-mentioned situation its proper consideration.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 7-31-45

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN) (Vice Minister of War)

May 26, 1941  
# 302.

2 Parts complete.

Part 1.

Committee wire # 28.

1. In the present war the Germans have developed an ultra short wave wireless telephone for use with the armored units. This equipment is perfect and because of the splendid results it has helped achieved it has been installed even on motor cycles. It is provided with a radio shield which cuts out all interference completely.

2. This equipment was perfected recently after long years of research by the BOSCH Company 3LIG .

Part 2.

3. This company is willing to grant us patent rights on this device together with technical supervision for a price of 1,500,000 marks.

4. At this time, when we are beginning to set up armored units in our country, I feel that it is absolutely imperative that we purchase this equipment and install it in every vehicle. Please give this serious consideration.

Trans. 6-17-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Bangkok (SIAMD) June 4, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (Head, General Affairs Department)) # 739.

There are indications that recently both England and America have been working on the solution of Japanese codes. Their hands seem to have even reached into the telegraph offices in this country. Therefore, I feel that it is vital that the Army, Navy, and (? Foreign Office ?) change their codes in general, and also that they construct special difficult codes for ultra-secret use and distribute these to the important places.

For your reference.

Trans. 6 20-45

FROM: Tokyo June 6 1941  
TO: Rome (Rikugun) # 109.

Part 1<sup>a</sup>.

Army China Secret wire.

Answer to your wire # 270<sup>b</sup>.

1. It will be possible to furnish the raw materials other than nickel. However, it will be possible to furnish an alloy, *nickel-RUTSUPE*, which is a (?copper?) alloy containing 2% of nickel.

If raw materials are furnished, study must be given to the problem of transportation.

2. In obtaining technical aid for manufacturing processes, we would like to obtain two or three men for a period of about one half a year.

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 5 same number. No other parts available.

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

Trans. 3-29-45

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY, Vice Minister of War) June 6, 1941  
TO: Rome # 109.

Part 5<sup>a</sup>.

Army "China" secret wire.

3. (?We would like?) a considerable quantity of ammunition as a sample. We would not only like to purchase the powder, but would like also to obtain the manufacturing rights.

In the problem of supply of —1/2G— and raw materials, the difficult problem concerns the 21 RYU manufacturing (?plans?). The main aim is the purchase of manufacturing plans, and we would like to have you carry on the negotiations assigning the purchase of cannon (KAHO) ammunition to second place.

---

<sup>a</sup>Part 1 same number. No other parts available.

Trans. 3-30-45

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (Autumn) (Head, General Affairs Department)

June 17, 1941  
# 410.

Today, the 17th, Col. HAYASHI interviewed the code chief of the ABWEHR and discussed with him questions of future operations. There Germans are anxious to work closely with Japan in view of the present situation and both men agreed that they should begin with the solving of Russian codes.

We would like to know when interpreters SEKIMOTO and TAKAHASHI will be able to leave.

DoD Comment: See Vol. III, Part C, Section 465 for related information.

Trans. 6-25-45

FROM: Berlin (Japanese Ambassador)  
TO: Tokyo (Foreign Office)

June 21, 1941  
# 739.

Regarding my 1728<sup>a</sup>.

In case it is clear that as a result of the talks between Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Ambassador Abetz, there are no prospects of any success, am I to understand that in accordance with your circular 2134 (?), I am to refuse their assistance? Please reply to this.

On the 20th, I had a conversation with RI<sup>b</sup>, at which time I told him that in case there did not seem to be any prospects of the actions of German assistance, Japan was considering taking suitable steps. "RI" asked, "What kind of steps," I replied that there were no instructions as yet.

However, conditions will arise under which Japan, in achieving her individual ends, might find it convenient to make use of Germany, and I believe that it would be expedient for Japan to outline very clearly the steps she plans to take under such circumstances.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

<sup>b</sup>Ribbentrop.

Trans. 6-25-41

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN, Vice Minister of War)

June 1941  
# 478.

(?Part 1?)<sup>a</sup>

Committee wire # 38. Following are the results up to the present of an investigation concerning PO<sup>b</sup> company cartridge cases.

1. There is a possibility of introducing the manufacturing process for these cartridge cases into Japan (there is no patent on it).

2. We will obtain technical experts. We are limited to 3 types, a —1G— of a caliber of 7.7 mm., a 47 mm. anti-tank gun, and a 75 mm. in the above calibers in our estimated requirements please let us know immediately.

3. After reaching an agreement, it will be possible to get practical instruction in the PO<sup>b</sup> matter of sending technical experts to Japan from Germany who will supervise manufacture.

---

<sup>a</sup>See Part 2, next message.

<sup>b</sup>Probably POLTE.

Trans. 3-30-45

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN (Vice Minister of War))

June 26, 1941  
# 478.

Part 2.

4. The nature of the steel to be used will be revealed by the PO<sup>a</sup> Company following the completion of the contract. Patent rights for the steel used by this company are held by KRUPP and we are negotiating separately with KRUPP to acquire the manufacturing rights.

5. In order to study manufacture and to produce the necessary production equipment, it will be necessary to have the official drawings of the brass cartridge cases for the calibers mentioned above. We want to have these sent as soon as the means of transport is determined.

6. The estimate for the manufacturing (?rights?) including testing apparatus for the manufacturing equipment of the Navy's OERLIKON 20 mm high angle machine cannon is 400,000 marks. For your reference.

---

<sup>a</sup>Probably POLTE.

Trans. 6-26-45

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)  
TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN (WAR OFFICE, SEN. AD-  
JUTANT))

August 14, 1941  
# 099.

2 Parts Complete.

Part 1. Berlin technical wire (Berlin Technical Headquarters wire # 68<sup>a</sup>).

To the Chief of the Technical Headquarters.

1. High-frequency —2G—

We are reporting, for your reference, the results of experiments in regard to the reflection of electric waves by airplanes.

Wave length used: 20 meters

Plane used: KJ 32 type (—1G— for sports use) 180.

Flying altitudes: 200, 500, 1000, 2000 meters.

The effect of the plane, which is over the receiving station is measured with a distance of 35 kilometers between the sending and receiving stations. As a result of these tests it has been determined that calculations in regard to the DOPPLER effect are in exact agreement with actual results and that the volume of reflection from the plane, although differing in accordance with the location and altitude of the plane is about half that of the waves sent up from the ground.

Part 2. Although nothing has been reported here in regard to long waves; England and America, as reported in Berlin technical wire # 12<sup>b</sup>, are, contrary to expectations, actually using (extremely?) long waves. This field seems to require study as well.

---

<sup>a</sup>Could be "88".

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

Trans. 7-9-45

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice Minister of War)  
TO: Berlin (RJKUGUN)

September 5, 1941  
# 393.

Parts 1 and 2.

Part 1.

Committee wire # 44.

Re: (?Your wires?) # 46<sup>a</sup>, 51<sup>a</sup>, and 55<sup>a</sup>.

1. There has been no change in our resolution to acquire the "IG" process. However, since we don't know Germany's conditions for the transfer of patents concerned in this matter, we cannot proceed in our studies in regard payments, etc., and find it extremely difficult to make suggestions in regard to the application of the (?terms?) of the economic pact. Since this is the situation, please refer to paragraph # 2 and then begin negotiations through the ambassador—and please be sure at least to try to get Germany's fundamental approval and to sound her out on the conditions which will be imposed.

Part 2. On August 29 the following requests were made to WOHL TAT —3G—:

(a) The Japanese Army is extremely anxious, even after so many years, to acquire the "IG" patent rights.

Trans. 9-9-45

FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY (Vice-Minister of War))  
TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN)

September 5, 1941  
# 393.

Part 4<sup>a</sup>.

He replied: "Although I suppose it is because it was merely added that Lt. Col. YOKOTA, who is in Berlin, will handle the matter, there has been no report that he has been chosen as negotiator. We are in accord in regard to the "IG" transfer; however, there is the fact that, just as Japan feels about America, Germany, for her part, does not wish to goad (? her enemy?).

4. Since we are still studying the question of acquiring synthetic oil materials, we will wire you later in that regard.

---

<sup>a</sup>Parts 1 and 2 same number; part 3 not available.

Trans. 9-10-45

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (War Office Sen. Adjutant))  
TO: Berlin (Rikugun)

September 5, 1941  
# 980.

3 parts complete.

Part 1. Air Headquarters wire. Reply to Berlin wire # 687<sup>a</sup>.

1. We have decided upon the purchase of the JUNKERS propeller; therefore, please take the following steps to close the contract immediately.

2. After purchasing the samples, machinery, plans, and the like immediately for the home production of this propeller, you will make arrangements for sending them to Japan, using German shipping facilities. You will contract for the purchase of as many as possible, considering the danger of sinkings while en route to Japan.

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

3. Please have a minimum number of these plans duplicated and have SUZUKI of NICHIGAKU<sup>b</sup> carry them to Japan. He will return to Japan by the same means used by diplomatic couriers.

4. After completing the contract with —1G—, Engineer SANUKI of NICHIGAKU<sup>b</sup> will remain for training in the (German) factory.

## Part 2

5. Since it is necessary from the standpoint of formalities concerning the remittances, etc., in Japan, please report immediately the minimum list of goods which are being sent and the estimated potential home production as referred to in paragraph #3, as well as the amount of money necessary for the articles and contract purchases, etc., as outlined in paragraph #2.

6. After the amalgamation of the JUNKERS Company with the MANHI Company, because the JUNKERS' obligations will be transferred to the MANHI Company. . . .

## Part 3.

it has been decided that we will receive the transfer of the patent rights for this propeller from MANHI for a sum of money.

For the present please contract for these patent rights to be used only by the NICHIGAKU<sup>b</sup> Company, and, because of this, bear in mind the necessity for keeping the contract price low. Colonel IJIMA was advised of this matter by MUHLEN, Director of JUNKERS.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

<sup>b</sup>Abbreviation for NIPPON GAKKI SEIZO HAMAMATSU.

Trans. 6-22-45

FROM: Tokyo  
TO: Singapore

September 6, 1941  
# 249.

(Secret.) Message to Batavia # 558<sup>a</sup>.

The APC wired to RA that if it would pay the expense in advance, permission would be given for the loading of the Eiyo Maru which has been anchored at Singapore since September 2 for the purpose of taking on Tung oil and gasoline, and so on the 3rd of this month, RA remitted 800,000 yen to the Bank of Java through the Yokohama Specie Bank. I understand that although this money has already been transferred to the BPM, no permission has been issued for this ship. The ship is still waiting. If the money has been paid to the BPM, will you please request the authorities in your city to issue a permit at once for the loading of the same and then let me know the results.

---

<sup>a</sup>See Vol. III, Appendix Message Number 1163.

Trans. 12-9-41

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice Chief, Gen Staff))

September 20, 1941  
# 196.

Parts 1-6 complete.

Answer to your wire # 949<sup>a</sup>.

A. Today, the 20th, I conferred with the German Attaché. We exchanged opinions in a round-about way, without making direct statements. His ideas are more or less as follows:

1. Britain would probably actually welcome a Japanese attack on Russia, as she would think that it would lighten the pressure on her south. Nevertheless Britain and America would probably continue their aid to Russia (of which the quantity is very small). In case of a northern advance by the Japanese Army, he feels America's attitude would be more or less as you estimate in 1 of your wire.

Part 2.

2. Two of your wire tallies with the German Attaché's opinions. He even goes on to say that even though the Japanese Army should invade the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, America would probably not force even a political or commercial war with Japan, provided that the Japanese Army does not directly attack the Philippines or block the shipment of tin, rubber and the like from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

Part 3.

He continues, if Japan should reserve these products like tin and rubber for her own exclusive use, America might declare war against us with little delay, but it is more probable that even in this case America would hesitate for a long time, giving Japan an interval which we would have to use for the assiduous collection of materials of war such as, for one, gasoline.

3. 3 and 4 of your wire coincide with the opinions of the German Attaché.

Part 4.

B. My opinions on the foregoing:

1. America is maintaining her traditional far-eastern policy, devoting her best efforts to upholding and augmenting her power in the Far East, particularly in the South Seas, and to insuring the transport of war materials to England from the South Seas, Australia, and India. Therefore, if the Empire should drive southwards I doubt that America would look on unconcerned.

Part 5.

I mean, as I have set forth in previous wires, # 159<sup>a</sup> and others, that although America would not force Japan into a decisive war, she would, quite possibly, sever economic relations, or start a commercial war, or take some action along that line.

2. The greater part of your wire # 949<sup>a</sup> coincides with the views which the German Attaché has frequently expressed to us. The German Councillor and Naval Attaché also agree that an invasion of the Dutch East Indies by the Imperial Forces would probably not occasion a Japanese-American war.

Part 6.

However German and Italian, especially German, estimates on the U.S. are almost always over-optimistic and, at times are of such a nature as to make one think them deliberately planned for the purpose of impelling the Imperial Forces into a Northern or Southern Drive.

---

<sup>a</sup> Not available.

Trans. 5-2-45

FROM: Tokyo (Nerns (Vice Chief, Gen. Staff))  
TO: Washington (RIKUGUN)

September 20, 1941  
# 949.

Parts 6 and 7<sup>a</sup>.

Part 6. Recently, in order to boast to Japan of her unlimited economic strength, America has extended export permission to include even foodstuff, fibres, finished articles, etc., from the Philippines. However, from an overall viewpoint, whether or not a certain amount of goods leaks out of the Philippines into Japan is a question of no great importance. Finally, as a device to

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

bluff Japan and to conceal her own lack of power, there has recently been a great deal of editorializing in American newspapers on the question of sending aid to Russia via Vladivostok.

Part 7. The opinion is widely expressed that it would even be all right to risk war with Japan by shipping via ports other than Vladivostok—for example, (?Amur?) River ports. However, this seems to be merely a device for testing the mettle of the American people. Since 1918 the American Government has depended chiefly on a policy of bluff and intimidation. Even today, it believes that it can mask the actual facts of America's handicaps, but this is a great mistake.

\*Parts 1-5 not available.

Trans. 7-23-45

FROM: Washington (Nomura)  
TO: Tokyo

October 3, 1941  
# 894.

In 4 parts, complete.

Although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U.S. talks have finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through.

The general public has been becoming more and more favorable to the President's foreign policy, until today it is being supported overwhelmingly. The program of war time industrial production has been making satisfactory progress, and it may be said that the general public is taking a more optimistic view of the European war. This last is due to the surprisingly good showing the Soviet Union has been making in her war efforts. The United States is well satisfied with that.

At the same time, however, both the United States and Great Britain are fearful lest the Soviet Union enter into an independent peace. The United States and Britain are giving determined aid to the Soviet Union in order to prevent such a peace from materializing, and, if possible, to enable the Russians to hold out over the winter and resume fighting next spring. The Atlantic war has shown a definite turn in favor of Britain; submarine losses have increased and hence, loss to shipping has dropped radically. Due to the vastly strengthened air arm of the British and because of her power on the seas, England herself is practically safe from invasion.

### Part 2.

That all is not perfect for Germany in the war on her eastern front may be seen from the fact that the various Balkan countries show some hesitancy. At the same time unrest is on the increase in the various occupied areas and Italy's war strength is constantly on the decrease. Apparently it is only through German intervention and pressure that Italy is prevented from entering into a separate peace. The effectiveness of the blockade will increase as the war is prolonged, and the same situation as existed in the last war will probably be brought about.

Such are the optimistic predictions being made here with regard to the final outcome of the war.

Should Germany succeed in bringing about an independent peace with the Soviet Union at this time, Germany would be able to amply reinforce her forces directed toward England. This would place England in a critical position once again and this is probably the one thing the United States does not want. (Translator's note: From this point to the end of Part 2 badly garbled; guess work contained in translation.) For such a development will probably involve the United States very deeply in the Atlantic war and it is possible that the United States would lose ships because of it. If such a situation materializes, the United States would for the

first time realize the imminence of the war to herself and may then—but not until then—take a slightly more conciliatory attitude toward Japan.

From the Japanese point of view, it would be most favorable if the Soviet Union does sue for an independent peace and if, as a result, the Germans launch a new phase of the war on the Atlantic, such developments would undoubtedly have the most favorable effects on U.S.-Japanese relations.

#### Part 3.

It is true that the Konoye message relieved to a certain extent the very critical situation between the United States and Japan for it has a tendency to squelch those few in the United States who advocate going to war against Japan first. This sentiment has been kept smothered since then and at the same time the message did, indirectly, tend to get the United States to become further involved in the Atlantic.

On the other hand, however, the United States has not decreased her economic pressure against Japan one iota. It should be carefully noted that the United States is proceeding along a policy of making this her threatening power. Should the United States continue along her present economic policy, without resorting to the force of arms, she shall gain her objectives of a war against Japan without once resorting to a battle. Moreover, I am of the opinion that unless there is a radical change in the world situation or unless Japan changes her foreign policy, the United States will not alter this policy of hers against Japan.

#### Part 4.

Of the three major topics involved in our negotiations, two have been agreed upon for all practical purposes. (Hull is an advocate of free trade and believes that "bloc" economics is the cause of wars. He is trying to force the British Empire to accept this philosophy at the present time.) Thus the only remaining problem is that concerning the evacuating of our troops. In view, however, of the conditions you referred to in your message # 622<sup>a</sup>, and upon taking into consideration the undoubted confusion in the future of the world, it will become apparent that a complete evacuation would be an impossibility. We do not believe that it will be an impossible task for us to come to some acceptable understanding with the United States at a later date.

In view of the fact that the "understanding" between the United States and Japan hinges on this one point, I would appreciate your giving this phase your further consideration.

Incidentally, in the course of a friendly discussion with a Cabinet official, he advised me that both the President and the Secretary of State are sincere in their desire to bring about an "understanding" between Japan and the United States and that the matter of the removal of the troops is the only thing that blocks the attainment of this goal.

In the opinion that the matter involved is of much importance, I submit my humble opinions concerning it to you.

---

<sup>a</sup> Long 3 part summary of military-political-economic conditions with "free China".

Trans. 7 Oct. 41

FROM: Berlin (GMBRK)

October 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN (War Office, Sen. Adjutant)) #922.

Please transmit to Air Headquarters.

1. As regards joint designing with the "ME" Co., we proposed the designing data as per your recent instructions from Japan. However, after thorough study, the "ME" Co. replied that if they were to incorporate the points requested by Japan, it would be very difficult to get any good

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

results in cruising range. Therefore, please let us know the points on which we can make concessions.

2. Are the civilian personnel coming on the ASAMA MARU to have status as people attached to the Army or to the various companies.
  3. We expect to have our first conference with Dr. MESSERSCHMIDT at Augsburg at the end of this month.

Trans. 5-24-45

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (WAR OFFICE, GEN. ADJUTANT)) October 8, 1941  
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN) #000.

Air Headquarters Wire #1199. From the Chief of the General Affairs Section. Please report this to Lt. Colonel —2G—. From Colonel NAKAYAMA.

1. We understand that 300 kilotons of brass and 100 kilotons of copper have been obtained in Bangkok by special secret means and we have arranged to have the material shipped by the Continental Trading Co.
  2. We ask you to put the —1M— for foreign use into safe-keeping at the attaché's office.
  3. It is planned to have the contract for this matter specially drawn up at Shanghai.

Trans. 9-13-45

**FROM:** Berlin (GMBRK) **TO:** Tokyo (RIKUGUN JIKAN) (Vice Minister of War) **DATE:** October 15, 1941  
**REASON:** #972.

Complete in 2 parts.

## Part 1.

Committee wire # 76. Please transmit to the Chief of the Fuel Section of the Army Ministry and to the Chief of the Fuel Ministry.

In December of last year the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL COMPANY (HOKKAIDO JINSEKI) signed a contract with the RUHR CHEMIE COMPANY for the purchase of the right to use FISCHER SYNTHETIC OIL as the basic material for the manufacture of aviation lubricating oil.

The plans (for the plant) are to be forwarded on the ASAMA MARU through the MITSUI COMPANY in the near future.

According to this contract, the RUHR CHEMIE COMPANY was to send to Japan the equipment and the technicians needed to lead out in operating this process. But the present international situation makes it impossible to send these Germans to Japan and it will also be difficult for the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO. to send technicians to Germany. The foregoing contract —3G—.

## Part 2.

It will be difficult to supply Japan immediately with the desired production equipment, other than the thermal cracking and refining units.

Fortunately Major (? YOSHIDA ?) and Engineers HANAOKA and KINOSHITA of the Army Fuel Department (RIKUGUN NENRYOSHO), in connection with purchase of these rights are expected to be given about one month's instruction in the technique of the process and they can at the same time minutely observe all the details of the operations.

While the importation of skilled technicians would be the proper procedure, the local MITSUI office wishes to make the above suggestion to the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO., and would like to have their opinion regarding this proposal.

As soon as you have contacted the HOKKAIDO SYNTHETIC OIL CO., and the other quarters concerned, please send your answer immediately.

Trans. 7-25-45

FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (War Office, Sen Adjutant))  
TO: Bangkok (RIKUGUN)

October 21, 1941  
# 000.

Military affairs wire # 1001. Reply to your wire # 216<sup>a</sup>.

The industrial diamonds which the SHOWA COMMERCE COMPANY has ordered from the Ordnance Bureau amount to 235 karats. At your convenience, please remit 23874 (?yen?).

<sup>a</sup> Imperfect text allows # 286.

Trans. 9-21-45

FROM: Helsinki (Helgs)  
TO: Tokyo (Summer, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)

October 22, 1941  
# 559.

Complete in 5 parts.

Part 1. Otsu [“B”] Intelligence:

Report on the Russian Army's MIG-1 type destroyer (fighter) plane (Report is based on the statements of captured officer pilots of this plane. It is the same plane which we have been calling the “I-17” type in our country):

1. The power plant consists of 1400 H.P. liquid-cooled (M-35) type engine. It displays maximum power at an altitude of 5,000 meters.

Part 2. 2. The body of the plane is of metal construction and is about 2.64 meters high. The engine and the underside of the fuselage are finished in sheet-copper of a thickness of about 6 mm. Furthermore, for the back protection of the pilot they have constructed a shield 10 to 12 mm thick.

Part 3. 3. Performance:

a. Level-flight speeds.

Maximum—660 K.P.H.

Cruising—580 K.P.H.

b. Rate of climb:

One minute 20 second to get to an altitude of 2,000 meters;

3 minutes to get to an altitude of 5,000 meters;

11 minutes to get to 10,000 meters.

c. Ceiling: 10,000 meters.

d. Time of flight: 1 hour and 40 minutes.

e. Taxing range for takeoff and landing:

Takeoff—about 750 meters,

landing—300 to 350 meters.

Part 4. Armament:

a. Fuselage: Three 12.7 centimeter machine guns on the front part of the plane.

Two 22 centimeter cannon, one on each wing.

Two 50 kilogram bombs.

b. The number of rounds carried for each machine gun is 2000.

Number of rounds for each cannon is 40.

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## c. Rate of fire:

250 rounds per minute for machine guns and 40 rounds per minute for cannon.

## Part 5. 5. Other details:

- a. It is very easy for this plane to tip over on takeoffs or landings; and if by chance one had the misfortune to fall into a tailspin, at 2000 meters or lower it is impossible to pull out of it.
- b. The cooling apparatus is of two types, the large and the small. The small type is put on both wings, and the large type is on the underside of the engine. Since they have no (protective) coverings, it is a good idea to direct one's fire at them.
- c. Only veterans of over four or five years' experience are used as pilots for this plane.
- d. The fuel used has an octane rating of 90.
- e. Places where this plane is manufactured include Leningrad and Voronezh.

Trans. 7-12-45

FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) October 23, 1941  
TO: Tokyo (Summer (Vice Chief, General Staff)) # 560.

4 parts complete.

## Part 1. OTSU ("B") Intelligence:

Report on the Russian Army's "IL" type assault plane (source of report same as that of Finnish wire # 559):

1. This plane is a low-wing monoplane type with twin engines. The front half of the fuselage is of metal construction; the latter half of wood construction.

### 2. Performance:

#### a. Speeds:

maximum—520 K.P.H.

cruising—480 to 490 K.P.H.

#### b. Taxiing range—for takeoff—250 to 300 (meters).

## Part 2. 3. Armament and equipment:

a. Five 12.7 MM machine guns; two 22 MM cannon; in addition to these a 500 kilogram bomb. Two tanks for scattering gas.

b. Four of the machine guns are on the front part of the fuselage. One machine gun is set to be able to fire from the forward underside (this machine gun presents an angle of 45 degrees with the fuselage).

d. A cannon on each (side of the) wing.

e. The gas tank(s) are to the rear of the wheel.

## Part 3. 4. Armor:

a. The front half of the fuselage is protected by steel plate 7 to 8 mm thick.

b. A protective shield for the pilot has been constructed around the seat (12 MM in thickness). In addition to this there is a (cockpit) cowling which can be swung open and shut at will.

c. This (cockpit) cowling consists of a glass plate 180 MM thick which is impenetrable by small-arms fire.

## Part 4. 5. Other details:

- a. Power plant: "V" type 18-cylinder engines, but the other data about them are not known.
- b. This plane has very excellent maneuverability.
- c. A hard-surfaced airfield is required for this plane.

<sup>a</sup>Item "c" omitted in text.

Trans. 7-13-45

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)  
TO: Tokyo

November 4, 1941  
# 224.

Although I am of the same opinion as that expressed in wire # 194<sup>a</sup> from the Attaché resident in Mexico regarding the Attaché Conference, when the Conference convenes I would like to have attention given to the following items:

1. As relations between Japan and America are at the present time extremely tense, I would like to have the time (?agenda?) etc. of the conference given careful attention.
2. As the Empire appears to be about to make its final decision in its policy toward the United States, it is our most earnest desire that if possible a diplomatic representative from the Central Government be sent to this Attaché Conference.

This is addressed to the Vice Chief of Staff.

---

<sup>a</sup>Not available.

Trans. 8-6-45

FROM: Tokyo (Tixns (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.))  
TO: Stockholm (Rikugun)

November 12, 1941  
# 058.

2 parts complete.

1. After the Japanese government's —1G— Poland one of the Polish officers remained while the others broke their contracts on orders from the home government and withdrew to Egypt.
2. The officer remaining is a 1st Lt. on active service (MICHISLAV NICOLAEVICH SZKOLA (SHIKORA) (he is in HSINKING with 4 children) and at present is engaged in vital work in the KWANTUNG Army.
3. Because of this man's wishes and also for reasons of espionage, the KWANTUNG Army had this 1st. Lieutenant remain. However, he is anxious about his position because he received no formal approval from the Polish War Ministry to his withdrawal from the military lists. Therefore we would like you to work through Polish officers in contact with your office in order to arrange for official recognition by the Polish War Ministry authorities of the separation from the service of the above 1st Lt. Then, see that the proper response is transmitted to this man through the Polish consul in Harbin or Shanghai.

Trans. 3-21-45

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## PART D—SPECIAL STUDIES

### 1. The "Winds" Code Messages.

On November 19, 1941 Tokyo sent to the Japanese Embassy in Washington the "Winds" code which was to be used as a signal for the immediate destroying of all secret papers in the event that diplomatic relations were severed with the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. The key *sentences* were to be given in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language shortwave *news* broadcasts, with each sentence repeated twice. In addition, key *words* were to be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the Japanese *general intelligence* broadcasts. The messages, which were translated by American cryptanalysts on November 28 and 26, 1941 respectively, are as follows:

#### No.1

FROM: Tokyo November 19, 1941  
TO: Washington Circular # 2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

- (1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.<sup>a</sup>
- (2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.<sup>b</sup>
- (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.<sup>c</sup>

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

---

<sup>a</sup>East wind rain.

<sup>b</sup>North wind cloudy.

<sup>c</sup>West wind clear.

Trans. 11-28-41

#### No.2

FROM: Tokyo November 19, 1941  
TO: Washington Circular # 2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.), "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

Trans. 11-26-41

On November 28, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations received the following dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with copies going to the Commandants 14th and 16th Naval Districts and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet:

No. 3

FROM: CINCAF For Action: OPNAV  
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1941 Information: COMSIXTEEN, CINCPAC, COMFOURTEEN  
281430

FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS *REPEATED FIVE TIMES AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS*<sup>a</sup> WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA AND NEI XX ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE FOREIGN NEWS BROADCASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED TWICE IN THE MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS WILL BE USED XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI XX ENGLAND X NISHI NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND COMSIXTEEN MONITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS

<sup>a</sup>THIS IS IN MORSE CODE

Major (now Colonel) Wesley T. Guest, United States Army Signal Corps, requested on November 28, 1941 that the monitors of the Federal Communications Commission be on the lookout for certain weather messages in the Tokyo broadcasts. Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, was to be advised if any such messages were intercepted. The following are the weather messages Major Guest requested the Federal Communications Commission to monitor:

No.4

- GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
- GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
- GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
- GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST<sup>a</sup>

On December 4, 1941, at approximately 2200 GMT, a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 was intercepted by Federal Communications Commission monitors. Since the Federal Communications Commission was not able to get in touch with Colonel Bratton, the message was delivered at 9:05 p.m. EST, December 4, 1941, to Lieutenant Brotherhood, Op 20-G Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office<sup>b</sup>. Although the message referred to the weather, it did not contain the phrases which would indicate the severing of diplomatic relations by Japan. The message is as follows:

<sup>4</sup>Memorandum from T. J. Slowie, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, dated August 18, 1944, Washington, D.C., paragraph relating to Document No. 1.

<sup>b</sup> Op. cit., paragraph relation to Document No. 2.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

### No. 5

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT  
TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON  
MORE CLOUDS

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY  
CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

On December 5, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations received the following dispatch from the United States Naval Attaché in Batavia for delivery to the War Department:

### No. 6

FROM: ALUSNA BATAVIA  
DATE 5 DECEMBER 1941

For Action: OPNAV

031030

FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT:- JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END. EAST WIND RAIN UNITED STATES; NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA; WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES. WILL BE REPEATED TWICE OR MAY USE COMPASS DIRECTIONS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WORDS WILL BE INTRODUCED FIVE TIMES IN GENERAL TEXT.

G LFS

DISTRIBUTION:

FILES: CNO. 20 OP...

WAR DEPT... ACTION

20A

RECORD COPY: 20G.. SHOW OPDO..

On December 5, 1941, at 2130 GMT, another weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 was intercepted by Federal Communications Commission monitors and at 0750 p.m. EST, December 5, 1941, was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence.<sup>3</sup> This message, which follows, apparently did not relate to the "Winds" code, established by the Japanese.

---

<sup>3</sup>Op. cit., paragraph relating to Document No. 3.

### No. 7

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (Repeated 3 times)

On December 8, 1941, between 0002 and 0035 GMT, two weather messages were intercepted by Federal Communications Commission monitors from Tokyo stations, JLG4 and JZJ. These messages were telephoned to Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, United States Army Signal Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8:00 p.m. EST, December 7, 1941, long after the attack had been made against Pearl Harbor.<sup>4</sup> The messages indicate that Japan was breaking diplomatic relations with England:

---

<sup>4</sup>op. cit., paragraph relating to Document No. 4.

No. 8

*English*

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE  
NEWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT  
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE THE  
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR  
WEST WIND, CLEAR

*Romaji*

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE  
GOZAIMASU GA HONJITSU  
WA TOKU NI KOKO DE  
TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE  
MASU

*NISHI NO KAZE HARE*  
*NISHI NO KAZE HARE*

No. 9

*English*

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE  
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT  
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE  
WEATHER FORECAST:

WEST WIND, CLEAR  
WEST WIND, CLEAR

*Romaji*

NYUSU NO TOCHU DE  
GOZAIMASU GA KYO WA  
KOKO DE TOKY NI TENKI  
YOHO WO MOSHIAGE MASU

*NISHI NO KAZE HARE*  
*NISHI NO KAZE HARE*

It will be apparent from the foregoing that American intelligence agencies throughout the world were maintaining a constant watch in order to intercept a "Winds" code message which would indicate that Japan was breaking off relations with the United States. However, the Federal Communications Commission has no record of intercepting a message other than those mentioned above which indicate, after the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun, that Japan would break off relations with England. Furthermore, there is no document in American Communication Intelligence files which indicates receipt of any "Winds" code message announcing the severance of relations between Japan and the United States.

The preliminary "Winds" code messages pointed only to the breaking of relations with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, and gave no hint as to the possibility of an attack upon Pearl Harbor. In the light of all other evidence available concerning Japan's intentions to go to war, it is apparent that even if the "Winds" messages had never existed, United States' authorities would have been just as well informed of Japan's intentions to go to war.

DoD Comment: Article originally prepared in November 1945. Republished without changes or additions.

## 2. The "Stop" Code Messages.

In addition to the "Winds" code, which had been established as a means of informing Japanese representatives throughout the world that relations between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Great Britain were to be broken, Tokyo set up another code on November 27, 1941. This code was known as the "Stop" code for the indicator on each message of this type was to be the English word "Stop" rather than the Japanese word "Owari" (end). This message follows:

### No. 1

FROM: Tokyo November 27, 1941  
TO: Washington Circular # 2409.

(In 4 parts, complete.)

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular # 324.

(Washington send to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

#### Part 1.

Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

*Example:* A message meaning:

"Japan and U.S.S.R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English words S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

#### Part 2.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (of consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and . . . . .(blank). . . . .have been severed.
HATTORI	Relations between Japan and . . . . .(blank). . . . .are not in accordance with expectation.
HIZIKATA	Japan's and . . . . .(blank's). . . . .military forces have clashed.

#### Part 3.

<i>Code Word</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
HOSINO	Japan and . . . . .(blank). . . . .are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you —?— the . . .(blank). . .matter?
ISHIKAWA	I have —?— the . . .(blank). . .matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing military action ? against . . .(blank) . . .
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of . . .(blank). . .nationality.
KODAMA	Japan
KOMIYAMA	China
KOYANAGI	England
KUBOTA	U.S.S.R.
KURIBARA	France (?)
KUSUNOKI	Germany
MUTUTANI	Italy
Part 4.	
MINAMI	U.S.A.
MIWATA	Canada
MIYAZAKI	Mexico
MOROKOSI	Brazil
MOTIZUKI	Panama
NAGAMINE	Argentina
NAKAZATO	Thailand
NANGO	French Indo-China
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East-Indies
OGAWA	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO	Malaya
OKUMURA	Australia
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODERA	Enemy country
OTANI	? (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI	Year
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki Month
SIGENOI	(KŌ) Paragraph
SANZYŌ	(Toki) Time
ITIRO	1
NISAKU	2
SANTARŌ	3
YOITI	4
GORŌ	5
MASAROKU	6
SIMETARŌ	7
YASOKITI	8
HISAMATU	9
ATUMI	0

Trans. 12-2-41

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On December 7, 1941, Tokyo sent Circular # 2494 to Hawaii, Honolulu, New York, Vancouver, Ottawa, San Francisco, Portland, New Orleans, Seattle, Chicago and Los Angeles. This message, using the "Stop" code, read as follows:

No. 2

SF DE JAH

621 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG      S 7 DEC 41      5651

KOSHI PANAMA

URGENT 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HATTORI MINAMI  
KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASI  
STOP—TOGO

1208 S JP

7630

S 387/7 850S GR23

This message was translated by American cryptanalysts from a teletype copy of the intercept on December 7, 1941, as follows:

No. 3

FROM: Tokyo

December 7, 1941

TO: (Circular telegram)

Circular # 2494.

(Plain Japanese language using code names.)

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Trans. 12-7-41

In comparing the text of this message sent on December 7, 1941, and the message establishing the code, it will be noted that three of the code words were used:

KOYANAGI—England

HATTORI—Relations between Japan and ----- (blank) ----- are not in accordance with expectation

MINAMI—U.S.A.

It is not possible to determine whether the omission of the word "MINAMI" (U.S.A.) was due to an oversight on the part of the translator or to an error in the transmission of the intercept by teletype.

DoD Comment: Article originally prepared in November 1945. Republished without changes or additions.

## PART E—SUMMARY PARTS A OF ALL FIVE VOLUMES

### SUMMARY OF THE HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

Relations between the United States and Japan were growing worse rapidly by the middle of February 1941. The two countries were already in opposite camps. Hostile words, suspicious accusations were rife. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuko Matsuoka, asserted that his country would unswervingly hold to its plan for co-prosperity. "Has America", he cried on January 27, 1941, "any right to object if Japan does dominate the Western Pacific?" United States Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was warned that Pearl Harbor was in danger of attack, while nervous Japanese in Honolulu secretly informed Tokyo on February 15 that the United States might declare war on Japan within three weeks.

In this martial atmosphere a new Japanese Ambassador, Kichisaburo Nomura (an admiral Feb. 14 and not a career diplomat) was introduced to President Roosevelt on February 14, 1941. The meeting was formal but cordial. The President regretted the hostility of the Japanese press and the statements of certain politicians; he complained of Japan's war-like actions, especially the steady encroachment upon Asiatic countries and in particular the southward pressure upon French Indo-China. The Ambassador agreed with the President that relations between the two countries were deteriorating. Though realizing that the militarists in Japan endangered efforts to improve relations, Ambassador Nomura emphatically desired to achieve peace. The two men concluded the meeting hopefully.

Mar. 8 On March 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull. The discussion soon went to the root of their troubles—economic problems and the embargo acts. After reviewing his belief in liberal commercial agreements which avoid trade difficulties and so eliminate the chief cause of conflicts, Secretary Hull complained of the current tendencies to violence. Ambassador Nomura, dismissing the war cries of Foreign Minister Matsuoka as political fodder for home consumption, hoped that peace might be made with China. The Ambassador suggested that the United States lighten the embargoes, which Secretary Hull implied had been imposed in an effort to stop Japan's military expansion. Ambassador Nomura denied that Japan desired military conquest. Her desire was for good trade relations, and the acts of embargo, far from checking her military expansion, were forcing it upon her. When asked if the Japanese would advance against Singapore and the Dutch East-Indies, Nomura said no, "unless circumstances make it unavoidable", i.e., continuation of the embargo. But it was the opinion of Secretary Hull that Japan's agreement with the Axis rather than the embargo would force Japan into aggression to the south.

Ambassador Nomura did not succeed in his efforts to show that the bone of contention was wholly economic, that Japan had no purely military or political ambitions despite her ties Mar. 14 with the Axis. In a second meeting with President Roosevelt, on March 14, 1941, the President would not accept the Ambassador's explanation of the "New Order" as a device to give the Japanese free access to raw materials in the Orient. Rather, Japan's tie to the Tripartite Pact convinced most Americans that the three countries were planning a world grab—Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Indian Ocean to fall to Japanese aggression. It was up to Japan, the President and Secretary Hull agreed, to prove her good intentions, to prove that economics and not politics were her concern. Removal of embargo restrictions was a most important consideration to the Japanese; the Ambassador seemed to feel that there was some hope on this point, and he reported to Tokyo that this second meeting with President Roosevelt was pleasant throughout.

A month was to pass before Ambassador Nomura would resume these secret informal talks with Secretary Hull. In the meantime he was busy reporting to Tokyo the state of affairs in America. Americans backed their President in aid to Britain. The bulk of their navy, Ambas-

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

sador Nomura thought, would be concentrated in the Atlantic to convoy ships and bolster the British Isles and, therefore, the United States would be most anxious for peace in the Pacific.

The first proposal to settle Japanese-American relations came not from the officials of either country but from a group of private individuals of both nations. It was presented to the State Apr. 9 Department on April 9, 1941. It sought, among other goals, the resolution of the war in China and an "open door" policy in trade.

On April 14 the Japanese Ambassador revealed to Secretary Hull that he had helped to draw up the April 9 proposal and was ready to use it as a basis for negotiations. The Secretary Apr. 14 too believed that immediate conversations based on this unofficial proposal should now begin.

Meanwhile American convictions about the aggressive policies of Japan were strengthened by the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, which Foreign Minister Matsuoka signed in Moscow on April 13. Japan was now free to turn more of her forces southward. Both Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura were concerned over the American reaction to this pact and hastened to Apr. 16 confer again on April 16, 1941.

On this day Secretary Hull found much of the April 9 proposal acceptable, with some modifications, provided Japan would substitute principles of law and order for methods of violence. He wished the Ambassador to ask his government to consider four principles as a basis upon which official negotiations might begin later. These principles, or points, were:

- (a) Respect for the territory, integrity, and sovereignty of all nations;
- (b) Non-interference in the internal affairs of others;
- (c) Equality, as of commercial opportunity;
- (d) No change in the Pacific status quo except by peaceful means.

Ambassador Nomura seemed disappointed that the Secretary would not at once agree to the April 9 proposals. Secretary Hull, however, would agree to nothing until the Ambassador had communicated with Tokyo and had obtained his government's acceptance, particularly of the four points. On the following day the Ambassador sent the entire proposal to Tokyo, favoring it on grounds that it did not conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that it was a step toward accomplishing peace in the Pacific, and that it would serve as a basis for Japanese-American agreement when the war in Europe ended.

Despite Nomura's claim that the proposal did not conflict with the Tripartite Pact, Tokyo's first concern was to ensure the absolute secrecy of these conversations. An exchange of notes between Tokyo and Ambassador Nomura during the last half of April revealed fear in Tokyo that the public would regard the proposal as contravening the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, since it would check Japan's advance to the south and this would free English and American forces in the South West Pacific for use in the European struggle. Ambassador Nomura, arguing to the contrary, believed that the proposed agreement, besides putting the Japanese in a better position to get raw materials and to terminate the China war, accorded with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. Germany wished the United States to keep out of the war in Europe. If the proposals succeeded, the Ambassador believed that the United States would remain neutral. Failure of the Japanese-American negotiations would mean inevitable war between the United States and the Axis in both the European and Pacific areas.

Tokyo delayed its reply to the proposals of April 9-16. Ambassador Nomura, impatient because he wished to conclude an agreement with the United States before opposition might May 2 develop, visited Secretary Hull on May 2 to explain the delay on grounds of Japanese politics and to reiterate Japan's irritation at the embargoes.

On the next day, May 3, Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied but withheld sanction of the proposals. Instead, he ordered Ambassador Nomura to make an entirely different proposal to May 7 Secretary Hull—a neutrality pact similar to the one recently signed with Russia. On May 7 the Ambassador complied with his orders. Secretary Hull rejected the proposal saying that he would consider only broad principles upon which negotiations might be based. Foreign Minister Matsuoka did not seem cooperative, Hull complained, and had continued making aggressive speeches which conflicted conspicuously with the peace plans of Ambassador Nomura.

After this meeting the Japanese Ambassador informed Tokyo that hedging must cease, that Secretary Hull insisted upon definite and authorized instructions from the government of Japan.

Just when both Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull were at the end of their patience awaiting a definite answer from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka at last, on May 9, sent an official reply to the proposals of April 9-16. The reply set forth six points for discussion—these were the international and neutral concepts of the countries, their attitude toward the war in Europe, their relation to the China Incident, their trade, their economic activities in the Southwest Pacific, and their policies toward political stability in the Pacific.

**May 11** Two days later, May 11, Ambassador Nomura gave part of the proposed terms to Secretary Hull. Both men agreed to treat the proposals only as a basis for negotiations, so that they could truthfully deny any rumor that official negotiations were under way. Secretary Hull again complained of the Japanese Foreign Minister's apparently hostile attitude. He feared, too, that the China situation, which would play a most important part in the discussions, might prove a stubborn obstacle. The Secretary stressed his determination to check Hitlerism and territorial violence wherever they might appear.

The statement that the United States would seek to check Hitler disturbed the Ambassador, for in his report to Tokyo, he said that he would try to soften this American stand. On the whole, he was optimistic over the conversations with the Secretary, even those touching the difficult China question. He had told Secretary Hull that Japan would withdraw her troops from China (except in the North where they would remain on guard against the Communists), and that she would not invade the South Pacific, preferring commercial penetration instead.

**May 12** On the following day, May 12, Ambassador Nomura met Cordell Hull again to present documents giving the remainder of the terms received from Tokyo May 9th. These papers contained many details, elaborating upon the basic proposals, together with some additions and deletions. The United States was to urge Chiang Kai-shek to open peace negotiations with Japan, cutting off aid to him if he refused to negotiate. Japan would offer terms to China on the basis of the "Konoye Principles", which included economic cooperation and a joint front against Communism in the North. The United States and Japan would cooperate in the South Pacific. Japan would adhere to the Tripartite Pact and would prevent nations, not already embroiled, from entering the European conflict.

In the days that followed the presentation of these proposals authorized by Tokyo, Foreign Minister Matsuoka troubled his Ambassador in Washington with numerous changes in the terms of the proposals. The Foreign Minister had also offended Ambassador Grew in Tokyo,

**May 14** Secretary Hull told Ambassador Nomura in a conversation on May 14.

Meeting with the Ambassador two days later, on May 16, Secretary Hull reported that his government viewed the Japanese proposals favorably. The United States was ready to notify Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the basic terms for a Sino-Japanese peace. If China and Japan could reach a settlement, the Secretary saw no serious difficulty in the other terms of the proposals.

**May 20 and 21** In meetings on May 20 and 21 Secretary Hull discussed further the proposed arrangements to accomplish peace between Japan and China, which he held to be an essential preliminary to peace in the Pacific. Peace in the Pacific he wished to make the central purpose of the proposals, so as to encourage businessmen to renew commerce in the seas of the Southwest. This impressed the Ambassador, who reported to Tokyo that support of Secretary Hull's aims would be profitable to Japan.

During this period of discussion and amendment of the proposals, friction increased between the Ambassador and his superior, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who charged that the Ambassador had helped to give Secretary Hull an unfavorable impression of the Foreign Minister's attitude toward the peace discussions. The Ambassador brought up the matter in the next

**May 28** meeting, May 28, with Secretary Hull, who dwelt on Matsuoka's frequent statements stressing Japan's tie to the Axis. However, Ambassador Nomura believed that the Japanese extremists,

led by Matsuoka, would lose all influence once an agreement with the United States and a repeal of the embargoes had been accomplished.

On May 29 the Ambassador sent Tokyo a summary of the conversations from May 16 to 28 inclusive: the United States desired that both countries enjoy equal opportunities in the South Pacific; the United States insisted upon peace terms before she mediated in the China affair; the United States wished to avoid the word "Communism" in China peace texts because of her relations to Russia and China.

Throughout the month of June numerous conferences were held between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and between officials associated with them. The first set of terms authorized by Tokyo had been presented on May 11-12. On May 31 the United States presented to Nomura an American version of the terms. Differences of varying importance occasioned a great deal of bickering. All the while Foreign Minister Matsuoka seemed none too cooperative and most eager that the discussions be kept from the public ear, although the Axis nations had now been notified of them and leaks had occasionally reached the newspapers. On June 2 the Ambassador told Secretary Hull that he found the American proposal of May 31 agreeable, except for some of its wording. The Secretary reiterated his concern over the continued loud talk of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

Disturbed by revisions in wording and policy made by subordinates in a meeting early in June 6 June, the Secretary of State on June 6 gave the Ambassador an unofficial statement in which he noted great differences between the original proposal and its revision, differences which tied Japan closer to the Axis, left her relations with China less satisfactory, and avoided clear commitments of policy in the Pacific.

Continued bickering over the terms of the proposals caused Ambassador Nomura to report to his superior on June 8 that "I and my associates are certainly not optimistic but on the other hand, we are not pessimistic". However, the staff members of the Japanese Embassy in Washington were in disagreement, and the discussions were beginning to bog down in a welter of misunderstandings which would bring the Ambassador to his "wit's end" in another month.

On June 10 Foreign Minister Matsuoka rebuked the Ambassador for taking too much upon himself; he wished to remind the Ambassador that good relations with the United States were not so important as adherence to the Tripartite Pact, according to which Japan would seek to keep the United States out of the war and refrain from anti-Axis measures. The impression must be avoided that Japan would not fight if the United States warred on Germany, he said.

June 15 Reporting to Tokyo a conversation with Secretary Hull on June 15, Ambassador Nomura said that though the United States had not made any worthwhile concessions, the State Department was keeping the press calm and was restraining the efforts of certain Americans who favored a general oil embargo against Japan.

In reply to the ever changing proposals (the Japanese had offered altered versions on June 8 and 15), Secretary Hull requested Ambassador Nomura to call upon him on June 21 in order to receive a new American revision of the proposal. This revision sought to counter the tendency toward the Axis, of which Secretary Hull had complained when he reviewed some of the previous Japanese versions. Included in this American revision was the stipulation that Japan be not obligated to act against the United States if the latter were drawn into the war in Europe.

Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that Japan could not accept this revised proposal, but he forwarded it to the Foreign Minister nonetheless. In a follow-up message the Ambassador listed the three chief obstacles: the United States would not yield on any Japanese proposals regarding the war in Europe and self-defense rights; the United States was opposed to Japanese troops in North China; the United States insisted on commercial non-discrimination for China and the Pacific. Even so, the Ambassador believed that if United States were convinced that Japan sincerely desired peace, she would continue negotiations since she herself was so anxious for a peaceful settlement; and to continue negotiations would be well for Japan also, he added, for a break in relations would cause the United States to freeze Japanese credit and to increase trade restrictions.

Meanwhile, on June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia, which now became one of the Allies. On July 3 in a message to Tokyo Ambassador Nomura urged that Japan stay out of the Russian conflict because participation therein would further damage Japan's American relations. He also added that if Japan moved her army to the south, relations with the United States would become hopeless.

Knowing of Japan's planned aggression into French Indo-China, Ambassador Nomura made every effort to conclude an agreement between Japan and the United States before further aggressions could occur. However, he was helpless because Foreign Minister Matsuoka was delaying his answer to the American revision of the proposals offered on June 21. On July 4 the Ambassador sent a note to Secretary Hull (apparently without authorization from Tokyo) asserting that there were no fundamental differences between the governments to retard the adjustment of their relations. In messages to Tokyo on July 7 through July 14 the Ambassador sent reports about American pacifist activities and especially about the rumored German-British peace plans.

During these days conflict among Japanese statesmen increased. Foreign Minister Matsuoka rebuked Ambassador Nomura on several counts, particularly for the American impression that certain members of Prince Konoye's cabinet were unreliable and that there was dissension in the cabinet.

On July 14 the Foreign Minister finally replied to the American proposal of June 21. The proposal had been accompanied by an oral statement which enraged Foreign Minister Matsuoka since he interpreted it as an attempt by the United States to direct Japanese affairs, to change the attitude and the set-up of the government of Japan. The Foreign Minister poured out his wrath upon the Ambassador, charging that he had let himself be molded by American ideas and had then in turn tried to influence his government. Rejecting the American version, the Foreign Minister now submitted a Japanese revision eliminating some of the American proposals and rewording others. He instructed Ambassador Nomura to emphasize in particular that Japan disapproved the unfriendly actions of the United States against Germany. The presentation of this revision was interrupted by changes in the Japanese cabinet and by the occupation of French Indo-China.

The apparent conflict within the Japanese government became obvious when, on July 17, the cabinet was dissolved. Prime Minister Konoye, retained at the Emperor's request, formed a new cabinet in which Foreign Minister Matsuoka was replaced by Teijiro Toyoda. Ambassador Nomura, despite his previous wish to resign (July 14), was retained in Washington.

**July 18** Conferring with Acting Secretary Welles on July 18, the Ambassador said he felt the cabinet change would improve Japanese-American relations. An exchange of notes between the new Foreign Minister and the Washington Embassy reaffirmed the secret and unofficial character of the Hull-Nomura conversations and discussed some of the points of the proposals. The Ambassador wished most of all to know the views of the new Foreign Office on the war in Europe and on the China Incident. He reported, too, that peaceful penetration of French Indo-China would not disturb America, but that violent aggression would terminate negotiations.

Although Ambassador Nomura and his assistants had frequently assured American statesmen that Japan planned no aggressions in the South, American officials knew from decrypted Japanese messages that plans to take over French Indo-China (peaceful penetration in some interpretations) were now being completed.

On July 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda notified Ambassador Nomura that Japan, having agreed with the Vichy government on the joint-defense of French Indo-China, would begin occupation of the southern part of that country late in July. The Ambassador was to assure the United States that there would be no change in the territorial sovereignty or in the domestic administration of French Indo-China. The Foreign Minister added that the previous cabinet had decided upon the occupation and that he had not yet had time to formulate his own foreign policy. He was particularly anxious that the Hull-Nomura conversations continue and that the United States take no measures such as freezing acts and oil embargoes because Japan would be forced to retaliate and great deterioration in relations would inevitably ensue.

Also on July 23 Ambassador Nomura conferred with Acting Secretary Welles, who repeated what he had told Minister Wakasugi two days before (July 21)—namely, that Japan's policy of occupation was utterly opposed to the policies under informal discussion with Secretary Hull. The occupation of French Indo-China, he said, indicated a policy of conquest, in which this action was but another step in a South Seas offensive. These intentions, he concluded, destroyed any basis for continuing the conversations.

A series of conferences now began in which the Japanese strove to justify their move into Indo-China on grounds of self-defense and of economic necessity to obtain vital materials. They strove both to maintain their claim of peaceful intentions so that the discussions might continue and to stave off further restrictions such as the freezing of funds.

**July 24** On July 24 a conference with President Roosevelt was arranged. Ambassador Nomura at once sent two reports (July 24 and 25) of this conference to his new superior, who was so concerned that he requested a still more detailed report (July 27); and this the Ambassador sent on July 28. President Roosevelt had attributed the occupation to German pressure rather than to economic needs since the United States had continued to supply Japan with such materials as oil (against public wishes) precisely so that Japan might not feel forced to seize the sources of needed raw materials. If oil shipments to Japan were stopped and Japan sought to seize supplies in the Netherland East Indies, conflict would result. The President proposed that if Japan would withdraw her forces from French Indo-China, he would arrange an agreement with the countries concerned whereby Japan would be assured of even larger quantities of needed materials at less expense than could be gotten by violence and at the huge cost of war. Ambassador Nomura was not optimistic because withdrawal would entail loss of face; yet he admitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda that such a step would accord with American practices under the Good Neighbor Policy, in which military force was not used. He had denied that the occupation was the result of German pressure, assuring the President that Japan had taken the step on her own initiative.

On July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets; Tokyo retaliated similarly on the 27th. Public opinion in Japan was so aroused, Foreign Minister Toyoda implied to Ambassador Grew on July 27, that there was little chance of President Roosevelt's proposal about French Indo-China being accepted.

**July 28** On July 28 Ambassador Nomura, after an interview with Mr. Welles, warned Tokyo that Japan was heading for war with many enemies. The warning was underlined by the bombing of the U.S.S. *Tutuila* in Chungking on July 30. The Japanese were so genuinely concerned by the Ambassador's urgent messages that they harkened to his advice and discontinued bombing Chungking for a time (until about August 8).

Germany did not regard the Hull-Nomura conversations favorably. Foreign Minister Toyoda sought to explain Japanese policy in a message to Berlin on July 31. The occupation of French Indo-China was necessitated by economic needs and by political encirclement. It was a heavy blow to the United States, he added. Though Germany might dislike the conversations with the United States, she could not deny, Toyoda asserted, that Japan had restrained the United States from entering the conflict in Europe. The Foreign Minister concluded that Japan's activities were conforming with the Tripartite Pact.

Ambassador Nomura was getting out of touch with Japanese current thinking. He had not been in Japan for months, in which time many events had influenced public opinion and national policy. Complaining that his hands were tied by ignorance of his government's secret policies, he requested on August 4 that an expert both in Japanese and in foreign affairs be sent to assist him in the even more critical days to come. He suggested Ambassador Kurusu.

President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24 that Japan agree to withdraw from French Indo-Aug. 6 China in return for a favorable commercial pact remained unanswered until August 6, when Ambassador Nomura presented terms he had received from Foreign Minister Toyoda the day before. The Foreign Minister hoped now to resume the discussions which had been interrupted since July 14. The proposals offered at that time by previous Foreign Minister Matsuoka had never been presented for discussion. In the meantime affairs had changed for the worse since

Also on July 23 Ambassador Nomura conferred with Acting Secretary Welles, who repeated what he had told Minister Wakasugi two days before (July 21)—namely, that Japan's policy of occupation was utterly opposed to the policies under informal discussion with Secretary Hull. The occupation of French Indo-China, he said, indicated a policy of conquest, in which this action was but another step in a South Seas offensive. These intentions, he concluded, destroyed any basis for continuing the conversations.

A series of conferences now began in which the Japanese strove to justify their move into Indo-China on grounds of self-defense and of economic necessity to obtain vital materials. They strove both to maintain their claim of peaceful intentions so that the discussions might continue and to stave off further restrictions such as the freezing of funds.

**July 24** On July 24 a conference with President Roosevelt was arranged. Ambassador Nomura at once sent two reports (July 24 and 25) of this conference to his new superior, who was so concerned that he requested a still more detailed report (July 27); and this the Ambassador sent on July 28. President Roosevelt had attributed the occupation to German pressure rather than to economic needs since the United States had continued to supply Japan with such materials as oil (against public wishes) precisely so that Japan might not feel forced to seize the sources of needed raw materials. If oil shipments to Japan were stopped and Japan sought to seize supplies in the Netherland East Indies, conflict would result. The President proposed that if Japan would withdraw her forces from French Indo-China, he would arrange an agreement with the countries concerned whereby Japan would be assured of even larger quantities of needed materials at less expense than could be gotten by violence and at the huge cost of war. Ambassador Nomura was not optimistic because withdrawal would entail loss of face; yet he admitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda that such a step would accord with American practices under the Good Neighbor Policy, in which military force was not used. He had denied that the occupation was the result of German pressure, assuring the President that Japan had taken the step on her own initiative.

On July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets; Tokyo retaliated similarly on the 27th. Public opinion in Japan was so aroused, Foreign Minister Toyoda implied to Ambassador Grew on July 27, that there was little chance of President Roosevelt's proposal about French Indo-China being accepted.

**July 28** On July 28 Ambassador Nomura, after an interview with Mr. Welles, warned Tokyo that Japan was heading for war with many enemies. The warning was underlined by the bombing of the U.S.S. *Tutuila* in Chungking on July 30. The Japanese were so genuinely concerned by the Ambassador's urgent messages that they harkened to his advice and discontinued bombing Chungking for a time (until about August 8).

Germany did not regard the Hull-Nomura conversations favorably. Foreign Minister Toyoda sought to explain Japanese policy in a message to Berlin on July 31. The occupation of French Indo-China was necessitated by economic needs and by political encirclement. It was a heavy blow to the United States, he added. Though Germany might dislike the conversations with the United States, she could not deny, Toyoda asserted, that Japan had restrained the United States from entering the conflict in Europe. The Foreign Minister concluded that Japan's activities were conforming with the Tripartite Pact.

Ambassador Nomura was getting out of touch with Japanese current thinking. He had not been in Japan for months, in which time many events had influenced public opinion and national policy. Complaining that his hands were tied by ignorance of his government's secret policies, he requested on August 4 that an expert both in Japanese and in foreign affairs be sent to assist him in the even more critical days to come. He suggested Ambassador Kurusu.

**Aug. 6** President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24 that Japan agree to withdraw from French Indo-China in return for a favorable commercial pact remained unanswered until August 6, when Ambassador Nomura presented terms he had received from Foreign Minister Toyoda the day before. The Foreign Minister hoped now to resume the discussions which had been interrupted since July 14. The proposals offered at that time by previous Foreign Minister Matsuoka had never been presented for discussion. In the meantime affairs had changed for the worse since

both the United States and Japan had been further alarmed, the United States by Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, Japan by the American freezing order. Japan now proposed to withdraw from French Indo-China *after* the settlement of the China Incident, to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines, and to cooperate in economic relations, provided the United States and the Allies cease military operations in the Southwest Pacific, cooperate in economic relations (resuming trade as before), and urge the Chiang regime to settle the China Incident. The discussions would remain secret and unofficial as before.

These proposals offered by Toyoda were hardly an adequate answer to President Roosevelt's offer of July 24. Ambassador Nomura reported to his superior that Secretary Hull felt talk was useless as long as Japan remained aggressive. Then Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 7, reviving a suggestion included in the original proposals of April 9, proposed a conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt. On August 8 Ambassador Nomura was summoned by Secretary Hull to receive the United States answer to Toyoda's proposals.

**Aug. 8** This answer was substantially the offer President Roosevelt had previously made (July 24). The Ambassador complained to Tokyo that the United States had not compromised in the least. He reported also that it was useless to try to arrange a conference between the leaders of the two countries since the Americans refused to negotiate as long as Japan continued military operations.

Although the United States would not compromise, Japan was prepared at least to appear to do so. Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 11 informed his Ambassador that his proposals of August 6 were not necessarily final.

**Aug. 13** On August 13 Secretary Hull again summoned the Japanese Ambassador to complain of injuries to Americans both in areas controlled by the Japanese and in Chungking, where bombings had been resumed, despite the Japanese promise, after the *Tutuila* affair (July 30), to cease the attacks.

Three days later Ambassador Nomura called on the Secretary of State in an effort to break the deadlock to which Japanese-American relations had been reduced. Reiterating the peaceful aims of Japan and stressing the cooperation implied in her co-prosperity policy (which he compared with America's Good Neighbor Policy), he again proposed a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt. Secretary Hull promised to take the matter up with the President when he returned from the Atlantic conference then in progress with Prime Minister Churchill.

**Aug. 17** Immediately upon his return to Washington on August 17, President Roosevelt called Ambassador Nomura to an informal talk. The President had prepared two oral statements for Japan. In the first he referred to his offer of July 24, which Japan had ignored by her occupation of French Indo-China; further aggression, the President added, would compel the United States to take steps to protect her rights and interests. In the second statement President Roosevelt, referring to Japan's desire to resume the Hull-Nomura conversations, said that these discussions could not continue unless Japan changed her policy of force. The next step was up to Japan.

Japan then took two steps—she renewed the request for a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt and she undertook the preparation of new proposals. On August 18 Foreign Minister Toyoda persuaded Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to support the proposed meeting of leaders. Ambassador Grew was also impressed by Japan's desire to press new proposals although he had pointed out that her grounds for occupying French Indo-China were inconsistent. Previously she had attributed the aggression to threatened encirclement; now she explained it as a necessary step toward closing the China Incident.

Feeling that President Roosevelt had intended the offer of August 17 to be his last, Ambassador Nomura on August 20 urged Tokyo to speed the new proposals.

**Aug. 23** On August 23 the Ambassador conferred twice with Secretary Hull both to promise proposals forthcoming from Japan and to speak of Japanese temper aroused by American aid to Russia, particularly oil shipments to Vladivostok through Japanese waters.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

**Aug. 28** On August 28 Ambassador Nomura delivered to President Roosevelt messages from the Japanese government and from Prime Minister Konoye, who said that informal negotiations had been inadequate, that both Japan and the United States continually misconstrued the other's intentions, and that only an immediate conference between the two leaders could hope to solve their difficulties.

President Roosevelt was agreeable to such a meeting but suggested Juneau, Alaska, rather than the vicinity of Hawaii, which Konoye had mentioned, and he did not suggest a date, though the Japanese eagerly wished it to be early. In a conference with Secretary Hull later on this day (Aug. 28), the Ambassador suggested the meeting be held between September 21 and 25. The conversation turned to the principles of the proposed agreement, which the Secretary thought should be agreed upon before the meeting. The next day the Ambassador summarized the conversation in a message to Tokyo, emphasizing that a general agreement upon principles ought to precede the meeting, which he recommended take place at Juneau about September 21.

Although Japan took great care that the American conversations and the proposed meeting of leaders remain secret, news leaks occurred, to the alarm of the Japanese government heads who feared the effect on public opinion and on the success of their plans. In communications with Berlin and with the Italian Ambassador in Washington, Tokyo vaguely discussed Japanese-American relations and merely mentioned that Prince Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt.

**Sept. 3** On September 3 President Roosevelt called Ambassador Nomura to receive his answer to Prince Konoye's personal message on August 28. He desired that, before the meeting with the Prince, the two countries first agree on basic principles, such as the four points which the American government had set forth at the start of the conversations on April 16.

Since the meeting of leaders now awaited upon an agreement on basic principles, Japan quickly produced new proposals. Foreign Minister Toyoda delivered them to Ambassador **Sept. 4** Grew in Tokyo on September 4. They were in part as follows: Japan would not advance further in French Indo-China, unless for a justifiable reason; if the United States entered the European war, Japan would interpret independently its obligations to the Tripartite Pact; Japan would withdraw her forces from China after satisfactory agreements had been concluded with China; Japan would cooperate with the United States in trade relations. The Foreign Minister also on this day notified Ambassador Nomura that his government felt confident these concessions would meet the approval of the United States and believed the freezing order would be withdrawn. He instructed the Ambassador not to admit that this order had harmed Japan.

Tokyo's confidence was shared by her Ambassador, who on the same day (Sept. 4) conferred in high spirits with Secretary Hull. The Ambassador declared that in his opinion no basic differences on the principles of peace now existed between Japan and the United States, and he added that there was no question of Japan's attacking the United States if the latter entered the war.

Meanwhile the Japanese leaders seemed feverishly eager to effect the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt. On September 4 Ambassador Nomura had mentioned announcing the plan to the public, but Secretary Hull preferred that the preliminary discussion be completed first. The Foreign Minister urged both Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and Ambassador Nomura in Washington to discourage questions in the course of the preliminary discussions so as to speed the date of the meeting. The Prince himself at a private dinner with Ambassador Grew on September 6 declared that he would carry out a peaceful settlement despite the opposition of those Japanese who wanted war. However, he added that the internal situation required the least possible delay in the proposed meeting between himself and President Roosevelt.

**Sept. 6** Not until September 6 did Secretary Hull receive the new Japanese proposals which Toyoda had delivered to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo two days before. When Ambassador Nomura presented the Secretary with the documents, he said that, in his opinion, they contained

Japan's maximum concessions. The Ambassador remarked in his report to Tokyo on this conference that the Secretary maintained a very cautious attitude and seemed also to doubt the stability of the Japanese cabinet. The Ambassador also relayed to his superior clandestine reports that the President and Prime Minister Churchill hoped continued pressure on Japan might compel her to compromise with the United States; then the Pacific Fleet, they hoped, could be transferred to the Atlantic. However, fearing the internal situation in Japan, President Roosevelt hesitated to demand too much lest Prince Konoye and his cabinet collapse.

**Sept. 10** On September 10 Ambassador Grew presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo an American statement regarding the latest Japanese proposals of Sept. 4-6, which the State Department was continuing to study. This statement dealt with the China problem: the United States could not assist in this problem unless Japan first accepted the American principles, agree to withdraw her troops, and agree not to discriminate in Chinese commerce. The statement requested Japan to clarify a number of points on principles and on economic matters.

On the same day (Sept. 10) Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull met in Washington. The Secretary complained that the new proposals were narrower than the old. The Ambassador answered that the concessions which had been agreed upon previously were omitted from the new proposals. To clear up certain misunderstandings, members of the Japanese Embassy and of the United States Department of State conferred later in this day. The officials debated inconclusively economic problems and certain difficulties relative to the occupation of French Indo-China and of China as well. The United States officials concluded that the Japanese representatives were not definitely informed of their government's intentions, except for its eager desire that Prince Konoye meet with President Roosevelt as soon as possible.

In the week following September 10, numerous messages were exchanged between Tokyo and the Embassy in Washington. Ambassador Nomura, feeling that agreement was possible on all matters except the China problem, urged Tokyo to meet the United States demands. An agreement that Japan would withdraw her troops from China within two years after the return of peace would permit Japan considerable latitude; new circumstances in the future might call for another agreement extending the period of garrisoning troops in China, the Ambassador explained.

While the United States continued to study the Japanese proposals of September 4-6, much bickering arose over certain phraseologies and intents. In conferences in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew and their associates, the Japanese showed considerable willingness to meet United States demands provided the proposed meeting between the leaders was thereby speeded. The Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura on September 13 that several points in the proposals had been adequately discussed. He urged that prolonged discussions of minutiae be avoided, adding that only a consultation between the two leaders could now succeed. In reply the Ambassador denied that the proposals were as satisfactory as his superior had supposed. Difficulties remained and preliminary conversations must resolve them; in particular, Japan must more explicitly state its China policy before there could be a meeting of the leaders, he said.

Although Secretary Hull had insisted, against Foreign Minister Toyoda, that the Japanese-American conversations be pursued in Washington and although Ambassador Nomura had told his superior (on Sept. 13) that he intended to disregard discussions of the points debated in Tokyo, nonetheless conferences in Tokyo continued. On September 17 Shigemitsu, former Japanese Ambassador to London, sought to assure Ambassador Grew of Japanese support of the conversations and of loyal adherence to any resultant agreement. On the same day Ushiba, Konoye's private secretary, visited United States Counselor Doomen in Tokyo. The officials discussed among other things Japan's failure to state her plan for making terms with China—a failure which Prince Konoye would repair, Ushiba said.

**Sept. 19** On September 19 Ambassador Nomura discussed the state of affairs with Secretary Hull, who again complained that the new proposals did not clear up any of the points at issue, but

rather they actually narrowed the original Pacific program. To the Ambassador's query whether or not the Japanese troops in China posed the chief problem, the Secretary answered that the difficulty of any agreement on the entire Pacific problem was the main stumbling block. The Ambassador, reporting this conference to Tokyo, implied that the Secretary was intentionally prolonging the conversations. The Ambassador had previously reported (Sept. 17) that the Secretary was most cautious about the proposed meeting of the leaders and that it seemed unlikely the new proposals of September 4-6 would suffice to accomplish a preliminary understanding, chiefly because of the Japanese troops in China.

Firm in his belief that the new proposals and subsequent conversations were adequate, Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 20 ordered his Ambassador in Washington to press for a definite reply. There would be no other proposals, he asserted, except for the China terms which he intended to deliver to Ambassador Grew in a few days, and these terms would be merely a rehash.

On September 22 these terms were presented to the American Ambassador in Tokyo: sovereignty and territorial integrity for China; cooperative defense against Communism, calling for Japanese garrisons; economic cooperation; a fusion of the Chungking and the Nanking governments; Chinese recognition of Manchukuo; and a guarantee that there would be no further annexations and no indemnities. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that despite the American desire to agree on policy before the meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, his government intended that the divergent policies of the two countries be discussed at the meeting and that details be handled through diplomatic channels after the meeting. He urged that there be no delay.

**Sept. 23** On September 23 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the China terms together with two other documents which, he hopefully observed, clarified all disputed points. The meeting between the two leaders, he added, would greatly pacify Japanese public opinion. Reporting to Tokyo, the Ambassador said he tried to obtain a favorable statement from the Secretary on the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State had refused to commit himself.

Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 26 urged his Ambassador to strive for the utmost efficiency and care in the delicate negotiations. He particularly directed that Ambassador Nomura not alter any Japanese communications without permission from the Home Office. Difficulties had arisen on this score before, and were again to arise. The Ambassador replied that, since the English texts often differed from the Japanese originals, the Foreign Minister should check the English translations made in Tokyo before sending them to Washington.

**Sept. 27** On September 27 the Japanese government transmitted to Secretary Hull the original proposals in an enlarged redraft which embodied all the proposals recently communicated to the United States. The same draft (except for the inclusion of four articles which did not appear in the draft presented in Washington) had been delivered to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo two days earlier. Also on September 27 Foreign Minister Toyoda asked Ambassador Grew about the proposed meeting of the leaders of the two countries. The Foreign Minister emphasized that if the United States delayed its reply too long, another favorable opportunity might not occur. He suggested a date between October 10 and 15. On the next day the Foreign Minister reported to Ambassador Nomura that pro-Axis feeling was increasing in Japan, but he denied that this was weakening the cabinet. Above all, he wished to convey to United States officials confidence in the dependability of the present government.

Communications with American officials now ceased while the Japanese leaders awaited an answer. Despite their eagerness, they decided not to press further proposals for fear of creating inconsistencies, though Ambassador Nomura suggested certain measures to meet objections which he expected the United States might raise. From Tokyo Ambassador Grew reported domestic opposition to any Japanese military withdrawal, but still he recommended to the United States a policy of constructive conciliation rather than one of economic strangulation. Anticipating that Ambassador Nomura might be asked to elucidate certain phrases in the proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda coached him at length and showed willingness to compromise.

**Oct. 2** On October 2 the eagerly anticipated reply to the Japanese proposals (Sept. 4-6, redrafted Sept. 27) was presented to Ambassador Nomura. Secretary Hull reviewed at great length the diplomatic events of August and September. The proposals presented on September 6 were disappointing, he said, because they were narrowed down from former broad assurances by unnecessary qualifying phrases. Inconsistencies in Japanese statements and policies would not aid the cause of peace. A meeting between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt could not hope to succeed while the Japanese government insisted on qualifying and circumscribing its program. President Roosevelt was still interested in such a meeting but an agreement on fundamental principles must first be accomplished. Ambassador Nomura, disappointed, felt that Japan's internal situation would prevent further concessions at this time.

Foreign Minister Toyoda was still hopeful, however. He informed Ambassador Nomura that negotiations could easily continue because only three points of divergence remained: economic activity in the Pacific, withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. Yet, Japanese disappointment at the American reply of October 2 was shaking the Konoye cabinet. The Foreign Minister, receiving no word that the negotiations would open as he had hoped, summoned Ambassador Grew on October 7 to complain that the October 2 memorandum of Secretary Hull reported Prince Konoye as having fully subscribed to the four points, whereas actually (when at dinner with Ambassador Grew on Sept. 6) he had accepted the four point program only "in principle", so as to allow latitude in its application.

During the remaining days of the Konoye cabinet (which fell Oct. 16, 1941) the conversations remained deadlocked. Foreign Minister Toyoda reviewed the conversations in a message to his Ambassador in Berlin on October 8. He attributed the negotiations to severe economic difficulties in Japan and to a desire to keep the United States out of the European war. They did not depart from the principles of the Tripartite Pact, Toyoda asserted.

Also on October 8 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that the United States would not agree to the meeting of the two leaders until Japan applied the four principles to the Pacific area. He agreed with Secretary Hull that the proposals of September 6 were too restricted. Japan might accept the four principles without concern, the Ambassador implied, because they were very abstract and could be applied with "some elasticity".

The deadlock in the negotiations was threatening the existence of Prime Minister Konoye's cabinet. The Foreign Minister seemed to think only a meeting between the two leaders could preserve his government, for he tried desperately to break the deadlock and effect the meeting. Discussion between representatives of the two governments in Tokyo and Washington was now further imperiled by news of additional troop landings in French Indo-China. Consequently, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked the Japanese War Minister to restrain military activities in that country. He also ordered Ambassador Nomura to obtain exactly the opinions of United States officials on the points of the proposals. He wished to know just what commitments the United States desired Japan to make, he told Ambassador Grew on October 10. He added significantly that he could easily control public opinion after the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had been convened. He was certain that at the meeting Japan would make extensive commitments which she could not make beforehand.

A basic difficulty in the relations of the two countries was their inability to pursue the conversations at the same level; the United States dealt largely with broad principles and generalities while the Japanese seemed to think only in terms of concrete commitments of limited application, as Minister Wakasugi pointed out when reporting to Tokyo on a conference with

**Oct. 13** Under Secretary of State Welles on October 13.

In a conference with Rear Admiral Turner on Oct. 15 Mr. Terasaki, of the Japanese Foreign Office, criticized American policies in the Orient as idealistic and characterized talk of principles as a "sort of hobby among the rich". Also on October 15 Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered Minister Wakasugi to avoid debating with American officials the United States desire for basic principles and the Japanese desire to clarify differences, since the United States might then insist on the four basic principles which Japan wished to leave out of any agreement.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

And so the deadlock continued. Then at last the tension broke. Dissension both within the Konoye cabinet and out of it forced its resignation on October 16. An example of the dissension is a message from the army headquarters in Tokyo urging that the Japanese representatives yield not an inch in their stand on the necessity for Japanese garrisons in China, and yet Minister Wakasugi had previously told Under Secretary Welles that the Japanese were willing to withdraw eventually all their troops from China.

Prime Minister Konoye informed Ambassador Nomura on October 17 that disagreement within the cabinet, partly on the matter of stationing or evacuating troops in China, caused the resignation. In a farewell note to Ambassador Grew on this same day, the retiring Prime Minister attributed his resignation to the internal political situation. The new cabinet, he added, would continue to press the conversations with the United States.

**Oct. 16 and 17** Meanwhile two conferences that had been previously arranged for October 16 and 17 were carried on between Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles and Minister Wakasugi. The conferences, though exhaustive, accomplished nothing. The Secretary of State, moreover, believed that little could be expected from further discussions.

Ambassador Nomura, when congratulating the new cabinet on October 18, complained that he had accomplished nothing hitherto, that he was unaware of Japanese policies, and that coordination between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Navy Department did not exist. He urged that he be recalled.

**Oct. 24** The new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo (the new Prime Minister was Hideki Tojo), asked Ambassador Nomura to remain at his post. He said his government would continue to negotiate only if the United States would submit a counter proposal to the Japanese document of September 25-27. To Minister Wakasugi's request for such a counter proposal, Under Secretary Welles relied on October 24 that the views of his government had been completely clarified in its documents of June 21 and October 2. Minister Wakasugi then suggested that both governments submit entirely new proposals and basic principles, to which Welles agreed. Under Secretary Welles then discussed, among other things, an economic program by which Japan might improve her trade relations.

On October 29 both Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi reported to the new government upon the current situation. Japanese-American relations were at a breaking point. The United States would not submit further counter proposals and she would not make any concessions, said Minister Wakasugi. Ambassador Nomura reported that the United States would not reach any agreement before November 15, at which time the Japanese Diet would convene. Ambassador Grew had reported on October 25 that the new Japanese cabinet had been set up after a conference of the Privy Council and military leaders called by the Emperor. The military leaders had refused to support a peace policy with the United States. The Emperor then ordered that the military leaders obey him. As a result, General Tojo, because he could control the armed forces, was appointed Prime Minister under the Emperor. It was the Ambassador's opinion that the Emperor's intervention had served to bridle anti-American feeling in Japan; if he actually was participating in Japan's policy, more concrete concessions could be expected.

Tojo's government, now expecting no move from the United States, began to formulate a new proposal. On November 2 Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Nomura that a last effort to improve relations with the United States would be forthcoming soon. The next day Ambassador Grew learned that maximum commitments agreed upon by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of the Navy had been delivered to the Emperor. At the same time Ambassador Grew advised the State Department that Japan was committed to the China war which she could not disassociate from the war in Europe; he warned that American economic measures, far from failing to avert war in the Far East, might injure the United States because these measures would bring about a breakdown of diplomatic relations. Still, he refused to advocate any appeasement by compromising the principles America had laid down. The Ambassador concluded his report from Tokyo with the statement

that the bellicose words of the Japanese press and of certain high officials indicated Japan might take action which would lead to unavoidable war with the United States.

The American Ambassador spoke more truly than he knew. Two days after Grew's report to Washington, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, issued Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 1. This Order of November 5, together with Order #2 of November 7, established the plan of attack on Pearl Harbor and set the date, December 7, 1941 (United States time). Not without reason did Ambassador Nomura complain on October 20, when he was seeking to resign, that there was not any coordination between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Navy Department.

The Japanese government now made frantic efforts to press its new proposals to a successful conclusion. Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura on November 4 that domestic and foreign conditions made the success of the negotiations imperative, that Japan had therefore yielded to many of the American demands. The Ambassador was coached carefully; for example, he was not to guarantee the evacuation of troops from Indo-China even on the conclusion of the Chinese Incident. Japan would apply the term "evacuation" to the shifting of troops in China, by which the Japanese hoped to meet American objections to the China garrisons. Since it was impossible for Japan to recall its troops from China, the Ambassador was asked to soften that fact by insisting that "unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation".

The Foreign Office also complied at this time with a request Ambassador Nomura had made on Aug. 4 when he asked for an assistant who was an expert in both Japanese and foreign affairs. He had suggested Mr. Kurusu, former Ambassador to Germany, whom the Foreign Office now sent to Washington in an attempt to assure the United States of Japan's sincere desire to conclude the conversations successfully.

On November 5 the Japanese government approved and sent to Ambassador Nomura two proposals, A and B. If the United States objected too strongly to proposal A, the Ambassador was instructed to offer B. This was Japan's last offer, the Ambassador was told; but he was asked to avoid giving the impression that it was actually an ultimatum. Tokyo also asked that the agreement be signed by November 25.

**Nov. 7** On November 7 the Hull-Nomura conversations were renewed. The Ambassador handed Secretary Hull proposal A. He reported to Tokyo that the Secretary of State seemed satisfied with Japan's stand on economic non-discrimination but was non-committal on Japan's proposal for partial troop withdrawal and on her attitude regarding self-defense. The Secretary asked if Japan would be interested in having the United States arrange a conference between Chinese and Japanese leaders.

News leaks were again plaguing Japanese officials who feared their effects upon Japanese-American relations. For example, an Associated Press dispatch quoted Ambassador Kurusu as follows: "I am going to Washington but I have no great hopes for a successful conclusion to the negotiations". On November 10 Ambassador Nomura, reporting to Tokyo a conversation with an American cabinet member, said that the United States government, on reliable information, expected another aggressive move by Japan soon and that therefore neither President Roosevelt nor his government believed Kurusu would be able to help the situation.

Foreign Minister Togo, however, was very hopeful of Secretary Hull's suggestion about arranging a conference between Chinese and Japanese leaders. In messages sent on November 9 and 10 he told Ambassador Nomura he felt the United States was now willing for Japan and China to settle their differences between themselves without American interference. He felt that therefore the question of withdrawing troops from China could be left out of the proposals, and this would speed the agreement with the United States. First, however, the Japanese government desired a guarantee from the United States that she would not interfere with Japanese-Chinese terms and would cease giving aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

On November 10 Foreign Minister Togo conferred with Ambassador Grew in Tokyo saying that Japan's increasing need for more raw materials could not tolerate delay; he urged that the United States come to an agreement with Japan by November 15. Then he gave Ambassador

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Grew proposal A. Japan had made a number of concessions, he said, in the matter of commercial discrimination and in the question of garrisons in China. Continued economic pressure, he warned, could force Japan to take measures of self-defense; moreover, if Japan were compelled to sacrifice the fruits of the China war, she would collapse. Japan's actions in China, Foreign Minister Togo reported later to Ambassador Nomura, were not aggressive, as the United States insisted, but were acts of self-defense.

Also on November 10 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt. He reiterated the three major points of disagreement between the two countries and then presented the new proposal for their solution. Japan was now ready to agree to the principle of economic non-discrimination throughout the Pacific and even in China, provided the principle was similarly applied to the rest of the world, as Secretary Hull wished. Japan insisted that it reserve the right to decide independently its obligation to the Tripartite Pact according to considerations of self-defense. As for troops in China, Japan wished to retain soldiers in specified areas of North China, Inner Mongolia, and Hainan Island for a certain required time after peace with China. She would withdraw her troops from other parts of China within two years. President Roosevelt replied, the Ambassador later reported to Tokyo, that the Japanese must give a definite guarantee of intent to cease aggression in the Far East. He added that before a satisfactory conciliation could be accomplished, a *modus vivendi* must be found, which Ambassador Nomura interpreted to mean a provisional agreement.

Meanwhile there were no signs of an agreement though Japan had made November 25th the deadline. Germany demanded that Japan force the United States to cease its action against the Axis, and Tokyo informed the British that the American negotiations were in their final stages. Ambassador Grew was similarly informed by a Japanese representative on November 12.

On November 12 Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi what he had in mind when he asked on November 7 for Japan's reactions to a conference with the Chinese. The Ambassador had said at that time that if Japan withdrew all her troops, the Japanese would have nothing to show for their four years of struggle in China. However, the Secretary of State was thinking of the fine example just such an act of withdrawal would set; when he suggested the conference, he had in mind a complete reconciliation between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Togo's wishful interpretation of this idealistic suggestion, it will be remembered, was that the United States was ready to wash its hands of China and let the two countries settle their differences by themselves.

Secretary Hull now asked Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi if the new Japanese government was willing to adhere to certain peaceful declarations made by the previous governments, if it was willing to omit certain objectionable phrases of qualification from the proposals. The Secretary complained also of the Tripartite Pact. This conference of November 12 was inconclusive. The Japanese representatives were unable to get definite replies to their questions about peace with China and they were troubled by the dilatory attitude of the Americans.

On November 13 Minister Wakasugi conferred with J. W. Ballantine of the United States State Department. Wakasugi wished to speed up these Japanese-American negotiations which, he pointed out, were considered full-fledged and final by Japan, whereas the Americans continued to regard them as exploratory or preliminary conversations. Japan desired definite answers; and if the proposals were unacceptable, she wished the United States to make counter proposals which would clearly indicate the revisions desired.

Meanwhile America was preparing for war in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura reported to his superior on November 14. On the 15th he offered plans for the disposition of Japanese officials in the event the American Consulates closed.

Ambassador Kurusu at last arrived in Washington on November 15. It seemed the chief purpose of his assignment was to impress upon the United States the importance of the present negotiations. He himself brought no new proposals.

Also on November 15 Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a reply to the Japanese acceptance of non-discrimination in trade, provided it was applied throughout the world. Asking that the proviso be omitted, Secretary Hull had drawn up a declaration of economic policy which would draw Japan into partnership with the United States in leading the way to free trade. When asked about America's stand both on Japan's relation to the Tripartite Pact and on the question of Japanese troops in China, the Secretary answered that his government could not go beyond exploratory conversations in the matter until it had consulted Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands. As for the Tripartite Pact, the Secretary said that the American public would not accept a peace agreement with Japan while the latter adhered to a fighting alliance with Germany. Japan must guarantee that she considered the Pact a "dead letter" before she could begin formal peace negotiations with the United States, the Secretary said.

After this decisive conference of November 15, in which the United States clarified the trade question and rejected Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura and his assistant, Ambassador Kurusu, entered upon several days of extended but fruitless debate with United States officials.

On November 17 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull documents answering the Secretary's requests of November 12. The new government upheld the peaceful declarations of the previous Japanese cabinets and it sought to explain or eliminate from the proposals certain qualifying phrases of which the Secretary had complained. The officials then presented Ambassador Kurusu to President Roosevelt in the White House. Much of the conversation revolved around the Tripartite Pact, which Kurusu had signed when serving as Ambassador to Germany previously and which he now described as a pact designed to prevent future war and to maintain peace.

In a long conference on November 18 one of the chief topics was again the Tripartite Pact, which Secretary Hull attacked but which Ambassador Kurusu said Japan could not abrogate. The conversation turned to economic matters, with which Ambassador Nomura was so impressed that, when reporting to Tokyo, he said this aspect of the proposals and also Japan's relation to the Tripartite Pact were now more important than the China problem. Unless a commercial policy were agreed upon, it would be useless, the Ambassador informed Tokyo, to submit proposal B. He suggested that Japan submit a compromise without provisos on economic policy and that Japan withdraw her troops, in return for which the United States would rescind the freezing order.

This conference was continued on November 19. Ambassador Nomura repeated a suggestion he had made the day before, that the United States should rescind the freezing measures after the Japanese evacuated southern French Indo-China since it was the occupation of this area which provoked the United States to apply the freeze. Secretary Hull admitted such action might help to pacify public opinion in Japan. The conference ended inconclusively.

The end was now near. To protect its codes by assuring their destruction in the event of war, Japan sent, on November 19, to its embassies throughout the world a simple code of weather terms to be inserted in news broadcasts. For example, if diplomatic relations with the United States were broken, the code words were to be "East Wind Rain", upon the receipt of which Japanese officials in the United States were to destroy their codes. "West Wind Clear" would mean a break with England. Two messages containing "West Wind Clear" were intercepted on December 8, but none was received containing "East Wind Rain".

Proposal A had failed. The Japanese now made their last bid and presented proposal B. Ambassador Nomura handed it to Secretary Hull on November 20. Japan would withdraw her troops from southern to northern French Indo-China if the United States would rescind the freezing order, restore commercial relations, supply required amounts of oil, and refrain from acts that would hinder restoration of peace between Japan and China. Secretary Hull, promising to examine the proposal later, pointed out that the United States could no more discontinue aid to China than to Great Britain unless Japan proved its peaceful intents and abrogated her alliance with Germany. An improvement in the attitude of the Japanese people and press, the

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Secretary said, was leading him to hope for a change for the better, whereupon Ambassador Nomura, reporting to Foreign Minister Togo, requested him to continue his control of the Japanese press.

On November 21 Kurusu, who, as former Ambassador to Germany, had signed the Tripartite Pact, sought to convince Secretary Hull that the alliance did not affect Japan's right to independent action and did not bind her to the interpretations of either of the other two parties. Nothing was accomplished in the brief conference on this day.

Although the American reply to proposal B was not expected till November 24th (the conference was later postponed to the 26th), Ambassador Nomura requested a conference with Secretary Hull on November 22. The Secretary said he had conferred with the representatives of other governments about the relaxation of the freezing orders. They had agreed with him, that until Japan gave evidence of its peaceful intents, there could be no satisfactory settlement. Any Japanese troops in Indo-China constituted a threat to neighboring countries and required military counter measures. Withdrawal of troops from the southern to the northern parts of the country was not a satisfactory solution. Ambassador Nomura replied that troops were needed in the northern parts of French Indo-China to press the war against China. Japan would withdraw all the troops, he said, after the China Incident had been settled. Despite Japan's stubborn military measures which conflicted so conspicuously with the peaceful assurances of Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, the United States was considering the release of oil to Japan for civilian purposes. Secretary Hull felt he could win some sympathy for Japan if she would make her peaceful intentions more definite.

Time was now fast running out. Foreign Minister Togo had previously set the deadline for the agreement at November 25th. The Japanese fleet, now ready to carry out the attack on Pearl Harbor set for December 7, could be checked by November 25. America's answer to proposal B would possibly be ready by November 24, Secretary Hull told Ambassador Nomura (on Nov. 22) who assured the Secretary that his government did not wish to press for an immediate reply. However, on November 22 Foreign Minister Togo sent a most significant message to Ambassador Nomura, advancing the deadline from November 25 to the 29th. "There are reasons", Togo said, "beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but ----- if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth) ----- we have decided to wait until that date." After that date, the message ominously warned, "things are automatically going to happen".

Meanwhile, on November 24, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations warned the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets that a surprise Japanese aggression could be expected from any direction. The Philippines or Guam were thought the most probable targets.

On November 24 Foreign Minister Togo had repeated to Ambassador Grew Nomura's argument for the retention of troops in northern French Indo-China—namely, to help prosecute the war against China. The withdrawal from southern Indo-China was Japan's maximum concession, the Foreign Minister said, adding that the proposal manifested Japan's cooperative spirit aspiring for peace.

Foreign Minister Togo sent several messages on November 26 in order to make various requests. He desired an agreement on proposal B, excluding the questions of non-discrimination in trade and the Tripartite Pact but including the stipulation that the United States mediate between Japan and China. He expected a guarantee that the United States supply petroleum in the same amounts as before the freezing measures. Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu replied pessimistically that there was little possibility of the United States' accepting proposal B entire. Ambassador Nomura suggested that President Roosevelt communicate with Tokyo and request cooperation in maintaining peace in the Pacific. They saw no possibility that the Sino-Japanese incident could be settled. Believing this to be their last statement on the negotiations, they asked that a copy be submitted to the Japanese Naval Ministry.

On November 26 Minister Wakasugi telephoned to Tokyo that the conference (postponed from Nov. 24) was being arranged for 4:45 p.m. that day. He was directed to report the results by telephone.

At the start of the conference Secretary Hull handed the Japanese representatives documents to counter proposal B. The four principles (first presented April 16) were reaffirmed, followed by five principles intended to provide an economic basis for peace. Next, among other things, the two countries were to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact with Britain, China, Netherlands, Russia, and Thailand. Japan would withdraw all forces from both French Indo-China and China. Because the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the principles the United States government was now offering its own suggestions for the settlement of Pacific problems. This was the American answer to proposal B.

The Japanese representatives objected to these documents, to the multilateral non-aggression pact, and to any implication that Japan recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Ambassador Nomura requested that he and his assistant, Ambassador Kurusu, be permitted to call on President Roosevelt.

When reporting this conference to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that the American counter proposal was unconciliatory and unacceptable. Secretary Hull had characterized the counter proposal as an effort to bridge the gap between the United States draft of June 21 and the Japanese draft of September 25. However, the Ambassador felt that no real attempt had been made to reconcile the two drafts. He regarded the principles as a reworking of the Stimson doctrine and the pact as a revision of the Nine-Power Treaty. Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan could not renounce the Nanking regime in China.

The American counter proposal of November 26 was thus doomed from the start but was not officially rejected until December 7. Only the promised interview with President Roosevelt now offered any glimmer of hope. Kurusu telephoned to Tokyo that the United States had not yielded a point. Ambassador Nomura asked that Japan openly terminate the negotiations. Meanwhile, the United States was making moves which indicated that she and Britain might occupy the Netherlands East Indies, the Ambassador warned Tokyo. Indications that the Japanese were strengthening their forces in the Pacific islands led to American counter measures.

On November 27 President Roosevelt conferred with the Japanese representatives. Public opinion, the President said, would permit little relaxation of the economic restrictions unless Japan clearly proved its peaceful intent. Reporting this conference to Tokyo by telephone, Kurusu said that little progress had been made. Even so, he was directed not to break off relations.

However, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commanders of the Asiatic and Pacific fleets on this day that negotiations had ceased and aggression could be expected within a few days, perhaps against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo. On November 28 Tokyo informed its embassies throughout the world that peace negotiations with the United States would be broken off. On the same day Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to avoid giving the impression that the negotiations were at an end and to emphasize that whereas Japan had made many concessions for the sake of peace, the United States, by refusing to compromise, had made negotiations impossible.

On November 29 the United States Chief of Naval Operations, following army reconnaissance and other precautionary measures, ordered Navy planes based on the Philippines to begin reconnaissance flights.

On December 1 Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Nomura that though the deadline, November 29, had passed, Japan desired the public to believe negotiations were continuing.

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt had left Washington on November 27 but suddenly and unexpectedly returned on the 29th. On December 1, complying with orders from Tokyo to learn the reason for the President's sudden return, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on Secretary Hull, who said that the President had returned because of a speech by Prime Minister

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Tojo. The Prime Minister had complained of the interference of many countries, such as Great Britain and the United States, which hindered the construction of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia; "for the honor and pride of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance", Tojo was reported to have said. The Japanese representatives in Washington tried to soft-pedal the statement. Ambassador Kurusu, promising that Japan would soon send an official answer to the American counter proposal of Nov. 26, said however that no good cause could be found for that proposal since the Japanese offer of November 20 had fully covered all points of view under discussion. The American counter proposal, he complained, emphasized the divergence of views whereas actually the two sides had often been near agreement. Secretary Hull answered that since Japanese actions were the opposite of the aims of the discussions, the United States government, wishing to dispel the confusion that resulted from such contradictions, had embodied all its basic principles in the counter proposal of November 26.

On December 1 Ambassador Nomura received an important message in which he learned that the Japanese offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines. The Washington Embassy was to retain its machines according to this message, but on December 2 another message to Washington ordered the destruction of one set of the code machines and all the codes except one copy of each of the machine codes. On December 3 the Chief of Naval Operations notified his Pacific commanders that the Japanese had ordered the destruction of these codes.

On December 2 two conferences took place in Washington. In the first, Japanese representative Terasaki sought to explain to Mr. Ballantine of the State Department that the offending statements of Prime Minister Tojo were a mistranslation. In the second conference, Under Secretary Welles delivered a statement from the President to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. The President complained of the large numbers of Japanese troops in French Indo-China (evidently further aggression could be expected) and he requested that the Japanese government state its intentions. When reporting to Tokyo, the Ambassador said he had made it clear to Welles that economic pressure was forcing Japan to protect her interests. The Ambassador optimistically asked Tokyo to consider the American counter proposal of November 26 with care and to reply with a view to a quick settlement, for which he believed the United States was eager.

Meanwhile, further measures were taken by the military to improve reconnaissance in the southwest Pacific and arrangements were made to exchange information with British and Dutch commands. On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered American officers in Tokyo, Bangkok, Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Guam, and Wake to destroy their codes and secret documents.

On December 5 Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on Secretary Hull to deliver Japan's answer to President Roosevelt's request of December 2. Chinese troops along the northern frontier of Indo-China were active, Tokyo explained, and as a precautionary measure Japan had reinforced her troops in that area. The officials then became involved in fruitless argument about principles, self-defense and the like, in the course of which Ambassador Nomura was heard to murmur "This isn't getting us anywhere".

Foreign Minister Togo's intent to continue negotiations in order to allay suspicions of impending action succeeded well. On December 3 the Japanese Military Attaché in Madrid reported to Tokyo that the continued conversations in Washington indicated new hope for a settlement in the Pacific. He believed that Japan was making many concessions, a policy of which he personally disapproved. On December 5 the Japanese Military Attaché in Washington similarly discounted the possibility of war; that the United States desired peace was substantiated, he thought, by the fact that Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conferred on that very day.

On December 6 President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Emperor Hirohito complaining of Japanese mobilization in French Indo-China, particularly in the southern area, and asking that Japan insure peace by withdrawing her troops. On the same day Foreign Minister

Togo, learning of this message, asked Ambassador Nomura to report to him the facts of the matter.

On December 6 the Ambassador received a brief order relating to a long message containing Japan's answer to the American counter proposal of Nov. 26. The answer was to be submitted to the United States government at 1:00 p.m. December 7, United States time. Another brief message also sent on Dec. 7 ordered the Washington Embassy, after decoding the long Japanese answer, to destroy the remaining code machine together with all codes and secret documents.

The setting of the time, 1:00 p.m., i.e., sunrise in Hawaii, and the order for destruction of all codes and documents impelled General Marshall to warn General Short in Honolulu. The message arrived twenty-two minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor but was not delivered to General Short until after the attack.

Not until 2:05 p.m., Dec. 7, did Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu arrive at the State Department to present their government's answer. The document reviewed the history of negotiations, claiming the Japanese policy had always been directed toward peace and accusing the United States of obstructive imperialism.

Releases to the press followed this final conference. On December 8 President Roosevelt reported to Congress, which then declared war upon Japan.

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

### PART F

### INDEX

The index that follows has been compiled from all the volumes (I-V inclusive) in the series entitled *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*.

Names of persons, places, ships, organizations, and articles of commerce are included. First names have been given when they could be ascertained (occasionally the first names of persons appearing in the text of the chapters are incorrect or uncertain and are not repeated in the index). Titles and added information appearing in the index are generally as of the year 1941 and agree with the data given in the decrypted Japanese messages which are bound as appendices following the text.

Beside each index entry is given the volume number (in Roman numerals) and the number of the section of text or the message in which that entry appears. Message numbers are enclosed in parentheses to distinguish them from section numbers.

Togo, learning of this message, asked Ambassador Nomura to report to him the facts of the matter.

On December 6 the Ambassador received a brief order relating to a long message containing a Japanese edition (version "A") submitted by the Japanese Ambassador to London to the United States government at Washington, D.C., which was transmitted to the United States government at Washington, D.C., by the Japanese Ambassador to London.

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Abasu, son of the Rajah of Koetaradja, Sumatra	III, 635
ABC Powers (of S. America, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile)	II, 121 III, 332, 350 IV, 362 IV, 107 (380), (1122), (1137) V, (8)
ABCD Powers (of S.W. Pacific, American, British, Chinese, Dutch)	IV, (822)
Abe, Jap. Naval Attache in Berlin	III, 572
Abe, Nobuyuki, Jap. Ambass. to Nanking, China	IV, (1018)
Abend, Hallett, <i>N.Y. Times</i> correspondent	II, 17, (52)
Abetz, Heinrich Otto, German Ambassador to Vichy	II, (567), (792), (798), (802) III, 432, 542
Aburto, Rodrigo, U.P. correspondent in Chile	III, (693) IV, (644)
Abyssinia	II, 154
Acapulco, Mexico	I, (182) III, 297, 322 V, 17
Achenbach, Ernest, German Sec'y in Paris	III, (1025)
Adani, Jap. Consul, Batavia	I, (402)
Ado, Assoc. Ed. <i>Bangkok Times</i>	IV, 600
Aegean Sea	I, (307), (375)
A.F. of L.—see Labor Unions	II, 175
Afghanistan	I, 14, 35, 38, (22), (367), (375) II, 68, 90, 126, 136, 244, (570), (792)
Africa	III, (684)
Agencia Sur Americana, correspondence agency in Rio	III, 141
Agua Dulce Field, Panama	III, 251
Aguinaldo, Filipino General	IV, 386
Aida	III, 682
Aighi, Jap. sec'y in Thailand	II, 202
Air Francais, Co. in Fr. In-Ch.	III, 313
Air Service Headquarters, Japan	III, (428), (429)
Aircraft Production, U.S.	IV, 601
Aitsu, Prince	III, 695
Akada, Saichiro, Jap. mint official	II, 117
<i>Akagi Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, (575), (633)
<i>Akagian Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 695
<i>Akamine Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 479
Akino—see Aquino	
Akiyama, Masatoshi, Jap. Minister to Panama	III, 141, 142, 238–240, 242, 244–247 336 IV, 127, 129, 133–134, 260–288 <i>passim</i>
<i>Alabama Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, (710)
Alaska	I, 30, (166) III, 16, 30, 31, 134 IV, 121
Alba, Duke of, Spanish Ambass. to London	IV, 368
Albania	I, (296), (339)
Albrook Field, Panama Canal Zone	III, 141 IV, 127

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
L'Alerte, Fr. newspaper, Saigon	III, 538
Al-Pachachi—see Muzahim Al-Pachachi	
Aleutian Islands	I, 30 II, (107) IV, 35, 60 V, 6
Alexandria, Egypt	I, (339) II, 123, 152 IV, 403
Alexandrovsk, Russia	I, (172)
Alexich, former Austrian Min. to the Netherlands	II, (555)
Algeria	I, 30
All-American Cable Co.	I, 30
All-American Telegraph Co.	II, 259
Allesandrini, Adolfo, Italian acting Ambass. to Chungking	III, 501 (1258) II, (966)
Alma Ata, Russia	IV, 423
Aloisi, Baron, Pres. of Society "Friends of Japan"	V, 14
Alps, German espionage agent	I, 35 II, (570), (792)
Alsace-Lorraine	III, 353
Aluminum	IV, 88
Alunan, Rafael, Sec'y of the Interior, Philippine Ils.	III, 265, 276, 516
Amada, Jap. sec'y in Bangkok	II, (1127)
Amagisan Maru, Jap. ship	II, (318)
Amano, Jap. business man, Panama	IV, 286, 363, (509)
Amano, Jap official, N.Y. office	IV, 242, (385)
Amau, Jap. Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs	III, 124 IV, 366
Amaya, of Jap. Petroleum Co. in Mexico	II, (448)
Amber, U.S. ship	IV, 121
American—see also United States	
American Catholic Mission Sisters	III, 162
American Continental Highway	IV, 134
American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai	III, 236
American Commission for Collections	II, 251
American Committee for Non-Participation in Jap. Aggression	III, 85
America-First Committee	II, 42 III, 67, 190 IV, 47, 192
American Industrial Daily	IV, 223
American Leader, U.S. ship	II, (256) IV, 150
American Metal Co.	II, 117
American Navigation, U.S. ship	IV, 165
American Red Cross	III, (372), (482)
American Soc. of International Law	II, 4
Americanism, published by a Jap. society in Los Angeles	II, 121
Amerika Maru, Jap ship	II, (946)
Amezcuia, Jose Luis, Mexican Min. in Tokyo	III, 297, 318, 324
Ando, of Jap. Pacific Petroleum Co. in Mexico	II, (448)
Ando, in Jap. Embassy, Washington	IV, 249, (385)
Ando, Yoshiro, sec'y in Jap Embassy in Rome	I, (31), (339) II, (564), (594), (614), (634), (988) III, 500, 501, 589, (1258) IV, 424, 429, 436

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Aneta, Jap. news reporter	III, 649
Anfuso, Filippo, director Italian Maritime Commission	III, 500
Anhui, British ship	III, 412
ANIC Corp	V, (20)
Ankara, Turkey	II, 172, 183, 191, (571), (611), (640), (673), (701)
Annamites (in Fr. Indo-China)	III, 173, 233
Anti-Comintern Pact	IV, 341, 382
Antigua, Lesser Antilles, West Indies	III, 537
Antimony	I, 41, 49, (369)
Antonescu, Ion, Premier Romania	II, 41, 59, 183, (717)
Aobasan Maru, Jap. ship	IV, 68, 90, 399, (891)
Aoki, reporter for Osaka <i>Mainichi</i>	III, 238
Aoki, Jap. secretary at Vichy	III, 353
Aoki, Kazuo, economic adviser at Jap. Embassy, Nanking	II, 180
Aoyagi, in Jap. Consulate, N.Y. City	II, (343)
Aoyama, Kazuichi, Major, Jap army cryptanalyst	III, (523)
APC Company	II, (80)
APRA Party Wing (Jap. sponsored, in South America)	III, 587
Apostolic—see Vatican	III, 235
Aquino, Gonzalo	IV, 550
Aquino, Juan	V, 16
Aquino, Raphael	III, 636
Arabs	IV, 365
Araki, Jap. official in Fr. In-Ch	III, 280
Araki, Sadao	IV, 256, 297
Aranha, Oswaldo, Brazilian Foreign Minister	III, 280
Aratame, Jap. translator	III, 280
Arazanya-Sisophon R.R., Thailand	IV, 256, 297
Argentina	IV, 433
Argentina, ship name	III, 527
Arias, Dr. A., President Panama	III, (1047)
Arisue, Jap. Vice Chief of Staff in China	IV, 356, 362
Arita, clerk in Jap. Embassy in Washington	IV, 535
Arita, Hachiro, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokyo	V, 57
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	I, 30, (31), (161)
Arnstein, Daniel G., U.S. transport expert sent to Burma Road	II, 113, 121, (391)
Ark Royal, British Carrier	III, 130, 132, 318, 348-353, 451, 459
Army Directory (U.S.)	IV, 282-385 <i>passim</i>
Army Technical Hq., Japan	III, 334
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	IV, 276, 286, (276), (480)
Arnstein, Daniel G., U.S. transport expert sent to Burma Road	IV, 515
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	IV, (385)
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	I, (235)
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	III, 22, (867)
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	IV, (723)
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	IV, 407
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	III, 224
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	III, 313
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	III, 514, 517, 533, 543
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	IV, 438, 452, 467, 478
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	II, (886)
Arnald, of the Vichy Foreign Office	III, 548

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Arroyo Del Rio, Dr. Carlos A., provisional President, Ecuador	III, 370
Arsene, Henri Charles, French Ambassador to Japan	II, (790)
Artificial Silk Export Association	II, 117
Asada, Shunsuke, Jap. Consul in Bangkok	II, 300, 301
	III, 673, 676, 677, 680, 683, 688, 689
	IV, 520, 533, 599, (1146)
	I, 1, (113), (190)
	II, 17, (673)
	III, 354, 379
	III, 686
Asahi, Jap. newspaper	I, (246)
Asahiyama Maru, Jap. ship	II, 109
Asaka Maru, Jap. ship	III, 217, 430, 538, 588, 589, 591, 594
Asama Maru, Jap. ship	IV, 160, 182, 300-305, 370, 387, 398, 498, 511, (878)
Asano, Jap. Commercial Firm	II, (214)
	III, (470)
	IV, (355)
Asano, Jap. news reporter	IV, 316
Asia	II, 244
	IV, 308
Asia, U.S. magazine	III, 223
Asia Petroleum Co.	II, 238, 304
Askania Co.	III, 480
Assenjo Co. (Japanese, in Mexico)	III, 310
Associated, U.S. ship	III, 219
Associated Press	I, (156)
	II, 17
	III, (183), (888)
	IV, 32, 98, 111, 160, 322, (418), (611)
Astoria, ship	III, (274)
Asuka Maru, Jap. ship	II, 103
	III, 335
Asuncion, Paraguay	IV, 345
ATC Co.	III, 698
Atcheson, of U.S. State Dept., Finance Division	IV, 181, 188
Atlantic Charter	III, 12, 16, 68, 391, 496
Attlee, C., Brit. Air Minister	III, 396
Austin, Brit. Consul, Yokohama	IV, (544)
Australia	I, 1, 20, 55, 64, (9), (139), (307), (395)
	II, 34, 41, 123, 208, 227, 288, (487) (574), (891)
	IV, 5, 8, 83
	V, 6
Austria	II, 191
Autonomy Society of Thailand	IV, 568
Awajisan Maru, Jap. ship	II, 103, (318),
Awaya, Jap. agent	IV, 584
Awatea, British transport	IV, 160
Azores	II, 53, 99, (275)
	III, (806)
	IV, 401, (397)
	II, 102
	III, 289-291, 294, 301, 308, 312, 313, 315, 318, 320, 323, 326, 327, 372, (683)
Azuma Maru, Jap. ship	
Ban, Non Chao, Minster of Finance Minister	
Barb, Ad. D., Brit. Ambassador	
Bart, U.S. Rep.	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Ba Tei Ken, Mohammedan leader in China	III, 569
Baba, Terukuni, Jap radioman	V, (55)
Bagao, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Baghdad, Iraq	II, (576)
Bahrein Island, Persian Gulf	III, 381
Bakkers, R., Col., Chief of General Staff, N.E.I. Army	IV, 523
Balanga, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Balboa, Canal Zone, Panama	II, (226) III, 142 IV, 129, 237, 239, 284, 319, 331
Baldwin, Hanson, columnist for the <i>New York Times</i>	III, 167
Balkans	I, 14, 26, 35, 38, 61, (67), (279), (283), (325), (329-66 <i>passim</i> ) II, 42, 167, 170, 198, (571), (610), (712) III, 30 IV, 401
Ballantine, J. W., Assistant Chief Division Far Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Dept.	II, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 27, 32, 37, 40, 41, 49, 50, 53, 56 III, 2, 6, 62, 63, 92, 114, 115 IV, 29, 39, 49, 55, 62, 68, 69, 71, 74, 84, 85, 98, 101, 102, 107, 113, 191
Baltic Sea	V, 14
Baltic Nations	I, 61, (372)
Baluchistan, India	II, (698)
Banat District, Yugoslavia	V, 17
Banco de Mexico	III, (557) IV, (565)
Bandar Abu Shehr, Iranian seaport on the Persian Gulf	IV, (720)
Bandar Shah, Iranian seaport on the Caspian Sea	IV, 394, (720)
Banden, former Fr. Foreign Min.	IV, (995)
Bandjermasin, Borneo	I, (404) IV, 531
Bandoeng, Java	II, 288
Banga, N.E.I.	III, 630
Bangkok, Thailand	I, 66, (204), (407), (416) II, 123, 273, 302, 309, 317, 320, 322 III, 665, 666, 670, 673, 676, 677, 679, 682-684, 686-692, 694-698, 701, 704-706, 709 IV, 389, 509, 520, 528 V, 16
<i>Bangkok Chronicle</i> , newspaper	II, 309
Bangkok Intelligence Service	III, 606
<i>Bangkok Times</i> , newspaper	IV, 600
Bank of Asia	III, 701
Bank of Indo-China	III, 518, 530, 540 IV, 457
Bank of Japan	III, 682 IV, 222
Bank of Taiwan	III, 620, 621, 633, (515) IV, (472)
Banzai, Col., Jap. Military Attaché in Germany	II, (550) III, (1019)
Baptists	II, 42 III, (31), 162, (372)
Baranovitshi (Baranowicze), Poland	II, 191
Bardossy, former Prime Minister of Hungary	IV, 399
Bari, Italy	V, (20)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Basra, Iraq	II, (701) III, 181, 381 IV, 394 III, 148 IV, 151, 155 IV, 158 I, 68 II, 269-272 IV, 232, 367, 509-539 <i>passim</i> V, (6)
Bataan, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 588, 615 III, 153, 181 IV, 135 II, (284)
Batangas, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 124, 134, 145, 147, 149
Batavia, Java	II, (636)
<i>Batavia Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 408
Batista, Fulgencio, Pres. of Cuba	II, 208, 270, 274
<i>Battle Report</i> , U.S. Naval Publication	IV, (718)
Batum, Russia	III, 429 V, (25)
Bauxite	III, 635
Beaverbrook, Brit. Min. of production	I, (161)
Becker, U.S. lawyer	II, 126
Becker, Col.	I, 45
Belawan, Sumatra	II, 45, 193, (113), (660), (891)
Belem, Brazil	III, 454
Belgian Congo	I, (296)
Belgium	II, (615), (638)
Belgrade, Yugoslavia	III, 630
Belitoeng, N.E.I.	III, 210
Bellmore, Long Island, N.Y.	II, (484), (565), (706)
Bengal, India	III, 635
Benkulen, Sumatra	II, 221, 225, (858)
Benoist-Mechin, J. (Bunoir Nessien) French Vice Pres. Council in charge of Fr. German affairs	III, 511
Berchtesgaden	II, 153, 198
Berle, A., U.S. Assistant Undersecretary of State	III, 432
Berlin	I, (199)
Berlin Exchange Control Bureau	I, 7, 11, 13, 20, 24, 31, 42
Berne, Switzerland	II, 45, 257
Bernheisel, Mrs. C. E., involved in Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	III, 42, 52, 58, 73, 124, 128, 433, 439-441, 446, 447, 450-452, 456, 459, 460, 465, 467, 469, 480
Bessarabia (part of Romania)	IV, 178, 337, 498, 511
Beunigen, Dutch financier	V, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17
Bevin, E., Brit. Min. of Labor	III, 451
Bibba, Non Chao, adviser to Thaisee Finance Ministry	IV, 234, 341
Biddle, A.J.D., Jr., U.S. Ambassador	II, (311), (315)
<i>Bird</i> , U.S. ship	I, (373)
	II, 171
	III, 437
	IV, 396
	I, (172)
	II, 125
	IV, 410
	II, 320
	I, (230)
	II, 234
	IV, 121

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Bismarck, O.F. von, German Ambassador to Italy	II, 139
Bizerte, Tunisia	III, 432
Black Hawk, U.S. ship	II, 148
Black Sea	IV, 150, 156, 160, 162 I, (325) II, (699) V, 14
Blair, H., representative of U.S. Presbyterian Church in Korea	II, (310), (315)
Blue Shirts, Chinese Nationalist terrorists	III, (1108) IV, 510
Bodet, J. T., Mexican Foreign Min.	II, 118
Boeing Airplane Co.	I, (175) II, 235, 243, (222) III, (137)
Bogota, Columbia	I, 30 II, (389) IV, 342, 353
Bolivia	I, 37 III, 346
Bolshevism	I, (5), (111) II, 183, (637), (715), (718) III, 182, 194, 492, 500 IV, 396, 407
Boltze, Erich, German Minister to Nanking	III, 593 IV, 499
B.O.M., Jap. Company in N.E.I.	III, 609, 626-628
Bomogoroff, Russian Ambassador to Vichy	II, 709
Bombay, India	I, 65 II, (926)
Borchers, J., member of German staff in Nanking	III, 593 IV, 499
Bordeau Maru, Jap. ship	II, (323), (342), (344)
Borelli, A., Editor of the <i>Corriere della Sera</i> , Milan	II, (524)
Boriban, P.P.B., Finance Minister, Thailand	IV, 611
Boris, ship name	IV, 384
Borneo	I, (404) II, 277
Borneo Petroleum, Jap. Co.	IV, 522
Borneo Rubber, Jap. Co.	IV, 534
Borneo Trading Co.	IV, 522
Bose, Subhas, leader of a group of the Congress Party, India	II, 150, 183, (524) IV, (110)
Bosweth, H., Counselor at the British Embassy in Tokyo	IV, (544)
Botanko (or Mutankiang), Manchuria	II, 183
Botolan, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Boxer Protocol (1901)	IV, 29, 68, 85
B.P.M. Co.	III, 610, 631, 635, 636, (1114)
Brain Trust, secret organisation (Lindbergh)	IV, 192, 193
Bratton, Col., in U.S. Army Intelligence	IV, (3), (7) II, 177
Brauchitsch, W. von, German Gen.	V, 12
Brazil	I, 30, (2), (31), (161), (218) II, 113, 121, (458), (463) III, 354-359
Brazil Asahi, newspaper	IV, 88, 231, 334, 339-365 <i>passim</i>
Breceda, Mexican Ambass. to Panama	III, 358
Bremerton Naval Yard, Washington	IV, 316 I, (175) II, (222) III, 133, 139 IV, 121

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Brenner Conference	II, (563)
Brest-Litovsk, Poland	IV, 69
Brinen, Fr. Ambass. for Foreign Colonies	III, 432
Britain	I, 1-67 <i>passim</i>
	II, 4, 34, 43-46, 62-64, 68, 71, 74-76, 78, 79, 183, 185, 208, 234
	III, 1, 2, 27, 45, 49, 59, 62, 67, 70-72, 85, 110, 123, 125, 130, 132
	IV, 4, 5, 7-11, 15, 21, 29, 35-38, 42, 47, 49, 57, 62, 65, 68-71, 74, 75, 77, 81, 83, 85, 88-90, 113, 119, 146, 300, 342, 349, 367-392, 401, 494
	V, (33), (60)
Britain and China—see China	Germany's plan to invade
German peace negotiations with U.S. aid to and coop. with	II, 12, 38, 42, 52, 61, (325), (365)
	II, 135, 136, 147, 163, 182, (660), (722), (736)
	II, 5, 6, 10, 42, 43, 45, 63, 68, 138, (101)
	IV, 105
	V, 2
British-Dutch Bank	III, 383, 390, (394)
British Imperial Bank	III, 381
Brooke, Alan, British General	IV, 383
Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert, British Commander in the Far East	II, 288
	III, 429
Brooks, U.S. ship	IV, 121
Brotherhood, F.M., Lt., U.S. Naval Communications	IV, (4)
Brown, British Honorary Consul in the Philippines	II, 96
Brown University	II, (219)
Brownsville, Texas	III, (587)
Bryan, former U.S. Sec'y of State	IV, 65
Bucharest, Romania	IV, 396
	V, 17
Budapest, Hungary	IV, 401
	V, 17
Budenny, S. M., Russian General	II, 191
	III, 448, (828)
Buenaventura, Colombia	IV, 263
Buenos Aires, Argentina	I, (159)
	II, 94
	III, 130, 339, 349, 353
	IV, 287, 335-349 <i>passim</i>
	V, (66)
Buenos Aires Maru, Jap. ship	II, (331)
	III, 243
Bugallon, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Buitenzorg, Java	II, 285
Bukovina, province of Romania	I, (373)
	II, 171
Bulacan Province, Luzon I, P.I.	IV, 161
Bulgaria	I, 42, 61, (296), (329)
	II, 181, 192, (612), (638)
	IV, (6), 399
	III, 473
	IV, 160, 296
Burma	I, 1
	II, 71, 75, 208, 227, 243, 250, (926)
	III, 405
	IV, 244, 562, 589, 618
	V, 16, (6), (56)

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Burma Road	II, 41, 62, 235, (886), (889) III, 560, (1054) IV, 58, 107, 137, 322, 486 II, (485)
Butler, Under-Secretary in London	II, 243
Butrick, R.P., U.S. Commercial Attaché in Peking	IV, 121
<i>Butternut</i> , U.S. ship	II, (309), (311), (315)
Butts, Alice M., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	III, 148
Cabanatuan, Luzon I., Philippines	III, 149
Cabanier, C., French Commander of Defense	II, 235
Calcutta, India	IV, 223
<i>California Daily News</i>	III, 244
Callao, Peru	IV, 340, (361) II, 110, 115, 118, (415) III, 305, 314 IV, 158
Camacho, Maximino	III, 305 III, 535 IV, (297)
Camarines Norte, Luzon I., P.I.	III, 145
Cambodia, French Indo-China	II, (796)
Camp Davis, North Carolina	IV, 95, 103
Camp Murphy, Philippines	I, 30, 36, (3), (306)
Camranh Bay, French Indo-China	II, 53, 208, (768), (926) III, 385, 414 IV, 5, 234, 284, 380, 391
Canada	IV, 380
<i>Canada</i> , a Candian warship	II, 133
Canadian-Japanese Commercial Treaty	IV, 380
Canadian Pacific Line	IV, 380
Canal Zone—see Panama Canal	
Canberra, Australia	I, (139)
Candia, Crete	V, (46)
Canca, Crete	V, (46)
<i>Canyes Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (332)
<i>Canopus</i> , U.S. ship	IV, 150, 160, 164
Canton, China	II, 197, 212, 215, 216, 237, 266, 267, 316 III, 56 IV, 377, 380, 392, 500
Capas, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Cape Verde Islands	II, 99, 333, 1092 III, 464, (806)
Capetown, S. Africa	II, 122, 126 III, 154
Caracas, Venezuela	IV, 353
Caribbean Sea	I, (22) II, 92
Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C.	I, 8
Castillo, F. V., Panama's Minister to Germany	III, 240
Castillo, R. S., Pres. of Argentina	III, 349, 350, 352
Castle, W. R., former U.S. Ambassador to Japan	III, 123
Catholic Church (see also Vatican)	I, 49 II, (219) IV, 420, 432-433
Caucasus Mountains	I, 61 II, 171, 180, 183, (675), (700) III, 392, 403, 411, 422, 423, 437, 471, 500, (925) IV, 401, 408, (822), (882) II, 96, 97

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Cebu Island, Phillipines	III, 148
Celebes, Netherlands East Indies	IV, 156, 160, 164
Central Afolk Japan Trade	IV, 159
Central America—see Latin America	II, (1103)
<i>Central China Daily News</i>	III, 598
Central China News Agency	III, 537
<i>Central China Post</i> , published in Hankow	II, (927)
<i>Central News</i> , newspaper	III, 407
<i>Central Telegraphic News</i> , newspaper	IV, 502
Ceuta, Morocco	IV, 502
Chamberlain, member Jap-U.S. group	I, (375)
Chamberlain, N., former British Prime Minister	IV, 193
Chambers, member Brit. Defense Organization, Singapore	IV, (49)
Chan Chun, President of the Chinese Central Executive Yuan	III, 429
Chang-Chung, of the "Four Chang Movement" and member Cent. Exec. Yuan	I, (355)
Chang Chun-li, of the "Four Chang Movement"	III, 562, (1048)
Chang En-po, Chinese army leader	III, (1048)
Chang Hsueh-liang, Nanking-Chungking intermediary	IV, 507
Chang Fa-kuei, Chinese Inspector	III, (1032)
Chang Lei-luan, of the "Four Chang Movement"	III, 559
Chang Po-ling, of the "Four Chang Movement"	III, (1048)
Chang Tsu-chung, cmdr. 38th Division	III, 562
<i>Chante</i> , ship name	III, 148
Chao Chen-shou, cmdr. 8th Army member 1st. Army	IV, (1014)
Chao Chi-lu, head of Kiangsu Prov.	II, (695)
<i>Charleston</i> , U.S. cruiser	IV, 121
Charlie Chaplin, his movie "Dictator" prohibited in Chungking	II, 240
Charton, A., Chief of Propaganda Dept. in French Indo-China	IV, 449
Cheelo University, Hsinan, China	III, (372)
Cheppensock, B.C., Thaiese Consul General, Batavia	III, 606
Chefco, N. China	III, (372)
Chekian Province, China	II, 240
Chen Cheng, cmdr. 14th Division, cmdr. 18th Route Army	II, 250
Chen Chieh, Chinese Amb. to Germany	III, (1031)
Chen Kuang-fu, Chinese special envoy	II, 257, 263, (1009), (1019)
Chen Kuo-fu, Maj. Gen. and leader of the "Blue Shirts"	III, 566
Ch'en Shao-yu, Chinese Communist	IV, 510
Chen Yu-jen, member of the Chinese Central Executive Yuan	III, 550
<i>Cheribon Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (695)
<i>Chester</i> , U.S. cruiser	II, (1119)
Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese General and head of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Government	II, 93
Chiang Kai-shek, Mme.	IV, 150
Chiang Po-ching, former Gov. of Chekiang Province, China	I, <i>passim</i>
	II, 1, 3, 6, 9-11, 13, 15, 16, 26, 27, 52, 74, 133, 183, 208, 234-262
	<i>passim</i> , (535), (679), (715)
	III, 38, 68, 69, 80, 110, 111, 546, 549, 555, 558, 562-566, 568, 577, 619, (487), (904), (933), (1052), (1053)
	IV, 5, 29, 34, 49, 71, 74, 77, 85, 98, 113, 375, 444, 495-510 <i>passim</i>
	V, 7, (8)
	II, 235, 240
	III, (1052)
	II, 240

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Chiang Ting-wen, cmdr. 9th Division	II, (696)
Chiba, Jap. Minister to Portugal	III, (660), (851)
Chicago	I, 36, (131)
<i>Chicago Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 220
<i>Chicago Times</i>	IV, 464
<i>Chicago Tribune</i>	III, 556
Chien Yung-ming, financial adviser to Chiang Kai-shek	I, (34)
Chiengmai, Thailand	III, 558
Childs, S. L., Counselor in British Embassy in U.S.	III, 698
Chile	IV, 234, 542, 569, 614
<i>China Daily Mail</i>	I, (172)
<i>China Economic Review</i>	I, 30, (31)
<i>China Herald</i>	II, 94, 113, 121
<i>China Journal</i>	III, 360-363
<i>China News</i>	IV, 282, 311, 360-363
<i>China Press</i>	V, (66)
<i>Chin Kyo-ju</i> , Maj. Gen. and leader of "Blue Shirts" in Shanghai	IV, 510
China	
Chinese National Government or Kuomintang (Chungking)	I, 11, 16, 22, 39, (200), (353-4)
<i>China Daily Mail</i>	II, 38, 183, 208, 209, 227, 234-264 <i>passim</i>
<i>China Economic Review</i>	III, 1, 32, 80, 110, 114, (176), 162, 398, 523, 446, 497, 546-569, 585
<i>China Herald</i>	IV, 113, 494-504, 518
<i>China Journal</i>	I, 30, 39, 57, (22), (353-4)
<i>China News</i>	II, 10, 15, 18, 24, 61, 62, 183, 236, 240, 241, 246, 249
<i>China Press</i>	III, 49, 63, 65, 69, 71, 114, 130, 398, 550-554, 562, 563
<i>China Weekly Review</i>	IV, 495
Chinese-Jap. Peace Negotiations	I, 8-29 <i>passim</i> , 49, 57, 62, (4) II, 6-31 <i>passim</i> , 52, 61 IV, 29, 34, 49, 51, 54, 65, 68, 74, 90, 112
<i>China Daily Mail</i>	
<i>China Economic Review</i>	
<i>China Herald</i>	
<i>China Journal</i>	
<i>China News</i>	
<i>China Press</i>	
<i>China Weekly Review</i>	
<i>China Aid Society</i>	I, (200)
<i>China Clipper</i>	III, 56
<i>China Defense Corporation</i>	III, 176
<i>China Press</i>	III, (1063)
<i>China Weekly Review</i>	II, 248
<i>Chinese Industrial Commerical Bureau</i>	II, 235
<i>Chinese Nationalist Party</i> —see China	
<i>Chinese Reserve Bank</i>	III, 580, 587
<i>China Trading Company</i>	410
<i>Chinghai, China</i>	II, 246
<i>Chinwangtao, China</i>	III, (31), (372) IV, (456)
<i>Chirubuto Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 289
<i>Chita, Siberian Russia</i>	II, 169, (683), (938)
<i>Chosen</i> —see Korea	
<i>Chou En-lai</i> , Chinese Communist leader	I, (281) II, 183, (914)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Chou Fu-hai	III, 550 II, (973) III, (1047) III, (1047)
Chou Tsuo-min	I, (34)
<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	IV, 105
Christmas Island, U.S. base	III, 475
Chrome	V, (27)
Chrysler Corporation	II, 107
Chu Chiu-hua, member of the Central Executive Yuan	II, 240, (274)
Chu Min-yi, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nanking (puppet) Gov't.	III, 584
Chu Te, Chinese Communist General	II, (914)
Chungking, China	I, 15, 22, 39, 52, 57, (17), (47), (48) II, 38, 81, 83, 84, 96, 158, 247 III, 12, 32, 59, 63, 68, 85, 120, 523 IV, 330, 349, 494-496, 500, 504, 507, 509 I, 52, 63
Churchill, W., Brit. Prime Minister	II, 4, 134, 135, 183, 185, (573), (653) III, 28, 30, 45, 55, 159, 180, 350, 391, 396, 422, 496, (749) IV, 4, 9, 28, 38, 42, 90, 375, 394, 410, 570, (381) I, 49, (374)
Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Italian Foreign Minister	II, 134, 139, 150, 155, 161, 258, (34), (594) III, 501 IV, 399, 425, 436
Cicognani, Papal Rep. in Washington	IV, 432
C.I.O.—see Labor Unions	
Cudad-Juarez, Mexico	II, 113
Civil War (American)	III, 114
Clark, C. A., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	II, (310-312), (315)
Clark Field, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 347
Claudius, Commercial representative in German Foreign Office	III, (841)
<i>Cleveland</i> , U.S. ship	III, 148
Closed Door Policy	III, 16
Cobaltera, Chilean company handling ore for Japan	II" 121
Cochran, P., Maj., U.S. Army Air Forces	III, 568
Codes	
Dutch	I, 39
Japanese	
(See also Japan, Codes)	II, 102 III, 121, 150, 164, 169, 173, 175, 227, 233, 281, 330, 338, 339, 344, 365, 377, 385, 415, 419, 465, 494, 575, 597, 618, 632, 645, 648 IV, 31, 70, 82, 91, 100, 142, 207, 219, 225, 230, 232-235, 245-247, 254, 259, 287, 293, 327, 333, 342, 345-346, 356, 359, 391, 446, 458, 468, 527, 539, 561, 577, 588, 607 V, Appendix
U.S.	
(See also U.S. Intelligence)	IV, 106 V, 16 I, (3) I, 30 II, 94
Cohen, B. V., Adviser to U.S. Ambass. in London	
Colombia	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Colon, Panama	III, 365
Colonial Company	IV, 134
Colonna, Don Ascanio, Italian Ambassador to U.S.	III, 610
<i>Colorado</i> , U.S. battleship	III, 43
Columbia University	IV, 121
Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Orders 1 and 2 (ordering Jap fleet to attack Pearl Harbor)	IV, 221
Comintern—see Russia and Anti-Comintern Pact	IV, 16A
Committee to Defend America	I, (24) III, 223
Communists (Communism)	I, 8, 11, 19, 29, 33, (17), (166), (174), (362) II, 36, 61, 121, 136, 167, 183, 227, 246, (820) III, 434, 437, 464, 469, 470, 490, 516, 521 IV, 399, 401, 403, 416, 495
See also China, Communist Party	
<i>Compayne</i> , of the "MM" Steamship Line	III, (994)
Congregationalists	II, 42
Congress (U.S.)—see U.S. Government	
Congress Party (in India)	II, 150, 183
Connelly, Maj., U.S. aviator serving in China	II, (820)
Conrow, W. S., Maj., of U.S. Air Corps, serving in Chungking	II, 96, (920)
<i>Contemporary Japan</i>	II, (553) III, 444
Convoys (U.S.)	I, 12, 18, 26-7, 35, 61, (18) II, 42, 98, 138, 141, 143 II, (311), (315)
Cook, Mrs. W. T., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	I, 8
Coolidge, C., Pres. U.S. 1923-1928	IV, 50
Cooper Party, touring the Far East	III, 361
Copper	II, 270, 289
Copra	III, 617, 647
Corozal, Colombia	III, 142 IV, 127
Co-Prosperity Sphere—see New Order in Eastern Asia	
Corregidor	II, 96 V, (54)
<i>Correio Paulistano</i> , newspaper in San Paulo, Brazil	III, 358
<i>Corriere della Sera</i> , Italian newspaper	II, (524)
Corsica	IV, (816)
Cosme, H., French Minister, Hankow	II, (828)
Costa Rica	I, (31) III, 239 IV, 126, 263 II, 118, 238
Cotton	III, 263, 333, 390, 410, 413, 416, 420, 479, 617, (512) IV, 367, 390, 444, 474, 522
Coville, C.	IV, 191
Covington, Miss H., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	II, (310), (315)
Cragette, U.S. Gen., Philippines	II, (883) III, 146
Craigie, Sir R. L., British Ambassador to Tokyo	I, (220), (226), (382) II, 48, 124, 129, 132 III, 103, 382, 413, 421 IV, 11, 42, 366, 378

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Crete	II, 42, 152 V, 14
Cripps, Sir Stafford, British Ambassador to Moscow	II, 128, 175, 183, 185
Cristobal, Panama	IV, 128, 133, 280
Croatia	I, (377)
	II, 149, 153, 167, 258, (524)
	III, 231, 498, 506, (949)
	IV, 399, 403, 435
	III, 675, (1301)
	V, 16
Crosby, Sir Josiah, British Minister to Bangkok	II, (311), (315)
Crothers, Mrs. J. Y., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	IV, 121
Crow, U.S. ship	
Cryptanalysis—see U.S. Intelligence	
See also Codes	
Cuba	I, (17), (22) II, 95 IV, 234, 313, 349, 391
Cultural Institute, pro-Jap. organization in U.S.	III, 197, 198, 208
Currie, Lauchlin, U.S. special delegate to China	I, 39, (355) II, (888), (958)
Curtiss Airplane	II, (921)
Customs Investigating Committee	III, 417
Curundu Heights, Panama	III, 142
Cyprus	II, 152
Czechoslovakia	II, 45, 180, 193 IV, 399 <i>passim</i>
Daet, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 158
Dai Nippon Airways	I, (416)
Daido Trading Company	I, (250) III, (1151)
Daietuto, political party, Fr. In-Ch.	IV, 445
Dainelli, L, sec'y in Italian Embassy in Washington	IV, 208
Dairen, Manchuria	III, 162
Dakar, French W. Africa	I, 35, (33) II, 53, 90, 147 III, 181, 464, (806) IV, 334
Dalmatia	II, (524)
Dalton, Brit. Economic Warfare Administrator	III, 397
D'Alumeida, Dr. Borja	IV, (428)
Danube River	I, (296), (325) II, 173 V, (61)
Dardanelles	III, 394, (759)
Darjeeling, India	II, 235
Darlan, J. F., Vice premier and Sec'y of State for Foreign Affairs	II, 4, 66, 153, 154, 198, 210, 220, 221, 223, 224, 233, 260 III, 432, 510, 515, 524, 533 IV, 454, 477, 493, (731)
Davao, Mindanano I., Philippines	II, (266) III, 146, 148 IV, 301-302, 347
David, Panama	III, 142
David Lawrence Proposal	IV, (376)
Davis, Brit. pastor in N. China	II, 123
Deabrist, Russian ship	III, 139
Deat, Marcel, editor of <i>L'Oeuvre</i>	III, 521
De Camp, U.S. missionary in Korea	I, (212) II, (310)

## INDEX

### *Vol. Sec.*

DeCoux, J., Gov. Gen. in Fr. In-Ch.	II, 66 IV, 476, 486, 491
Deganov, Russian Amb. to Germany	II, 174
DeGaulle, C. and DeGauillists	II, 64, 71, 133, 154, 198, 209, (516), (795), (813), (819), (823), (872)
De La Garza, J., Minister of Mexican Communications	III, 149, 516, 521, 527
De LaSalle, official in Fr. In-Ch.	IV, 449, (796)
DeSacy, S., reporter in Fr. In-Ch.	III, (607)
DeWitt, Lt. Gen., U.S. 4th Army	IV, 449
Delcasse, Theophile, French Min. of Foreign Affairs, 1898-1905	III, 137
<i>Delhi Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 51
Delmarten, Miss J., involved in the Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	III, 595
Denden Company (Jap)	II, (311), (315)
Denmark	III, 709
Dentz, French (Vichy) General	I, (29)
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	II, 45, 261, (612)
<i>Derii Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 120
Diamonds	IV, 399
<i>Diario Ilustrado</i> , Santiago, Chile	IV, (731)
Diaz, I, Jap. agent in Mexico	II, 14
<i>The Dictator</i> , Chaplin's motion picture banned in Chungking	II, (1186)
Dies Committee	III, 357
Dietl, E., German General	II, 362
Dill, Sir John G.	II, 110
Dingalan, Luzon I., Philippines	II, 240
<i>Diomede</i> , U.S. ship	II, 93, 102, 104
Direk, Chayana (Nai), Foreign Minister of Thailand	III, 448
DNB, German news agency	IV, 383
Dnepropetrovsk, Russia	IV, 151
Dnieper River, Russia	IV, 130
Do Ho Railroad, China	II, (1182)
Dobu, Papua, New Guinea	III, 670, 676, 682, 697, 714
Dodecanese Islands	IV, 567
Doi, Tomoyoshi, Jap. communications official	III, (888), (1015)
Domei, Japanese news agency	III, 440, 447, 452
<i>Donbas</i> , Russian tanker	II, (743), (750)
<i>Don Estaban</i> , U.S. ship	III, 385
Donovan, W. J., U.S. Army officer	II, (1088)
Dooman, E. H., Counselor in U.S. Embassy in Tokyo	I, (307)
Drava River	IV, (524)
Duff-Cooper, Sir Alfred	I, (52), (53), (113), (151-155), (191), (302)
	II, 17, 247, (486), (651), (654), (1046)
	III, 35, 203, 209, 303, 340, 358, 362, 362, 379, 447, 473, 527, 536, 649, 669, 675, 687, 714, (523)
	IV, 26, 32, 78, 121, 169, 178, 224, 253, 270, 556, (571)
	III, 133, (294)
	IV, 165
	I, (34)
	III, 18, 28, 29, 52, 69, 73, 82, 107, 112, 113, 131
	IV, 36, 45
	V, (61)
	II, 135
	III, 429
	IV, 368, 523, 549, 570

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Durban, Africa	II, 126 III, 157
Dutch East Indies—see Netherlands East Indies	IV, 534
Dutch East Indies Development Co.	IV, 88, 358
Dutch Guiana	III, (298)
Dutch Harbor, Alaska	III, 649
Dutch Information Bureau	IV, 121
<i>Eagle</i> 57, U.S. ship	III, 271, 376
East Asia Bureau (Japanese)	IV, 533 II, (967) III, 581, 584, 587 IV, 428, 508
East Asia Development Co. (Jap)	II, (553) III, 444 III, 572, 581, 587, 638 IV, 101
<i>East Asia Economic Intelligence Series</i> , Jap. publications	II, 272 III, 619 IV, (1020)
East Asia Reconstruction Bureau, Japanese	IV, 523 III, 339 IV, 62, 72 II, 121
<i>East India Daily News</i> , Jap. subsidized, published in Batavia	I, (384-388) II, 127, 130, 154, 183, (513) III, 5, 103, 381, (737) I, 19, (307), (339), (375) II, 123, 146, 183, (601), (701) III, 471, 492, (949) IV, 401
Egypt	III, 610
<i>Eiyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 362
El Gailani—see Rashid Ali el Gailani	III, (691)
<i>El Chileno</i> , Chilean newspaper	II, 251
<i>El Imparcial</i> , Chilean newspaper	IV, 73
Elisalde, Philippine official in U.S.	II, 155, (578)
Ellice Islands	IV, (385)
Emir Abdul Illah	II, 74
England—see Britain	IV, 406, 574
Enseki, employed in Jap. Embassy in Washington	IV, 4
Espionage—see U.S. and Jap Intelligence	III, 320, 327, (590)
Espionage Act of 15 July, 1917	III, 188, 280, 666
Esso, U.S. ship	I, 1
Ethiopia	II, 293
<i>Excelsior</i> , Mexican newspaper	IV, 262, 266, 269
Exchange Bureau	II, 102, (112)
Export-Import Bank, Washington	III, 169, 177, 184, 340
Export Licensing Law	IV, 197, 201, 220
Fabriga, Octavio, Panamanian Foreign Minister	III, 28, 240, 537
F.B.I.	III, 503
<i>Facts on File</i> , yearbook for 1941	II, 246
Far Eastern Association (Jap.)	II, 267
Far Eastern Council	II, 266, (488), (489), (954)
Far Eastern Newspaper Conference, August 4, 1941	III, 197
Far Eastern Construction Bureau	
<i>Far Eastern Trade</i> (Jap. publication)	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Fascists	I, (375) II, (518) III, 350, 498
Fauquenot, Pierre, former editor of <i>L'Alerte</i> , pub. in Saigon	III, 538
Federation of Japanese Association	II, (422)
Feng, sec'y to Minister Li, Nanking	III, 591 IV, 498
Feng Yu-siang, Member of the Chinese Central Executive Yuan	III, (1051)
Ferrari, A., Panamanian Minister in Tokyo	IV, 271
Fifth Column	I, (162) II, (675) III, 381 IV, 555, 582
Fiji Islands, U.S. base	IV, 105
Fillmore, M., former U.S. President	IV, 112
Finland	I, 61, (325) II, 183, 191, 261, (671), (677), (722), (752), (1006) III, 418, 437, 485 IV, (6), 396, 399
Fireside Chat	V, 12 II, 99
Fischer, M., German Consul General in Shanghai, later in Nanking	II, (586), (588), (1025) III, 591, 593
<i>Fitzsimmons</i> , U.S. ship	IV, 499 III, 133, 219
Fluospar	III, (561)
Focke-Wulf Co.	I, (245) V, 10
Fooches, China	II, (505) III, 162
Foote, W. A., U.S. Consul in Batavia	I, (227)
Forbes, U.S. Amb. to Japan in 1932	IV, 85
Ford Island, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii	III, 150 IV, 136, 148
Ford Motor Co.	II, 107
Foreign Fund Control Board	III, 188
<i>Foreign Observer</i> , Jap. publication	III, 197
Foreign Office Press Bureau	IV, 399
Formosa—see Taiwan	
Forrestal, J. W. U.S. Undersec'y Navy	II, (272)
Fort Bayard, S. China Coast	II, (789)
Fort Clayton, Panama	IV, 128
Fort Huachuca, Arizona	III, 137
Fort Kobbé, Panama	IV, 128
Fort Stotsenberg, Philippines	IV, 152, 155, 160
Forward Bloc, of India's Congress Party	II, (565)
Four Chang Movement (see Chang-chung, Chang Chun-li, Chang	
Lei-luan, Chang Po-ling)	III, 559
Fourteen Articles (Pres. Wilson)	III, 16
Fox, U.S. ship	IV, 121
France	I, 41, (253), (307) II, 4, 45, 64, 197, 199 IV, 7, 107
France Field, Panama	III, 142
Franco, F., Spanish dictator	II, 101, 183 III, 464
<i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> , newspaper	IV, 399
Free French—see DeGaulle	

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Freezing Measures, Trade Embargoes (See also under Japan)	I, 1, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 22, 38 II, 28, 41, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76-78, 82, 89, 90, 96, 103, 268, 293, 297 III, 5, 12, 24, 28, 38, 42, 48, 52, 95, 97, 130, 158-459 <i>passim</i> , 539, 580- 681 <i>passim</i> IV, 5, 36, 37, 68, 69, 71, 74, 77, 79, 80, 85, 113, 187, 193, 217, 297, 358, 365, 372, 379, 385-386, 444, 494, 505, 522, (399), (629) I, 1-8, 43, (18), (220), (246), (302) II, 30, 38, 41, 53-96 <i>passim</i> , 160, 189, 215, 233 <i>passim</i> III, 1-130 <i>passim</i> , 252-262, 495, 510-545 <i>passim</i> , (904) IV, 8-113 <i>passim</i> , 240, 411, 438-493, 509, 530 V, 6, 16, (6) III, 85 V, (29) III, 585 IV, 305, 525, 531, 534-537 II, 248, 263 IV, 144 II, 111 IV, 514 IV, 564 IV, (385) III, 705 IV, 60, (385) IV, 72 I, (161) IV, (385) III, 653 II, (479) II, 320, (1169), (1176) IV, 557, 586, 601 III, 549, (1037) I, 32 I, (120) II, (391) III, 217, 331 III, 220 II, (331) I, (270) II, (585) IV, (462) I, (402) II, (767) IV, 253 I, 16 III, 387 IV, 398 III, 162 V, (14) III, 402, 412, 413, 416 IV, 370 I, (204), (396) II, 302, 304, 306-309, 311, 313-315, 317-323
French Indo-China	I, 1-8, 43, (18), (220), (246), (302) II, 30, 38, 41, 53-96 <i>passim</i> , 160, 189, 215, 233 <i>passim</i> III, 1-130 <i>passim</i> , 252-262, 495, 510-545 <i>passim</i> , (904) IV, 8-113 <i>passim</i> , 240, 411, 438-493, 509, 530 V, 6, 16, (6) III, 85 V, (29) III, 585 IV, 305, 525, 531, 534-537 II, 248, 263 IV, 144 II, 111 IV, 514 IV, 564 IV, (385) III, 705 IV, 60, (385) IV, 72 I, (161) IV, (385) III, 653 II, (479) II, 320, (1169), (1176) IV, 557, 586, 601 III, 549, (1037) I, 32 I, (120) II, (391) III, 217, 331 III, 220 II, (331) I, (270) II, (585) IV, (462) I, (402) II, (767) IV, 253 I, 16 III, 387 IV, 398 III, 162 V, (14) III, 402, 412, 413, 416 IV, 370 I, (204), (396) II, 302, 304, 306-309, 311, 313-315, 317-323
Friends of China (U.S. society)	III, 85
Fromm, Fritz, German General	V, (29)
Fu Tsuo-i, Cmdr. Chinese 37th division	III, 585
<i>Fuji Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 305, 525, 531, 534-537
Fujii, H., Jap. agent and sec'y, Spain	II, 248, 263
Fujii, I., Jap. agent in Honolulu	IV, 144
Fujii, K., 1st Sec'y, Jap Legation in Mexico	II, 111
Fujishima, Jap official in Shanghai	IV, 514
Fujishima, Jap clerk	IV, 564
Fujita, official in Jap Embassy in Washington, D.C.	IV, (385)
Fujiwara, Maj. Jap agent in Hanoi	III, 705
Fujiyama, Jap Foreign Service Attache in the Washington Embassy	IV, 60, (385)
Fukai, Eigo, at Economic Conference in London	IV, 72
Fukuda, acting as courier in U.S.	I, (161)
Fukuda, employed in Jap Consulate at Manila	IV, (385)
Fukuda, Maj., Jap army surgeon	III, 653
Fukuda, Jap. official in Berlin	II, (479)
Fukuda, Yoichi, of the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in Bangkok	II, 320, (1169), (1176) IV, 557, 586, 601
Fukui, Consul at Macao, China	III, 549, (1037)
Fukumoto, director of N.Y. branch of <i>Nichi Nichi</i>	I, 32
Fukushima, Jap. Consul	I, (120)
Fukushima, interpreter in Jap Legation in Mexico City	II, (391) III, 217, 331
Fukuyama, G. Ass't Prof. at the University of Hokkaido	III, 220
Funagawa, officer on the <i>Buenos Aires Maru</i>	II, (331)
Funk, W., German Min. of Economics	I, (270) II, (585)
Furono, Manager of Domei in Tokyo	IV, (462)
Furuchi, Jap. secretary	I, (402)
Furumi, clerk in Jap Embassy, Moscow	II, (767)
Furumoto, managing director of Domei in Tokyo	IV, 253
Fushimi, H., Prince, Chief Jap. Naval Gen'l Staff until April, 1941	I, 16
<i>Fushimi Maru</i> , Jap ship	III, 387 IV, 398
Fushun, Manchuria	III, 162
<i>Fuso Maru</i> , Jap. ship	V, (14) III, 402, 412, 413, 416 IV, 370
Futami, Yasusato, Japanese Minister to Thailand	I, (204), (396) II, 302, 304, 306-309, 311, 313-315, 317-323

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Fuyo-No. 1, Jap. ship	III, 279
Gadar, political party in India	IV, 431
Galapagos Islands	III, (319), 371
Galicia (Poland)	IV, 134 II, (636) IV, 401
Gallup Poll	II, 91 III, 58
Gandhi, leader of the Indian Nationalist Party	II, (565)
Gargenlieu, C.I., Capt., a DeGaullist active in the Pacific	III, 149
Gauss, U. S. Ambassador to Chungking	II, 241, 243, 247 IV, 411, (779)
Gautier, G., a DeGaullist, serving in French Indo-China	IV, 449
Gaxiola, F., Mexican Minister of Economics	II, 117, 118
Gayda, V., Italian Fascist spokesman	I, 1 II, (706) III, 504 IV, 429 III, (1261)
Gei Jutsu Cinema Co. (Jap)	II, 107
General Motors Corporation	III, 135
General Petroleum Company	III, (1064)
George, Major, member of an American military mission to China	II, 125
George, Lloyd, former Brit. premier	IV, 4 III, 238 III, 603
Georgetown, British Guiana	I, <i>passim</i>
Gerindo Party (Java, anti-Jap)	II, 1-79 <i>passim</i> , 198, 219, 254, 255, 257, 265, (274)
Germany	III, 5-132 <i>passim</i> , (675), (1047)
(See also Tripartite Pact)	IV, 4-113 <i>passim</i> , 195, 266, 308, 341, 362, 376, 393-413, 499, 511, 519
Germany and Japan—see Japan	V, 7, 13
Germany and Russia—see Russia	
Gibraltar	I, 35, 42, (326)
Gilbert Islands	II, 147
Gilmore, U.S. ship	III, 464
Ginyo Maru, Jap. ship	IV, 401, 410
Giornale d'Italia, Italian newspaper	IV, 73
Gisho (Ichang), China	IV, 121
Globe Press Service	I, (182)
Glycerin	II, 115
Goebbeis, J., German Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment	II, (615), (706)
Goering, H., German Air Marshal	IV, 429 II, (498)
Globe Press Service	IV, 223
Glycerin	III, 410, 413, 416, 417, 420, 421
Goebbeis, J., German Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment	IV, 367
Goering, H., German Air Marshal	II, 45
Globe Press Service	I, (270), (328)
Glycerin	II, 45, 135
Goebbeis, J., German Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment	III, (825)
Goering, H., German Air Marshal	IV, 401, 410
Globe Press Service	V, 12

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Goez, P., Army Chief of Staff, Brazil	IV, 352
Gold	IV, 557-612
<i>Gold Star</i> , U.S. ship	III, 148
Good Neighbor Policy	I, 1, 11 II, 30, 53, 68, 115 III, 14, 130, 369 IV, 261, (634)
Goto, Major, Chief of Jap. Secret Service in Shanghai	III, 698 IV, 505
Goto, Saburo—see Osone, Y.	
Grady, H. F., U.S. economic expert in Hong Kong	III, 566
Grand Mufti of Palestine (Husseini)	IV, 433
Gray, C. W., Ass't to Sec'y Hull	II, 50
Graziani, R., Commander of Italian Army in N. Africa	I, (243)
Greece	I, 42, 49, 61, (326), (339) IV, 403
Greenland	I, 19, (34) II, 173 IV, 401
<i>Greer</i> , U.S. Destroyer	III, 57, 58, 62, 67, 92, 200, 458, (415)
Grew, J., U.S. Amb. to Japan	I, 4, 44 II, 4, 5, 8, 11, 41, 43, 54, 57, 75-78, 83, 141 III, 6-131 <i>passim</i> , 172, 185 IV, 10-112 <i>passim</i> , 188
Grozny, Russia	III, 452
Guam	I, 1, (10) IV, 76, 92, 106, 116, 347 V, 6
Guantanamo, Cuba	II, 95
Guardia, R., provisional President of Panama	IV, (477), (494), (496)
Guariglia, Italian Amb. to Turkey	II, (699)
Guatemala	II, 94, (229)
Guayaquil, Peru	II, 121
Gulf Dulce, Costa Rica	IV, 126
Gulf of Fonseca, Honduras	IV, 126, 134
Gurgan, Iran	V, (52)
Guthrie	IV, (1076)
Hachiya, Jap. Vice-consul, Bangkok	IV, 545
Hague Tribunal	IV, 85
Haifa, Palestine	II, 152
Hailar, Manchuria	I, (336) II, 183
Hainan Island	I, (1), (47) II, 30, 215
Hakko Itiu (Brotherhood of Mankind)	IV, 29, 38, (26), (39), (197), 487 I, (46) III, (14)
Hakodate, Hokkaido I., Japan	II, 252
<i>Hokone Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 278, 389 IV, 300, 302
Halder, F., German General	II, 177 V, (29)
Haleakala Road, Maui I., Hawaii	IV, 144
Halifax, British Ambassador to U.S.	II, 90, (881) III, 103
Hall-Patch, Col. E. L., British Finance Counselor	IV, 1, 9, 47 III, 429, 566
Hamamatsu Musical Instrument Co.	III, 480

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Hamanaka, K., Cmdr., Jap Mil. Attaché	III, 319
Hamburg, Germany	II, (772)
Hami, China	II, (966)
Hamilton, Maxwell M., Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Dept.	II, 10-74 <i>passim</i> III, 3, 62, 63, 69, 114, 115 IV, 23, 191
<i>Hana Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 349
Hanada, Jap. Commercial Attaché	II, (691)
Hanai, employed in Jap Embassy, Russia	II, (767)
Hanalei, Hawaii	IV, 139
Hanaoka, Jap. clerk	IV, 404
Hanaoka, Jap. technician	V, 20
Hanawa, Jap. Councilor in Tokyo	III, (1245) IV, (855)
Hanawa, Jap. official in Manchuria	II, (692) IV, (1033) III, 610, 611, 618 IV, (1080)
Handels Bank, N.E.I.	III, 485
Hango, Finnish-Russian territory	II, 234
Hankey, Sir Robert	II, 211-214, 237, 239
Hankow, China	II, (226)
<i>John R. R. Hanna</i> , U.S. ship	II, 66
Hanoi, French Indo-China	IV, 502
<i>Hanoi Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 488
Hara, Jap. Consul in Sao Paulo, Brazil	II, (458) III, 342
Hara, Jap. Vice-Consul, Panama	III, 239
Hara, Jap. Major General	V, (18)
Harada, Jap. courier in U.S., Mexico	III, 300
Harada, Jap. official in Peking	IV, 174, 179, 458, 542
Harada Corps, Kaifeng, N. China	III, (1048), (1067)
Harada, Ken, Jap Counselor at Vichy	III, 162 I, (149) II, (569), (808), (859) III, 514, 517, 523, 543 IV, 467, 469, 473, 478, (911)
Haraguchi, Jap. official in Fr. In-Ch.	IV, 456
Harbin, Manchuria	II, 183 IV, 29, 30, 241, 420 V, 14
Harbin Conference	III, 484
Harmony Societies, pro-Jap, in N.E.I.	III, 614
Harriman, W. A., U.S. representative in Russia	IV, 7
Hart, T. C., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1959-'42	II, 70 III, 147 IV, 7
Hase, Jap. Diet member,	III, 193
Hasegawa, Domei correspondent, London,	III, 379
Hashimoto, Jap. Communications Engineer in Bangkok	IV, 551, 564, (1113)
Hashizume, Jap. student clerk in U.S.	II, 109
Hashizuma, interpreter in Japanese Consulate in San Francisco	III, 205 IV, (385)
Hata, Jap. General in Manchuria	II, (963)
Hatakeyama, Jap. Lt. Cmdr	IV, 305
Hatanaka, Jap. representative in Batavia	II, 283
Hauptmann, Axis intelligence agent	III, (922)
Havana, Cuba	I, 65 IV, 233, 284, 349
Hawaii	I, 6, 30

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
<i>Hawaii Maru</i> , Jap ship	II, 97
<i>Hayakawa</i> , Jap Army Surgeon in Brazil	III, 6, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35, 102, 136, 148-150
<i>Hayasaki</i> , Jap. Consul in N.E.I.	IV, 16A, 60, 86, 89, 116, 136-149, 226, 289-294, 310, (606)
<i>Hayashi</i> , Jap. official in Peking	IV, 525
<i>Hayashi</i> , Lt. Col., of the Japanese Sumida organization in Fr. In-Ch	III, 220
<i>Hayashi</i> , Col., in Berlin	IV, 351
<i>Hayashida</i> , employed in N.Y. Consulate	III, 635
<i>Heian Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 538
<i>Heiyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 577, 585
<i>Helsinki</i> , Finland	IV, 506
<i>Hemp</i>	III, 537, 544
<i>Henchman</i> , A. S., Manager of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Bank	III, 465
<i>Henderson</i> , U.S. ship	IV, 242, (385)
<i>Henri</i> , Arsene, French Amb. in Tokyo	II, 103
<i>Henschel</i> Corporation	III, 217, 221
<i>Herald</i> , newspaper in Singapore	II, 117, 118
<i>Herari</i> , Min. Foreign Affairs, Panama	III, 285, 299, 306, 336, 339
<i>Heron</i> , U.S. ship	V, 17
<i>Hess</i> , Rudolph	II, 191 (1003)
<i>Hibari Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 418
<i>Hickam Field</i> , Hawaii	IV, 396
<i>Hidaka</i> , Shinrokuro, Jap. Commercial Attaché in Shanghai, later appointed Minister to Nanking	V, 13, 14
<i>Hidalgo</i> , E., oil administrator, Mexico	III, 253, 255, 277, 617
<i>Hie Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 251
<i>Higashi-Kuni</i> , Jap. prince	II, 96
<i>Hikawa Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 148
<i>Hikida</i> , Jap. agitator (negroes)	II, 197, (169), (809), (813), (819)
<i>Hill</i> , H. J., involved in Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	III, 535, 540, (964), (969)
<i>Hilo</i> , Hawaii	IV, 438, 451, 475
<i>Hiraiwa</i> , H., Capt., Director of Jap Naval Intelligence	V, (32)
<i>Hiraga</i> , Tadao, Jap. communist	III, 384
<i>Hiramitsu</i> , Jap. official in U.S.	IV, 268
<i>Hiranuma</i> , Baron Kiichiro, Japanese Vice premier	IV, 150, 156, 160
<i>Hirazawa</i> , Jap. representative in N.Y.	II, 4, 10, 45, 134-136, 164, 191
<i>Hirohito</i> , Emperor of Japan	III, 266
	IV, 472
	IV, 148
	I, (289)
	II, 265
	III, 579, 582, 596, (1047), (1071)
	IV, 399, 507, (1018)
	III, (613)
	III, 695
	III, 120
	II, (455)
	III, 221, 229, 232
	IV, 170, 174, 176, 196, 310, 313
	II, (356)
	IV, 250
	II, (311), (315)
	IV, 139
	IV, 5
	IV, (858)
	IV, 253
	III, 13, 22
	IV, 389, (385)
	II, 10, 47, 55, 322, (41)
	IV, 7, 112

## INDEX

## Vol. Sec.

Hitler, Adolph, German Chancellor	I, 8, 17, 22, 25, 29, 47, 49, 53, 61, (22), (51), (220), (270), (311), (366), (375), (376)
Hirota, member of the Yoshizawa party sent to French Indo-China	II, 4, 5, 7, 15, 22, 31, 37, 41, 45, 59, 64, 68, 69, 71, 92, 135-191 <i>passim</i> , 286, (512), (656), (981)
Hiye Maru, Jap. ship	III, 2, 11, 14, 62, 125, 132, 432, 436, 458, 469, 489, 496, 500, 507, 593, (469), (825)
Hirota, member of the Yoshizawa party sent to French Indo-China	IV, 4, 5, 49, 65, 68, 69, 71, 90, 98, 107, 262, 407-411, 425, (397), (730)
Hochi, Tokyo newspaper	V, 1
Hakane Maru, Jap. ship	III, 223
Holland—see Netherlands	IV, (974)
Holland, U.S. submarine tender	III, 406
Hollywood, California	I, (203)
Homma—see Honma	III, (1042)
Honda, K., Jap. Amb. to Nanking	III, (888)
Hondagua, Luzon I., Philippines	III, (733)
Honduras	IV, 162, 164
Hong Kong	III, 184, 192, 210
Hongo, Col., in N. China	II, 264, 266, (37), (964)
Honjo, employed in Washington Embassy	III, 68, 573
Honma, Jap. Vice-Consul, Rangoon	IV, 498-503
Honokura, member Jap. diplomatic staff in Rome	IV, 158
Honolulu	III, 283
Hoogstraten, Chief of Commerce, N.E.I.	I, 16, 65, (17), (38), (41), (202) (382)
Hooper, Rev. J., Presbyterian	II, 131, 235, 237, 243, 247, 263
Hoover, H., U.S. President 1928-32	III, 56
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	IV, 65, 100, 116, 232, 298, 390, 494, 497
Hori, official in Jap Embassy in Washington	III, 585
Horikiri, Zenbei, Jap. Ambassador to Italy	IV, (385)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	IV, 378, 561
Hornell, T. L., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1899-1902	III, 498
Hoover, H., U.S. President 1928-32	I, 4, 16, 30, 37, (46)
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	II, 97, 100, (926)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	III, 6, 16, 19
Hornell, T. L., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1899-1902	IV, 136, 141, 143, 147-149, 226, 290
Hoogstraten, Chief of Commerce, N.E.I.	I, 66, (407-410)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	II, 268-295 <i>passim</i> , (1041), (1063), (1112)
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, 599-662 <i>passim</i>
Hornell, T. L., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1899-1902	IV, 520-523
Hoover, H., U.S. President 1928-32	II, 102 (310)
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, (365)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	I, 8
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, 123
Hornell, T. L., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 1899-1902	I, 26
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	II, 89, 90, 108, (361)
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, (15)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	I, (78), (79)
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, 583
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	IV, 242
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	I, 61, (283)
Hornbeam, Sir A., Ambassador to Russia	II, 103, 135, 152, 153, 155, 161, 166, 167, 172, 174, 258, 285
Hopkins, H., adviser to Roosevelt	III, 495-501, 503-508, 684

## THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Horinouchi, Kensuke, Jap. Ambassador to U.S. preceding Nomura	IV, 423-432, 434-437, 504, 509
Horiuchi, official in Jap Embassy in Washington	I, (1)
	I, (78), (79)
	IV, 31, 242, (385)
Horiuchi, Jap. official in Shanghai	III, 397, 399, 416, 417, 420, 421, 425, 512
Hornbeck, S. K., of the Far Eastern Division, U.S. State Dept.	III, 75, (47)
Hoshida, H., official in Jap Embassy in Washington	IV, 191
	III, 165, (467)
	IV, (385)
Hoshino, N., Jap. Cabinet member	I, 16
Hosoi, J., professor, Catholic University (Tokyo?)	IV, 504
Houston, Texas	II, 113
Houston, U.S. Cruiser	II, 147, 148
	IV, 150, 156, 160, 164
<i>How War Came</i> , by F. Davis & E. Lindley	I, 55
	III, 432
Howard, Roy, U.S. publisher	I, 9, 26, 51, (280), (301)
Howard Field, Panama	IV, 128
Hoy, newspaper publ. in Mexico City	II, (385)
	IV, 315
Hozuituk, member of the Cooper Party touring the Far East	IV, 50
Hsinan, China	III, 162
Hsinking, Manchuria,	IV, 169, 177, 204, 210, 227, 392, 394, 397, 399, 516
	V, 14, 17
Hsu Chung-chih, Inspector, Chinese Nationalist Party	II, (695)
Hsu Hsiang-chien, commander of the 2nd Chinese Communist Army	II, (938)
Hu Shih, Chinese Amb. to U.S.	I, (200)
	III, 130, 558
Hu Tsung-man, Chinese Army Commander	III, 562
Huang Chi-hsiang, former commander of the Kwantung Army	II, (953)
Huang Hsu-chu, cmdr. Chinese 5th Army	II, (953)
Huang Yen-pei, Chinese educator	III, 552
Hull, C., U.S. Secretary of State	I, 1-29 <i>passim</i> II, 1-41, 141 III, 1-132 <i>passim</i> IV, 1-116 <i>passim</i> , 191, 221, 437 V, 1-3, 5
Hunan Province, China	II, 123, (953)
Hungary	I, (236), (296), (373) II, 180, 183, 191 III, 437, 474, 498
Hunters Point	IV, 401 V, 13, 17
Huntziger, C., French (Vichy) General	III, 139 II, 154 III, 392 IV, (731), (796)
Husseini, Al, Arabic Grand Mufti	IV, 412
Hwang Chang-chi	III, 614
Hwanghsien, China	III, 162
Hyasaki, Shinichi, Jap. Consul in Medan, Sumatra	IV, 529
Iba Airbase, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 151, 155, 347
Iceland	II, 53, 71, 133 III, 57, 120, (806)
Ichihashi, Jap. official, London	IV, 401 II, 323
Ichikawa, Jap. Minister in Iran	II, 192 III, 403, 419

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Ickes, H., U.S. Sec'y of Interior	II, (98)
Ida (or Ide?), Jap. official in Manchuria	II, (692)
	IV, (862)
<i>Igarka</i> , Russian ship	III, 139
I. G. (Farben), German Corporation	III, 480, (855) V, 10, (14), (21)
Iglesias, U.P. Correspondent, Chile	III, (693) IV, (644)
Iguchi, involved in repatriation of U.S. missionaries in Korea	III, 365
Iguchi, Sadao, Counselor in Japanese Embassy in Washington	I, 2, (32), (77), (185) II, 52, 94, 102, 103, (74), (77), (130), (309), (314), (1097)
	III, 9, 64, 97, 98, 116, 163
Iida, S., Lt. Gen., Vice-Consul, Hanoi	IV, 1, 58, 188, 242, 247, 254, (385) II, 215 III, 544
	IV, 456, (1139) II, (963)
Ikeda, J., Col., Jap. Army	IV, 152, 157
"Iko's", negro soldiers, Philippines	
Illah, Emir Abdul,—see Emir Abdul Illah	
<i>L'Illustration</i> , French magazine	IV, 450, 460
Ilocos Province, Philippines	IV, 158
Imagawa, of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Batavia, N.E.	II, 295, (1122) III, 598-600, 602, 604, 605, 610, 611, 640, 652, (1113)
	IV, 532, (1044), (1050)
Imai, sec'y in the Japanese Consulate in San Francisco	III, 205, 441
	IV, (385)
<i>Imperia</i> , ship name	III, 374
Imperial Petroleum, Jap. Co.	III, 609
Inagaki, of American Bureau of the Jap. Foreign Office	III, 69
Inagaki, K., Jap. Consul, San Francisco	II, (80), (219), (352) III, 205
	IV, (385)
Inagawa, official in Jap Embassy in Washington	IV, 60 (385)
Indelli, M., Italian Amb. to Japan	II, (594) III, (941)
	IV, 437, (873)
Independent Bank in Moscow	II, (661)
India	I, 1, 65 II, 23, 150, 156, 183, 227
	IV, 431
	V, 6, (6)
Industrial Commercial Bureau, China	II, 235
Infanta, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 151
<i>Infantry Journal</i> , U.S. publication	III, 224
Ingersoll, Rear Adm. Royal E., U.S. Ass't Chief of Naval Operations	II, 62
Inland Sea, Japan	II, 252
Inner Mongolia	III, 31, 44, 59, 112 IV, 29, 38
	III, 660
Ino, Jap Minister of Agriculture and Forestry	IV, 314
Inoma, Japanese courier	IV, 405, 408
Inonu, I., President of Turkey	IV, 401
Inoue, Jap. Ambassador to Hungary	IV, 242, (385)
Inoye, Jap. Consul in New York City	
Intelligence—see U.S. Intelligence and Japan Intelligence	II, (552)
International Cultural Advancement Society (in Rome)	II, (926)
International League of Propaganda Organs (Allied counter propaganda)	IV, (418)
International News Service (I.N.S.)	III, (372)
International Relief Association	
International Students Association	III, 503

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Interventionists	
Ioka, member of Sumitomo Corp.	I, 1 II, (1065)
Iran	II, 181, 185, 192 (653), (698) III, 55, 155, 157, 381, 392-394, 403, 406, 411, 419, 422, 423 IV, 168, 401 V, 15, 52
Iraq	I, (22), (307), (375), (377), (380) II, 47, 155, 183 (601), (612), (701), (768), (792) III, 406, 411, 422, 423 IV, (6), 382, 394, 401 V, 14
Ireland	I, (34) III, 58, (759)
Iriki, official in Jap Embassy in Washington	IV, 401
Iron	IV, (385) II, 191, 208, 289, 321 III, 254, 255, 353, 506, 647, 660, (385) IV, 369 V, 27
<i>Isabel</i> , U.S. ship	IV, 150, 156, 160, 164, (229)
Isfahan, Iran	V, (52)
Ishii, member of Domei Information Board	I, (302) II, (129), (337)
Ishii, Lt. Col.	II, 288
Ishii, Viscount, at London Economic Conference	IV, 72
Ishii, Itaro, Jap. Ambass. to Brazil	I, (128), (224), (340) II, 120, 121 III, (153), 336, 339, 343, 356, 359, 576 IV, 135, 338, 343, 350-359, 362
Ishii, Taro-see Maj. Kubo	
Ishibashi, H., representative of <i>Nichi-Nichi</i> in French Indo-China	IV, 585
Ishida, employed in Jap Consulate in Chicago	IV, (385)
Ishida, employed in Jap Consulate in Manila	IV, (385)
Ishikawa, Captain, Jap. Navy	III, 184
Ishikawa, Maj., Jap. Ass't Military Attaché in U.S.	III, 196
Ishizawa, Yutaka, Jap. Consul-General in Batavia	I, 66, (407) II, 272, 274, 275, 279-287, 294-299 III, 597-663 <i>passim</i> IV, 520-539
Isoda, S., Jap. Military Attaché in Washington	III, 200
Isolationists	IV, 108 I, 1, (18), (375) II, (736) III, 81, (11) IV, 368, 432
Isono, Jap Consul-General in Rangoon, Burma	IV, 561
Istanbul, Turkey	II, (203) V, 13
Italo Radio, Italian Radio Co.	I, 30
Italy (see also Tripartite Pact)	I, 1, 9, 25, 26, 35, 42, (2), (31), (32) II, 1, 4, 7, 15, 45, 94, 99, 138, 139, 1191, (704) III, 495, 498, 500, 501, 503-508 IV, 7, 113, 266, 341, 519 V, 11, (52) III, 334, (1312)
Ito, Jap. Lt. Col.	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Ito, official of Jap Home Ministry	III, 193
Ito, Jap. Consul in Mexico	II, 113, (404), (410)
Ito, Keisuke, member of Jap Far Eastern Economic Research Bureau	II, 283, 323
Ito, Kenzo, Jap Consul in New Orleans	I, (265)
	IV, 229
Ito, Nobumori, Chief of Information Bureau in Tokyo	I, 141
	III, 473
Ito, Col., Mil. Attaché in Fr. In-Ch.	IV, 491
Ito, Taro, Jap Sec'y in Hanoi	IV, 456
Ito Chu Co. (Itochu Sheji Kaisha)	IV, 311
Itsukushima Maru, Jap. ship	III, 132
	IV, 187, 189
Iwai, Jap Vice-Consul in Thailand	IV, 563
Iwai, Jap official in Hong Kong	II, 930
Iwai Shoten (Jap. Company)	II, 277
	III, (1151)
Iwakuro, Hideo, Col., adviser to Nomura and aide to the Jap.	I, 8, 19, (3), (138)
Military Attaché in Washington	II, 6-91 <i>passim</i>
	III, 8, 31
	V, 1-3, 6
Iwamatsu, of the Jap. 1st Army	IV, 506
Iwanaga, Hiraku, Jap. Consul	IV, (russian Embassy in Tokyo)
	III, (921)
Iwasa, Col., in U.S. with Nomura	III, 127
Iwasaki, T., Jap agent with Silver Shirts	II, 104
Iwatake, Jap. sec'y in Singapore	II, 248
Izawa, M., Jap. Consul in Panama	II, 94, (226), (227), (229), (234-236), (242)
	III, 239
	IV, 263, 276, 286, (612)
<i>Izvestia</i> , Russian newspaper	III, 493
Izumi, Jap official in Sofia, Bulgaria	II, 171
Jakobsen	V, (44)
Jaluit I., Marshall Is.	II, 109
	IV, 48, 67, 76
	II, (765)
Jannelli, P., Italian Commercial Attaché in Tokyo	I, 8, 29, (15)
Japan	II, 10, 12, 27, 37, 49, 52, 102, 232
Army	I, 8, 29, (15)
Axis relations—see Tripartite Pact, Germany, Italy.	
Chinese relations—see China.	
Codes (see also Codes, Jap.)	I, 31, 36, 45, 46, 65, 67 II, 109, 122, 186, 191, 237, 279 I, 1-(41) <i>passim</i>
German relations	II, 87 III, 432-481 IV, 15, 17, 41, 62, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 90, 113, 393-413 V, 9, 10, 12, 14
Government	I, 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 16, 62, (4) II, 1, 10, 12, 35-61, 88, 218, 280, (103) III, 24, 31, 37, 38, 53, 64, 72, 73, 457 IV, 10, 172, 177, 399, (1147) II, 146 I, 30-68 <i>passim</i>
International Cultural Advancement Society	II, 31, 35, 93-97, 113, 114, 235, 236, 239, 275, (411-413)
Intelligence and espionage	III, 9, 85, 99, 133-157, 160, 226,

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Press (see also Domei, Asahi, Hochi, and Nichi-Nichi)	236, 242, 329, 337-340
Public opinion concerning war	IV, 121-169, 239, 602
	V, 6, 14, 15
U.S. relations, negotiations and proposals	I, 2, 19, 28, 37, 38, 49, (1)
	I, 1, 8, 11, 16, 40
	II, 4, 5, 15, 17, 27, 41, 43, 49, 64, 76,
	77, 84, 280
	I, 1-29
	II, 1-92
	III, 1-132
	IV, 1-120
	V, 1-5
Japan Broadcasting System	I, (415)
Japan-Eastern Mining Co.	IV, 181
Japan Electric Co.	II, 45, (113)
Japan Musical Instrument Co.	V, (16), (21)
<i>Japan Newsweek</i> , Jap. publication	III, (888)
Japanese-American negotiations—see Japan, U.S. relations.	
Japanese Association	IV, 220
Japanese Aviation Co.	II, (806)
Japanese Continental Trading Co.	IV, 406
Japanese East Asia Bureau	II, 197
Japanese Fuel Bureau	II, 283
	III, 289, 601, 609, 626
Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact	
See also Russia and Japan	V, 2, 7, 17
<i>Japanese Times and Advertiser</i>	IV, 17, 26, 32
Japanese Trade Bureau	III, 607
<i>Japan Trade Monthly</i>	III, 444
Japanese South Seas General Merchandise Guild	II, 276
Japanese Steel Production Control Association	IV, 404
Java Bank	III, 510
<i>Java-Bo</i> , Javanese newspaper	III, 663
Jeschonek, H., German General	V, (29)
Jesst, A., German agent in Mexico	III, (583)
Jews	I, 42, 43, (175), (311)
	II, 104, 183, (219), (353), (689)
	III, 67, 443
	IV, 516
	III, (1314)
	IV, 563
John's Dispensary, Jap espionage center in Bangkok	I, (208)
Johnson, N. T., U.S. Amb. to China	IV, 381
Johol Rubber Plantation, Singapore	III, 378
Johore, Malaya	II, (1119)
<i>Johore Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 618
Jolo, Philippines	III, 148
Jones, British editorial writer for the Singapore <i>Herald</i>	III, 384
Jones, Jesse, U.S. Sec'y Commerce	II, 106
Jones, R. M., U.S. transport expert sent to the Burma Road	IV, 137
Jose Panganiban, Luzon I., P.I.	IV, 158
Jouan, Rene-Marie, Col., commanding French Indo-China forces	III, 544
Juan, in Fr. In-Ch. Governor-General's office	II, (819)
Juichi, Shimizu, Jap Consul in Thailand	III, 698
Julian, manager of the RKO	IV, (544)
Juneau, Alaska	III, 16, 30, 31
Junkers Company, Germany	III, 480
	V, 10, (16), (32)
Jushukin, P., Russian Ambassador to Chungking	II, 246
Justo, A. P., Argentine General and leader of a pro-democratic party	III, (667)

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Jyu faction (in the Philippines) .....	III, 274
K Company, Netherlands East Indies .....	III, 610
<i>Kabarundo</i> , ship name .....	II, 148
Kagesa, Jap Admiral or Major General acting as adviser in Nanking affairs .....	I, (352)
<i>Kagi Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	III, 578
Kahoolawe Island, Hawaii .....	II, (427)
Kaifeng, China .....	IV, 139
Kaihara, Jap official in Mexico .....	III, 162
<i>Kaiho Nippo</i> , Jap newspaper .....	III, 302
Kailan Coal Mines, China .....	II, (912)
Kailan Coal Mines, China .....	II, 246
Kaiser Wilhelm .....	II, 51
<i>Kaisoku Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	II, (262)
"Kaiui" Straits, N. of Hawaii .....	III, 267, 270
<i>Kaiyo Maru</i> , Jap ship .....	IV, 143
Kajiwara, telegrapher in Jap Embassy in Washington .....	II, 168
Kajiya, employed in the Japanese Consulate in Davao, P.I. ....	I, (78), (185)
Kakiage .....	IV, (385)
Kakitsubo, official of the European-American Office, Tokyo .....	III, 274
Kakiuchi, Jap. Navy Captain .....	IV, 303
<i>Kaku Maru</i> , Jap ship .....	IV, 487
Kakutani, ass't prof. Osaka Univ. ....	IV, 360
Kalama House, Oahu I., Hawaii (secret signal site) .....	III, 220
Kalaradja, Java .....	IV, 144
Kalgan, China .....	III, 653
<i>Kamakura Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	II, (692)
Kamata, employed in Jap Consulate in Los Angeles .....	II, 115
Kamchatka Peninsula, Siberia .....	IV, (385)
Kameda, Lt. Cmdr., Jap Ass't Naval Attaché in Chile .....	II, 190
<i>Kamedo Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	III, 55, 172
Kanakura, Jap representative in Rome .....	II, (453)
Kane, U.S. ship .....	III, 243
Kanebo, Jap. textile Company .....	III, 376
Kaneko, of Jap Petroleum Co. in Mexico .....	II, (552)
Kaneko, official in Jap. Consulate in Seattle .....	III, (935)
Kaneohe, Oahu I., Hawaii .....	IV, 121
<i>Kanju Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	I, (190)
Kano, mgr. Specie Bank, London branch .....	II, (448)
Kanto Army, Manchuria .....	III, 326
Karachi, India .....	I, (175)
Karafuto, Sakhalin I., Jap. half .....	IV, (385)
Karasawa, Director of Toa Kenkyusho .....	IV, 465, 472
Karlwitz, German Firm .....	III, 383
Kasahara, Jap. representative in Peru .....	IV, 419
Kasai, member of Jap. Diet .....	III, 387
<i>Kasai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	I, (323), (353)
Kase, Shun-ichi, Counselor at the Jap Embassy in Berlin .....	II, (640), (785)
<i>Kasai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	III, (1019)
<i>Kasai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	IV, 406
<i>Kasai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	II, (456)
Kasai, member of Jap. Diet .....	III, 37, 54, 64, 76, 478
Kasai, member of Jap. Diet .....	IV, 9, 172
<i>Kasai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	I, 181
Kase, Shun-ichi, Counselor at the Jap Embassy in Berlin .....	I, (225)
Kase, Shun-ichi, Counselor at the Jap Embassy in Berlin .....	II, (773), (986)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Kase, T., Chief of 1st Section American Bureau, Jap. Foreign Ministry	III, 590
<i>Kashima</i> , Jap Flagship of 4th Fleet	IV, 399, 411
Kashi Co., Jap Corp.	IV, 11, 36, 45
Kashitoro, R.	IV, (139)
Kata, Chief Panama Canal Defense Div.	II, 277
Kataoka, employed in the Jap Legation in Mexico	III, 280
Kato, member of the Jap Legation in Argentina	IV, 277
Kato, Jap. official in London	II, 111
Kato, Domei official, Washington	II, (392)
Kato, Jap agent in Mexico	III, 380
Kato, Jap official, Foreign and Domestic Commerce	IV, 253
Kato Firm	III, 305
Kato, Sotomatsu, Jap. Ambass. to Vichy	IV, 348
	III, 311, 315
Katoda, Jap. interpreter	II, 66, 101, 153, 154, 198, 215, 218-226, 228, 229, (283), (480), (571)
Katsuno, Jap. Vice-Consul at Singora, Malay States	III, 511, 650
Kaufmann, Director of Hamburg, Germany	IV, 447-491 <i>passim</i>
Kawabata, communications clerk, Jap. Consulate, Chicago	II, (692)
Kawahara, of Jap Petrol Co., Mexico	II, 323, (490)
Kawai, Jap. Minister to Australia	III, (810)
Kawaminami, Jap. official in Manila	IV, (787)
Kawamoto, official in Jap. Embassy in London	I, (79), (80)
Kawamura, Lt. Col., Jap Cryptanalyst	IV, (385)
Kawasaki Steamship Co.	II, (448)
Kawasaki, Jap official in Vancouver	I, (389)
Kawasaki, Jap Consul in Santiago, Chile	IV, 257
	II, 122
Kawashima, Jap official	III, 465
Kayahara, Jap clerk in Bangkok	II, (319)
Kayohara, Jap secretary in Berlin	III, 56
Kazama, Ryu, Jap interpreter	III, 414
Kazavin, Iran	IV, 369, 386
Kazayama, Chief of Staff, Jap Army in North China	I, (124)
Keelung, Taiwan	II, 121, (457)
Keijo, Korea—see Seoul	III, 363
Keitel, Wilhelm, German Field Marshal	IV, (609)
Keki, Mgr. of Yokohama Specie Bank	IV, 564
Kemp, German (?) cryptanalyst	II, (762)
Kennedy, J. C., U.S. Amb. to London	V, (55)
Kerr, Sir Archibald J. C., British Ambassador to Chungking	III, 403
	IV, 515
Khabarovsk, Russia	II, (505)
Kharkov, Russia	III, 448
Kiangsu Province, China	V, 12
Kido, Marquis, adviser to Jap Emperor	III, 610
Kiev, Russia	III, 465
Kiev, Russian ship	II, (219)
Kihara, Jap clerk in New York	II, (500), (889), (919)
Kihara, Jap Attaché in Mexico	III, 397
Kihara, Jap sec'y in Consulate in Lima, Peru	IV, 416
	III, 524
	II, 235
	III, 120
	II, (743), (757)
	III, 139
	IV, (694)
	II, (228)
	III, 374

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Kihara, Jap Consul at Davao, P.I.	III, 146, 148, 249, 250, 257, 276
Kijima, employed in the Jap Consulate at Manila	IV, 150
Kikaya, Jap. Finance Minister	IV, (385)
Kikuo, Kurauchi, Jap researcher, Pasteur Institute, Bandoeng, Java	IV, 53
Kimmel, H.E., Admiral and Cominch U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1941	III, 656
King, E. J., Admiral and Commander U.S. Atlantic Fleet in 1941	II, 70, (180)
King, E. J., Admiral and Commander U.S. Atlantic Fleet in 1941	II, 70, (180), (272)
King, E. J., Admiral and Commander U.S. Atlantic Fleet in 1941	III, (15)
King, M., Prime Minister, Canada	III, 386, 396, 404
Kinoshita, Domei employee in New York	IV, (461)
Kinoshita, Jap. engineer in Europe	IV, 404
Kinoshita, T., Jap Consul at Ankara	V, 10
"Kinyo Kai", a Jap association in Manila	II, (642)
<i>Kirishima Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 260
Kishimoto, H., customs official at Shanghai	II, (318), (334)
Kita, Nagao, Jap. Consul-General in Honolulu	III, 425
Kita, Nagao, Jap. Consul-General in Honolulu	I, (198)
Kita, Nagao, Jap. Consul-General in Honolulu	II, 100, (269), (278)
Kita, Nagao, Jap. Consul-General in Honolulu	III, 149, 151
Kita, Nagao, Jap. Consul-General in Honolulu	IV, 136, 139, 141, 145, 147-149, (385)
Kitano, Jap. courier	III, 1110
Kitazato Experimental Institute	III, 656
Kitazawa, Commander of Jap army in North China	IV, 515
<i>Kito Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 371
<i>Kiyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 631, 646
Kiyohara, Jap. secretary	III, 193
Kiyono, Yoshihide, Jap. Communist in Hsinking, Manchuria	IV, 416
<i>Kiyozumi Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (318), (334)
Kleist, Paul von, German General	IV, 411
Klingenberg Co.	V, (24)
Knox, F., U.S. Sec'y Navy	I, 1, 21, 26, 27, 46
Ko Mon Kai Society (Philippines)	II, 42, 98
Koan Maru, Jap ship	IV, 5, 7, 10, 33, 309
Kobata, Jap. official	III, 275
Kobayashi, Jap. Cabinet Member	II, (456)
Kobayashi, Jap. Minister in Bangkok	IV, 187
Kobayashi, Jap. Vice-Consul in San Francisco	I, 16, (227)
Kobayashi Firm	III, 695
Kobe, Japan	IV, 307
<i>Kobe Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 382
Koch, Erich, Director of East Prussia	II, 252, (1186)
Kodama, Jap. Business man in N.E.I.	IV, 428, 584
Koden Maru, Jap. ship	III, (810)
Koga, Jap. Admiral	IV, 401
Koga, Jiro, Jap. agent	IV, 531
Koizumi, Jap. agent	II, (262)
Kojima Affair	III, 596
Koko, Yoichi, Lt. Col., Jap. Military Attaché to Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia	II, 104
Kokumin, Jap. newspaper	IV, (1021)
Kokura Arms Factory	II, (353)
<i>Kokuryu Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (457)
<i>Kokuyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 193
Kola Peninsula, Russia	V, (24)
Kolhoz system (Russia)	IV, 458
Komori, head of a Jap-German broadcasting association	II, (316)
Komori, head of a Jap-German broadcasting association	IV, 396
Komori, head of a Jap-German broadcasting association	IV, 407
Komori, head of a Jap-German broadcasting association	III, 467
Komori, head of a Jap-German broadcasting association	IV, (723)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Kompontrach, airport in Fr. In-China	II, (796)
Komura, Jap. courier	II, (608), (767)
Komuro, Jap official (Balkans)	III, (836)
Kondo, Jap. Vice-Consul in New York	IV, (385), 242
Kondo, of the Dutch E. Indies Co.	IV, 531, 534
<i>Kongo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, (139)
Konigsberg, Latvia	V, 14
Kono, involved in the Tachibana incident	II, (289)
Konovaletz Party	V, (45)
Konoye, Fuminoro, Prince, Prime Minister of Japan	I, 1-29 <i>passim</i> , (41), (42), (46), (47), (106), (197), (417)
Konoye, H., brother of F. Konoye	II, 1-57 <i>passim</i> , 92, 221, 233, 267, (595), (818), (853)
Korea	III, 4-132, 477, 592, 596, 696, (663)
Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	IV, 10, 38, 45, (114), (142), (147), 411, 500, (1147)
Kosaka, telegrapher in Jap. Embassy in Washington and courier	III, 477
Koseki, Jap. representative in Asuncion, Paraguay	I, 39, (337)
Koshi, Jap. official in Panama	II, 90, 102, (692)
Kotani, Jap. official in Batavia	III, 158
Kotani, Jap. agent in Manchuria	IV, 171
Koto, Jap. businessman in U.S.	II, (310-315)
Kowloon, China	III, 339
Koyama, Jap. official at Manila	IV, 100, 231, 234, 245, 314, 323, 351
Koyamada, Jap. representative in China (Nanking)	IV, 345
Kra Peninsula, Thailand	IV, 279
Krasnoyarsk, Russia	III, 599, 600, 605
Kremlin, Moscow	IV, 520
Kronstadt, Russia	II, 183
Kubai, accompanied Matsuoka on his European trip	III, (413)
Kubo, alias Taro Ishii, Jap. Major sent to Bangkok	II, (505)
Kubota, president of Jap. Pacific Petroleum Company	II, 103
Kudo, Jap. official in Latin America	III, 576
Kuga (or Koga?), Jap. courier	II, 323
Kuge, official of Jap. Home Ministry	IV, 92
Kuibyshev, Russia	IV, 169
Kula Road, Hawaii (secret signal site)	III, 564
Kunming, China	IV, 396
Kuomintang—see China, Nationalist Party	I, (492)
Kung Hsiang-hsi, member of the Chinese Central Executive Yuan	IV, 547
<i>Kunikawa Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (448)
Kurata, official in Jap. Consulate in San Francisco	III, 282, 322
Kuribayashi, Jap. businessman	III, 339
Kurihara, Sho, Jap. Ambass. to Turkey	III, 136, 193, 235
Kurisuchan Niiruson Company	III, 193
	IV, 169
	IV, 144
	II, (926), (952)
	III, 555
	I, (355)
	II, 235, (922)
	III, (1054)
	II, (427), (429)
	III, 205
	IV, (385)
	III, 617
	II, (576)
	III, 237
	III, 696

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Kuriya, Jap. Major in Batavia	IV, 523, 528
Kuriya, Yoshizumi, of the Tokyo Ooki Drug Store	IV, 563
Kurokawa, Jap. engineer	IV, (1114)
Kuroki, T., Jap. Consul at Dili, Timor	IV, 527, 532
Kurusu, Saburo, former Jap. Amb. to Germany, Aide to Nomura Nov-Dec. '41	I, (141) II, 91 IV, 16-114 <i>passim</i> , 244, 252, 344, 364, 401, 417, 496
Kusano, Sec'y in Jap. Legation in Rio de Janeiro	II, (455) IV, 357
Kwangsi Province, China	II, 243
Kwantung Peninsula, Manchuria (and Kwantung Army)	I, (359) II, 183, 267, (692), (707) III, (818) IV, 398, 421, (706), (851), (856)
Kweichow, China	II, 243
Kweilin, China	II, (952)
Kweiyang, China	II, (921), (952) III, 546
Kyowa Kai, a political association in Manchuria	IV, 416
Kyushu I., Japan	II, 242
Kyushu Maru, Jap. ship	II, (342), (344)
Labor Unions	I, 33, 35, (162), (175)
LaGuardia, Fiorello, Mayor of New York, once head of National Defense	II, 68, 85
Laguna Oil Co.	II, (445), (446)
Lahaina Roads, Hawaiian Is.	IV, 139
Lake Baikal, Russia	II, 183
Lake Gatun, Panama	IV, 134
Lamon Bay, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 158
Lamao, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Langley, U.S. Carrier	III, 148
Langley Point, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 164
Lanikai Beach, Oahu I., Hawaii	IV, 144
Laoag, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 158
La Razon, Buenos Aires newspaper	IV, 349
La Rocque, Vichy General	III, 395
Laredo, Texas	II, 113 III, (585) III, 397, 560
Lashio, Burma—see also Burma Road	IV, 562
Latham, J. G., Australian Minister to Japan	I, (389)
Latin America—see also Good Neighbor Policy	I, 1, 4, 11, 19, 25, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, (158) II, 4-45 <i>passim</i> , 68, 144, 183, 192, 227, 244, (908) III, 28, 100, 102, 114, 125, 132 IV, 126, 253, 264, 266, 317, 334-365 V, 17, (7)
Lattimore, Owen, U.S. representative in China, and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek	II, 236, 247, (940) III, 550, 562
Latvia	IV, 496 II, 181 V, (14)
Laur, Luzon I., Philippines	III, 148 IV, 151
Laurencio Marques, S.E. Africa	II, 126
Laval, Pierre, Vichy Vice-Premier	I, (241), (326) II, 4, 153, 198 III, 432, 521, (966)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

### *Vol. Sec.*

Law for the Provisional Control of Distributing Literature	II, 102
Lawford, official in Shanghai Customs Office	III, (787)
Lawson, J. K., General, in command of Canadian troops, Hong Kong	IV, 380
Lead	III, 320, 327
League of Nations	IV, 85
Leahy, William, U.S. Ambassador to Vichy	I, 38 II, 153, (709) III, 195, 534 III, 451 IV, 348
Leather	III, 148 II, (254) II, (750), (752)
Legaspi, Luzon I., Philippines	II, 36, 42 III, 85, (15), 371, 411 IV, 68, 394, 396, 412
Leido, Jose	I, 362
Lemburg (Lwow), Poland	II, 191, (743), (771) III, 422, 440, 448, 452, 481, 486, 524
Lend-Lease—see also China—Brit.—U.S. aid to; Britain-U.S. aid to; Russia-U.S. aid to	II, 94 IV, 147
Lenin, Nikolai, Head of the Soviet Republic	III, 591
Leningrad	III, (1044) II, (953)
U.S.S. Lexington, U.S. aircraft carrier	IV, 498, 511
Li, Chinese Minister in Nanking Puppet Government	III, (1032), (1044)
Li Chi-shen, member of Chinese Central Executive Yuan	III, (1043) III, 450, 588, 591
Li Fang, Jap. (Nanking) Minister to Rumania	IV, 498, 511
Li Han-hun, Cdr. 56th Division, Kwantung Forces	IV, (1022)
Li Pin Hsien, Cdr. of Ch. forces between Anhwei and Hankow	III, (1043)
Li Sheng-wu, Nanking Gov't Ambassador to Germany	IV, 98
Li Shih Chun	II, (390)
Li Tsung-jen, Inspector and Chief of Ch. 4th Army	IV, 263, 280
Libya	I, 19
Lima, Peru	III, 101
Lima Conference	II, (947)
Lin Pai-sheng, Chief of Nanking Publicity Section	IV, 500
Lin Piao, Chinese Communist	III, 550
Liu Po-chao, Chief of Staff, Ch. Communist Armies	II, 246, (937), (938) III, 550
Lin T'su-han, Chinese Communist	III, 550
Lindbergh, Charles A.	I, 26, (34) II, 42, 106, (219) III, 67, 76, 200 IV, 28, 192
Lingayen, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 151, 152, 160
Linseed	IV, 348
Lisbon, Portugal	II, 45, 99, (275), (480), (763) IV, 509
Liszt, Sigmund, German Field Marshal	III, 453 IV, 403
Lithuania	II, 181
Liu Tsu-tan, Cdr. Ch. Communist 26th Army	III, (1044)
Liverpool, British cruiser	IV, 131
Living Age, Jap publication	III, 197
Litvinoff, Maxim, Former Russian Foreign Minister	II, (700)

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Livorno, Italy	V, (20)
Llasa, Tibet	II, (892)
Llergo, Jose, Mexican reporter for <i>Hoy</i> , to report for Japanese	II, 110
Lockhart, U.S. Counselor in Shanghai	III, (787)
London	II, 72
	IV, 232, 322, 349
Long, Breckenridge, Assistant Secretary of State	IV, 9
Los Angeles, California	I, 30, (118)
	IV, 179, 220, 226, 231, 237, 253, 284
	319, 331
<i>Los Angeles News</i> , U.S. newspaper	IV, 223
<i>U.S.S. Louisville</i> , U.S. ship	II, 93
Lozovsky, Solomon A., Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs	I, (336), (337)
Lu Ting-kuei, Secretary of the National Socialist Party, Shanghai	III, 559
Lu Yi-wen, Manchurian Minister to Germany	IV, 399
Luang Bhrom Yothi(Puromu), Thaiese Vice-Minister of Defense	IV, 591
Luang Pibul Songgram, Thaiese Prime Minister	I, (413)
	II, 261, 305-323, (820)
	III, 670-714
	IV, 546-611
Luang Pradit Manudhram, Thaiese Finance Minister	II, 320, (1174), (1176)
	III, 682, 714, (1228)
Luang Sindhu, Thaiese Minister of Education	IV, 604, 606, 611
Luftwaffe (German Air Force)	II, 152
Lumber	III, 267, 273, 451, (514)
	IV, 386
Lunghai Railroad, China	III, 570
Luxembourg	I, 35
Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 158
Lwow(Lemburg), Poland—see Lemburg	
Lyon, Cecil, Secretary in U.S. Embassy, Tokyo	I, (240)
Ma Hung-kiu, Cdr. Ch. 15th Route Army	II, (937)
Mabuchi, Jap. Col. opposed to U.S.-Jap. understanding	III, 98
Macao, Port. island in Canton R., China	II, 242, 245, (931)
	III, 549
	IV, 444, 509
MacArthur, Douglas, U.S. Gen., Cdr. Forces in Far East	III, 148, 249
	IV, 89, 95
Machinery	II, 112, 165, 194, 292
	III, 289, 304, 322, 413, 416, 420, 480, 637
	IV, 367
Madrid, Spain	V, 8, 11
	II, 263
	IV, 105
Maeda, employed in Jap. Embassy, Washington	III, 450
	IV, (385)
Maeda, Jap. army official, Batavia	II, 288
Maeda, Jap. courier	IV, 290
Magellan Straits, South America	IV, 362
Maglioni, Cardinal, Vatican Secretary of State	I, (285)
Magruder, John, Major General, head of U.S. Army Commission to China	III, 38, 566
Maine, U.S. ship	I, 2, (1)
	III, 93
	II, 256
<i>Mainichi</i> , Jap. newspaper published in Osaka and Shanghai	III, 269, (523)
<i>Makassar Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (1119)
Makino, employed at the Johol Rubber plantation	IV, 381
Malay States	I, 1
	II, 5, 41, 71, 227, 243, 269, 296, (543), (1039), (1042), (1150)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Malta	IV, 166, 514, 562, 589, 614, 618, 620
<i>Manchen Maersk</i> , former Danish ship under Panama registry	V, 6
Manchuli, Manchuria	I, 35, (375)
Manchuria (Manchukuo)	IV, 165
	II, 169
	IV, 420
	I, 16, 19, 20, 55, 59, 61, (22), (41), (46), (48), (55), (106), (220), (236), (352), (354), (358), (369)
	II, 1, 18, 74, 90, 158–191, 237–270, 322, (8), (91), (146), (154), (537), (543), (584–587)
	III, 27, 32, 80, 120
	IV, 227, 255, 398, 399, 404, 409, 414–422
	V, 10, 17, (14)
Manchurian Airplane Co.	V, 10, (16)
Manchurian-Mongolian Border Commission	III, 484
Manchurian Petroleum Co.	V, (14)
Manchurian Railroad Co.	III, (819)
Manchurian Railway Public Health Research Institute	III, 656, (1206)
Mandate Islands	II, 215
Mandel, former French Minister of Colonies	IV, 48, 67, 89, (165)
Manganese	IV, (943)
Manila, Luzon I., Philippines	II, 208
	I, 39, (42)
	II, 96, 103, (894), (920), (820)
	III, 118
	IV, 65, 138–151, 156–161, 164, 232, 234, 257–258, 297, 299–306, 322, 370, 400, 502, 509
Mannerheim, Karl Gustaf, German Marshal; leader of Rumanian army	II, 180
Manzanillo, Mexico	IV, (726)
	I, (182)
	II, 113, 117, 118
	III, (139), 289, 294, 296, 297, 299– 301, 306, 312, 313, 315, 319, 320, 323
	IV, 174, 237, 319, 321, 329
Mao, Jap. official in Mexico	IV, 351
Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader	II, (696), (936), (937)
	III, 551, (1055)
Maoek, Java	III, 653
Marblehead, U.S. ship	III, 148
	IV, 150, 156, 160
March Field, U.S.	III, 138
Marconi Telegraph Company in South America	I, 30
	IV, (599)
Marines (U.S.)	IV, 248, 347
Maritime Commission, (U.S.)	III, 102
Mariveles, Luzon I., Philippines	III, 144, 148
	IV, 151, 155
Markiw(v?), Boris, Ukrainian Nationalist leader	V, (45)
Marshal, <i>Joffre</i> , French liner	III, 217, 260
Marshall, George, General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff	III, (15)
	IV, 110, 352
Marshall Islands	IV, 89
Martin, Economic Representative from French Indo-China	IV, 479
Martinez, Juan R.	III, 370

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
<i>U.S.S. Maryland</i> , U.S. battleship	IV, 121
Marysville, Washington	III, 137
Masaryk, Jan, Premier of Czechoslovakia	IV, (397)
Masayoshi, Morino, Jap. courier	III, 300
Masayuki, Jap. courier	III, 300
Matayame, Jap. courier	II, (762)
Matchek Faction, Croatia	III, 498
Matson Steamship Co.	III, (358)
Matsudaira, Koto, Secretary in Jap. Embassy, Washington	II, 21, 28, 30, 37, 48 III, 92, 115 IV, 242, (385) IV, 139
<i>Matsuei Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 528, 538
Matsugaki, Yoshio, Jap. Consul in Soerabaya	II, (479)
Matsui, Secretary in Jap. Embassy, London	IV, 176, 245
Matsui, Junior Secretary in Jap. Embassy, Washington	II, (265)
Matsukawa, employed by Manila Branch of Ishiara Produce Co.	V, 59
Matsumae	II, 307 (1156), 1194
Matsumiya, Jap. Minister to Thailand	III, 374
Matsumoto, Jap. Secretary, Lima, Peru	III, 713
Matsumoto, Jap. technician, Bangkok	III, (422)
Matsumoto, Jap. propagandist, New York	I, 188
Matsumoto, Jap. agent in Panama	II, 134
Matsumoto, employed in Jap. Consulate, Portland	IV, (385)
<i>Matsumoto Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 388
Matsunami, advisor to Matsuoka	II, (42)
Matsuoka, Yosuke, Jap. Foreign Minister in 1941 until 17 July	I, 1-68 <i>passim</i> II, 1-304 <i>passim</i> III, 8-124 <i>passim</i> , 457, 478, (903), 951 IV, 98, 393, 461 V, 2-5, 7
Matsushima, Sikao, Jap. Minister attending the Italo-German-Jap. conference in Germany	I, (246) II, 191, (548), (606) III, 451
Maui Island, Hawaii	IV, 139, 144
Mayor of London	IV, (82)
Maze, Sir Frederick W., British Inspector General, Shanghai Customs	III, 425
McNutt, Paul V., U.S. High Commissioner of the Philippines	III, 251
Meadowford, Washington	III, 137
Mediterranean	I, 1, 61, (307, (326), (369) II, 136, 147, (524), (879)
Megurigami, Jap. commercial agent, Honduras	III, 283
Mei River, Thailand	II, 308
Mei-ling Soong—see Chiang Kai-shek, Mme	
Meiji, former Emperor of Japan and grandfather of Hirohito	IV, 10
Meiji, Jap. Milk products company	II, (903)
<i>Mein Kampf</i> , Hitler's book	II, 136, (512), (519)
Meinshausen, Carl, German trying to enter Japan from Mexico	III, (583)
Mekong River, Thailand	II, 308
<i>Melbourne Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 709 IV, 465
Menendez, involved in Nazi plot, Argentina	III, (672)
Menendez, Miguel, Mexican Minister to Chungking	IV, 330
Menzies, Rt. Hon. Robert Gordon, Australian Prime Minister	I, 64
<i>Mercurio</i> , Chilean newspaper	II, (470)
Mercury	II, 117, 118 III, 285, 305, 311, 320, 327, 430, (852)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Meshed, Iran	V, (52)
Messerschmitt Co.	V, 21
Methodist Church	I, 39
	II, 42
Mexicali, Mexico	II, 113
<i>Mexican Gazette</i> , Mexican newspaper	IV, 311
Mexican Petroleum Bureau	III, 323
Mexican Radio, Mexican Communications Company	I, 30
Mexican Telegraph Company	I, 30
Mexico	I, 30, 36, (2), (17), (22), (31), (161), (165)
	II, 45, 53, 94, 113
	IV, 125, 231-239, 307-331, 341, 343, 349, 351
	V, 17, (7)
Mexico City	II, 113
Meycuayan, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 161
Mi Chi Fang, Chungking representative in Shanghai	II, 239
Mica	III, 357, (562)
<i>Michulin</i> , Russian ship	III, 139
Midway	IV, 89, 116, 140, 347
<i>Migak</i> , ship name	III, 148
Mighel, Franz, German trying to enter Japan from Mexico	III, (583)
Migual Air Field, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 152
<i>Mijinski</i> , Russian ship	III, 139
Mikoyan, Anastas, Russian People's Commissar for Food Industry	I, 379
	II, (603), (621)
	V, (10), (40)
<i>Mikoyan</i> , Russian ship	III, 701
Min, Thaise leader	IV, 590
Minaguchi, Kotaro, Jap. propagandist in New York	III, 197
Minami, Jiro, Jap. Governor General of Korea	I, (212)
	III, (404)
Mining	III, 400, 429, 609, (591)
Minoda, Jap. representative, Saigon	IV, 479
Minsk, Russia	II, (743), (750)
<i>Minsk</i> , Russian ship	III, 133, 139
Mishio, Shigeru, professor at Tokyo Imperial University	III, 220
Missionaries—see also Korea Prayer Meeting Incident	I, 39
	II, 102
	III, 158, 170, 186
	IV, 204, 241, 420
	IV, 214
Missionary University, Shanghai	IV, 134
<i>U.S.S. Mississippi</i> , U.S. battleship	II, (767)
Mitani, clerk in Jap. Embassy, Moscow	III, 466
Mitani, Jap. Consul in Bern, Switzerland	I, (190)
Mitsubishi, Jap. business firm	II, 277, 283, 287, (440), (1127)
	III, 169, 310, 381, 508, (470), (592), (768), (955)
	IV, 336, 556, (810)
	V, (15)
Mitsui, Jap. business firm	I, (190), (245), (250)
	II, 277, (214), (428), (440), (1086), (1103)
	III, 169, 305, 310, 315, 346, 365, 430, 598, 601, 610, 611, 696, 709, (955)
	IV, 384, 531, (952), (1085)
	V, (15)
Mitsuura, Tadao, employed by <i>Asahi</i>	III, 354

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Miura, Consul General in Washington	II, (74)
Miura, Yoshiaki, Jap. Minister to Mexico, San Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras	I, (116) II, 94, 110-119 III, 217, 283-331 IV, 125, 195, 308, 310, 314, 316, 319, 321-332
Miyakawa, Jap. Consul General in Russia	II, (603), (619), (654-656), (770) V, 17
Miyamoto, Chief of Jap. Information Bureau	I, 239
Mizukawa, Jap. telegrapher and courier	III, 339
Mizuno, employed in Jap. Foreign Ministry	II, 307, (692), (1162)
Mizusawa	III, (493)
Moderationists (Roosevelt, Welles, Hamilton, Ballantine)	IV, 191
<i>Modus Vivendi</i>	IV, 1, 38, 85, 90
Mogami, Jap. Trade Bureau representative, New York	IV, 215
Mohammedans	II, 123 III, 498, 569 V, 15
Molasses	III, 253, 267, 270
Molina, Juan, involved in Nazi plot, Argentina	III, (667), (672)
Molotov, Vyacheslav, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs	I, 38, 47, 57, (327), (334), (373) II, 166-189, (678), (708), (724), (739), (769)
Molybdenum	V, 10, (27)
Mombasa, Kenya, S. Africa	III, 388, 406
<i>Momoyama Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (506)
Mongolia (outer—inner Mongolia considered part of China)	I, 29, 55, (47) II, 18, 62, 159, 183, 246, (627), (937) III, 563 IV, 11, 30, 36, 169, 414, 418 V, 17
Monroe Doctrine	III, 32, 94, 109, 183, (400)
<i>Montana</i> , ship registered in Panama	III, 240
<i>Monterey</i> , U.S. ship	III, 151
Montgomery, James N., responsible for U.S. Missionaries, China	III, 178
Montovani, A DeGaulist, employed in Fr. In. Ch. Gov't office	IV, 449
<i>Montreal Maru</i> , ship name	III, 660
Moore, Mr. J. Z., involved in Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	II, (310), (315)
Moore-Brabazon, British Minister of Aircraft Production	III, 396
Moral Rearmament Association	IV, 192
Morgan and Company, U.S. bankers	II, 37
Morgenthau, Henry, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury	II, (98), (184)
Mori, employed in Jap. Consulate, New York	IV, (385)
Mori, employed in Jap. Consulate, Chicago	IV, (385)
Mori, employed in Jap. Consulates, Manila and Davao	IV, 257, (385)
Mori, Jap. Vice Consul and courier in U.S.	I, (160)
Morimura, Jap. official in Mexico City	III, 326
Morimura, employed in Jap. Consulate, Honolulu	IV, (385)
Morinaga, Jap. Milk Product Co.	II, (903)
Morino, Jap. courier	III, 300
Morishima, Morito, Jap. Consul General in New York	I, 2, (2), (199) II, 108, 109
Moriwaki, Jap. official in Washington	III, 54, 55, 85, 173, 197-199, 206, 207, 211, 223, 235
Morocco	IV, 171, 218, 242, 250, (385)
Morokumo, Jap. friend of Rafael Aquino	IV, 253 I, 35, 61 III, 276 IV, 297

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Moron, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Moscow	I, 38, 47, 50, 54, 55, (62) II, 143, 191-195, (535), (743), (966) III, 25, 73, 110, 437-494 <i>passim</i> , 524, 563, 583 IV, 168 V, 2, 7, 12, 17
Moudakker, Ko, Mohammedan leader	V, (51)
Moulmein, Burma	V, (56)
Mount Everest	II, (518)
Mozambique (Port. E. Africa)	II, 99
Mukai, Jap. envoy to Batavia	I, (227)
Mukden, Manchuria	III, 162 IV, 420
Munas, Rafael, Jap. intelligence agent	III, (384)
Munich Pact (30 Sept. 1938)	III, (33)
Murai, Kimo, Jap. secretary	IV, 483
Murakami, Kiku, Jap. secretary	IV, 483
Murmansk, Russia	III, 155
Murmansk Railway	IV, 396
Mushakoji, Jap. Minister to Germany	I, (235) IV, (743)
Mussolini, Benito, Italian Premier	I, 1, 49, 61, (22), (293) II, 7, 32, 134, 139, 150, (704), (987) III, 496, 500 IV, 208, 425, 436, (731), (797), (816)
Mutankiang—see Botanko	
Muto, Teiichi, Jap. commentator writing for <i>Hochi</i>	III, (888)
Muto, Yoshio, Jap. Consul in San Francisco	II, 104 III, 133, 135, 139, 168, 208, 229, 548 IV, 172, 187, 197, 201, 253, (385) III, 497
Mutual Aid Treaty (Russia-Chungking)	
Muzahim Al-Pachachi, Iraquian Minister to Rome	II, 155
Myitkyina, Burma	IV, (701)
<i>Nachi</i> , Jap. cruiser	IV, 16A
<i>La Nacion</i> , Argentine newspaper	III, 349
Nagabuchi, Jap. businessman, Mexico	III, (593)
Nagafuku,	
Nagaki, Jap. secretary in Mexico	IV, 593 IV, 245
Nagano, Osani, Admiral, Chief of Jap. Naval General Staff, April, 1941	I, 16
Nagao, member of Kinyo Kai	III, 260
Nagasaki	
Nagato, secretary in Jap. Embassy, Moscow	IV, 510 II, (767)
Nagayo, Manila Mgr. for the Osaka Steamship Co.	IV, 258
Nagoya China Company	
Nagumo, Jap. Consul, Quito, Ecuador	III, 373 II, (390) III, (702) II, (796)
Nahtrong, site of Fr. In. Ch. airport	
Nai Vanich Panananda, Thaiese Minister of Commerce	II, 305-318, (1141), (1144), (1165) III, 668-714 IV, 549-611
Naito, Jap. Cdr. in South America	II, (459)
Nakagawa, employee of Jap. Pacific Petroleum Co., Mexico	II, (448)
Nakagawa, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank	III, (972)
Nakajima, former Manchurian R.R. Director	III, 193
Nakamura, Jap. commercial secretary in Buenos Aires	II, (471) III, (677) IV, 336
Nakamura, employed in Jap. consulate, Davao	IV, (385)
Nakamura, Jap. Major General, planned Jap.-Fr. In. Ch. Joint Defense	IV, 491

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Nakamura, employee of Jap. Pacific Petroleum Co., Mexico	II, (448)
Nakamura, Yoshio, Jap. commercial attache, Nanking	II, 254, 266, (471)
Nakamura, employed in Jap. consulate in Manila	IV, (385)
Nakamura, correspondent for <i>Asahi</i>	III, 379
Nakanishi, Jap. official of the Manchurian R.R.	II, (762)
Nakanishi, Jap. accompanying Matsuoka on his Axis trip	I, (292)
Nakano, opposed Jap.-U.S. understanding	III, 98
Nakano, Seigo	III, (1047)
Nakano, Jap. special correspondent	IV, 316
Nakano, Hiroshi, <i>Nichi-Nichi</i> representative in Fr. In. Ch.	IV, 585
Nakano, Jap. Lt. Col. Military Attache, London	III, 313, 326, 379 IV, 280
Nakauchi, Kenji, Jap. Consul in Los Angeles	I, (174) III, 133, 169, 184, 192, 201, 208, 210, 218
Nakayama, Jap. official, Panama	III, (493)
Nakayama, correspondent for <i>Domei</i>	III, (523)
Nakayama, Sadayoshi, Jap. Naval Cdr. in U.S., later appointed Naval Attache in Rio	II, 453
Nakazawa, employed in Jap. Consulate, New York	IV, (385)
Nakazawa, Jap. Intelligence Agent	I, (174)
Naminoue Maru, Jap. ship	II, (946)
Nana Maru, Jap. ship	II, (464)
Nanjo, Jap. Consul, Havana	III, 371, 409
Nanking Government (Wang regime)	I, 28, 49, (17), (39), (355) II, 158, 159, 183, 201, 248-267, 300, (772), (819)
Nanking Petroleum Guild	III, 581
Nanman Arms Factory	V, (24)
Nantes, ship name	III, 139
Nanyo Kaiun, Jap. Co.	III, (1152)
Naomiya, Naoyoshi	V, (55)
Napoleon	II, (742), (761)
Narita, Jap. secretary in Hsinking	II, (692)
Naruse, Kiyoshi, Jap. Consul in Sao Paulo, Brazil	II, (458)
Naruto Maru, Jap. ship	IV, (641)
Natal	IV, 135, (584)
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples	II, 105
National City Bank	III, 222
National Defense Act	I, 26, (30), (34), (163)
Natoena Islands, South China Seas	III, 630
Natural Resources Investigation Commission, Hanoi, Fr. In. Ch.	IV, 446
Nedich, General Milan, Serbian Quisling, Belgrade	IV, 403
Negishi, Jap. agent at Manila	II, 97
Negroes	I, 30, (174) II, 105
Nei, Jap. Vice-Consul, Vladivostok	II, (665) III, (921)
Netherlands	I, 1, 6, 18, 31, (42), (172) II, 45, 46, 62, 64, 68, 193, 208, 234, 268, (660)
Netherlands East Indies	III, 49, 59, 62, 69, 70, 78 IV, 21, 55, 62, 85, 88 I, 1, 8-20, 38, 39, 43, 57, 66-68, (58), (139), (233), (398), (411) II, 34, 42, 62, 68, 75, 77, 79, 89,

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
<i>The Netherlands Indies and Japan</i> , by van Mook	125, 132, 144, 209, 215, 268-294
Neubacher, Nazi Minister, former Mayor of Vienna	III, 1, 2, 27, 44, 45
<i>Neue Zuerich Zeitung</i> , Swiss Newspaper	IV, 8, 21, 49, 71, 81, 83, 88, 108, 520-538
Neville, member of British Defense Organization, Singapore	V, 6
<i>New Amsterdam</i> , Dutch ship	II, 270
New Caledonia	IV, 408
New Order in Eastern Asia (including the co-prosperity sphere)	IV, (354)
New Orleans	III, 429
<i>New York Herald Tribune</i> , U.S. paper	II, (497)
<i>New York Times</i>	III, 149
New York Chamber of Commerce	I, 1, 9, 11, 26, 29, 41, (10), (17)
New York Purchase Permit Board	II, 1, 10, 92, 140, 144, 147, 159, 189, 205, 234, 263, 268, 285
New Zealand	III, 14, 24, 32, 44, 105, 110, 130, 237, 346, 450, 471, 500, 592, 603, 693, (942)
Newman, writer for <i>New York Herald Tribune</i> in Tokyo	IV, 29, 65, 71, 90, 98, 113, 401, 410, 411, 423, 436, 530, 541, 580
Nicaragua	I, 46, (118), (131)
Nice, France	II, 113
Nichi-Nichi, Jap. newspaper, Tokyo	I, (8)
<i>Nichi Shin Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 9, 17, (36), (37), (48)
<i>Nichiran Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 37, 41, 45, (135)
Nickel	IV, 191, 223, 291
Nielson, Christian	I, 1, 2, 6, 8, 16, 28, 62
Niemeyer, Sir Otto, Director of the Bank of England	II, 17, 41, 98, (48), (50-52), (102)
Nihon Kagya, Jap. heavy industries	III, 13, 34, 41, 45, 53, 56, 81, 167, 176
Nihro, Katsumi, Japanese Consul in Manila	IV, 5, 9, 15, 27, 40, 42, 61, 78, 223, 272, 389
Nikolaevsk, Russia	III, (423)
Nine Power Treaty	III, 601
Nighsia Province, China	I, 1, (9)
	II, (891)
	IV, 5
	II, (36), (37)
	IV, 291
	I, (17)
	II, (414)
	II, 153
	I, 1, 32, (52)
	II, (247)
	III, 438
	IV, 15, 17, 27, 78, 585
	II, 102
	II, 289
	III, (1110)
	III, 63
	V, (27)
	III, (1286)
	III, 568
	I, (190)
	I, (394)
	II, 96, (245-271), (322-332)
	III, 143, 148, 251-280
	IV, 150-164, 256-259, 295-302, (385)
	III, 159
	IV, 71, 85, 113
	II, 246

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
<i>Nippon</i> , Jap. publication	III, 444
Nippon Broadcasting Company	I, (147)
<i>Nippon Yearbook</i> , Jap. publication	II, (553)
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Jap. shipping company	II, (333) III, 169, (567), (1278) IV, 5, 201, 370, (342), (465), (509), (546), (568)
Nisei	III, 213
Nishi, employed in Jap. consulate, Manila	IV, (385)
Nishi, Jap. official in Germany	III, 465
Nishi, Haruhiko, Jap. special Ambassador to Russia	I, (2) IV, 422
Nishi, Yoshiski, Jap. Military Attaché, Mexico	II, 115
Nishida, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Nanking	III, 574
Nishihara-Martin Agreement	II, 206 III, (1029) IV, 466
Nishihori, employed in Jap. Embassy, Washington	IV, (385)
Nishikawa	III, (493)
Nishimura, Chief of Staff Headquarters of Jap. Armies in China	IV, 515
Nishimura Detachment, Jap. Army under command of Gen. Iida, Fr. In. Ch.	II, 215
Nishina, Zozo, Jap. engineer	III, 193
Nishiyama, Tsutomu, Jap. financial Attaché in Washington	II, (168) III, 75, 164, 174, 177, 179, 212 IV, 53, 222, 236, 554, (415) II, (1119) III, 660 IV, 522, 525, 532
<i>Nissho Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 386
Nissho Company Branch, Ottawa	III, 228
<i>Nitsuta Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (292)
<i>Nitta Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, (20)
Nobara	III, 267
Noble, export official, Philippines	III, 267
Nogami, Soiehi, suggested as Jap. correspondent for the International Cultural Advancement Society	II, (552)
Nogares, Mexico	II, 113
<i>Nojima Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (342)
Noma (or Nomao), Jap. courier sent to Mexico	I, (182), (183)
Nomonhan Incident	II, (684), (692) III, 484, (906) II, 275 III, 597, 632
Nomoto, Zoku, Jap. telegrapher and courier	IV, (822)
Nomura, Jap. Lt. Gen., Military Attaché in Berlin	I, 1-64 <i>passim</i>
Nomura, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Jap. Ambassador to the United States	II, 1-94 <i>passim</i> III, 1-130 <i>passim</i> , 133, 135, 136, 158, 162, 164, 334, 336, (872) IV, 1-116 <i>passim</i> , 177-251 <i>passim</i> , 411 V, 1-5 II, 277 III, (1152) IV, 531, (1050)
Nomura Company	II, 103, 109 III, 335 IV, 185
<i>Norfolk Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 153
<i>Normandie</i> , French ship	II, 30
North China Development Company	IV, 134
<i>North Carolina</i> , U.S. battleship	III, 546, 562
Northwestern Military Conference held at Lanchow	

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Norway	I, (67), (243)
	II, 45
	III, 441
	IV, 419
	III, (440)
Noshita, <i>Domei</i> correspondent in Washington	III, 333, (689)
<i>Noto Maru</i> , Jap. ship	V, 17
Nouri Said,—see Nuri Pasha es-Said	
<i>Nobedades</i> , Mexican newspaper	III, 320, (624)
Nuri Pasha es-Said, Premier of Iraq	II, (577)
NYK—see Nippon Yusen Kaisha	
Nye, Gerald P., Senator from N. Dakota, Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee	II, 234 III, 200 IV, 383
Nye, A. E., British Major General	IV, 144
Oahu I., Hawaiian Is.	
Obata, Shigeyoshi, supervisor of Jap. propaganda in U.S., Mexico, and Canada	I, (145) II, 68, (181) III, 44, 49, 53, 62, 63, 115 IV, 183 III, 440, (831)
Odessa, Russia	
Oga, Jap. Army Colonel in N.E.I.	II, 288
Ogawa, Jap. Consul General, Hanoi	IV, 464, 485
Ogawa, Jap. Lt. Col., made Rome-Berlin trip	IV, (880)
Ogawa, Jap. official in Panama	III, 239
Ogawa, Jap. Commercial Attaché in Manchuria	II, (692)
Ogawa, Captain of Jap. General Staff in Tokyo	I, (7)
Ohgimi, Jap. Minister to Venezuela	II, 121 III, 342 III, 486
OGPU, Soviet Secret Police	I, 16
Ogura, Masatsune, Jap. Minister of Finance	III, 598, 610, 542, 643, 651, 652, 644 IV, 531 III, 630 I, (77), (407)
Ogura, Noboru, owner of the Taichan Company, Batavia	II, 54-57, 160, 217, 219, (591), (839), (843)
Ohashi, Chuichi, Jap. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs	IV, (649)
<i>O'Higgins</i> , Chilean warship	I, 1
Oikawa, Koshiro, Admiral, Jap. Navy Minister	I, 14, 38, 54
Oil	II, 41, 64, 67, 68, 73, 89, 102, 118, 175 208, 238, 274, 279, 280, 283, 314, 321 III, 1, 4, 24, 28-30, 63, 133, 135, 139, 142, (183), 166, 188, 212, 219, 221, 226, 297, 308, 315, 316, 318, 319, 321-325, 353, 392, 451, 452, 477, 489, 499, 506, 507, 581, 601, 610, 611, 624, 626, 631, 642, 659, 685, 688, (1020)
	IV, 68, 71, 74, 80, 85, 98, 107, 165, (29), (208), 188, 192, 193, 317, 394, 401, 408, 422, 487, 580, 589
	V, 10, (4), (20)
	III, 660
	IV, 187
	III, 208, 313
	IV, (385)
Uiwa Fishing Company, Menado, Celebes	
Oka, Jap. official in San Francisco	
Oka, Jap. Consul, Portland, Oregon	

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Oka, correspondent for <i>Asahi</i>	III, (1234)
Okabe, Takashi, Jap. Communist	IV, (858)
Okada, Jap. Intelligence agent, Seattle	I, (175)
	II, 102, (308)
Okada, Yoshiko, Jap. Communist	IV, (858)
Okamaru, Jap. in contact with U.S. labor unions	I, (175)
Okamoto, Chief of 6th Sect. Jap. General Staff	III, (1019)
Okamoto, employed in Jap. Embassy, Washington	IV, 353
Okamura, employed in Jap. Consulate, Los Angeles	IV, (385)
Okamura, Jap. official, China	III, 584
Okaniwa, employed in Jap. Embassy, Washington	IV, (385)
Okayama, Jap. Consul General	III, (1279)
Okazaki, Jap. Consul General, Bangkok	III, (1278)
Okazaki, employed in Jap. Embassy, Manila	IV, (385)
Okhotsk Sea, Russia	II, (617), (640)
Oki, Jap. courier	II, (608)
Okubo, Jap. member of the Blue Shirts, Macao	II, (929)
Okuda, employed in Jap. consulate, Honolulu	I, (7), (196)
	IV, (385)
Okuda, Irakame, Jap. specialist sent to Thailand	IV, 480
Okudira, Kameo, Jap. communications clerk	IV, 569
Okuma, Makoto, Jap. Consul	III, 443
Okuma, Jap. Consul at Kalgan, China	II, 692
Okumura	III, 115
Okumura, representative of the Jap. Pacific Petroleum Co., Mexico	III, 282, 288
Okumura, Katsuzo, second secretary of the Jap. Embassy, Washington	II, 6, 48, 119
	IV, (385)
Okumura, Shintaro, Jap. newspaper publisher	I, (144)
Okura, Jap. official in Hanoi	IV, 456
<i>Old Nanking Newspaper</i>	IV, 502
Olongapo, Luzon I., Philippines	II, 96, (258)
	III, 148
	IV, 155
Omori, Jap. Major	III, 313, 326
Ono, Jap. financial advisor, Thailand	II, 321, (1156)
	III, 541, 666, 673, 682, 690, (1208)
Ono, Chief of wireless dep't, Tokyo	IV, (1113), (1114)
Ono, Charge d'Affaires in Panama	IV, (514)
Open Door Policy	I, 1, 16, (41), (46)
	II, (50)
	IV, 85, (5)
Opium	IV, 598
Oran, N. Africa	II, (511)
<i>Orient</i> , Jap. publication	III, 197
<i>Oriental Affairs</i> , Jap. periodical	II, (553)
Osaka, Japan	II, 252
Osaka Chosen, Jap. business firm	II, (214)
Osaka Imperial University	III, 220
Osaka Steampship Company	III, 211
	IV, 258
	IV, (891)
Osbourne, Francis D., British representative to the Vatican	I, 24, 42, 45, 47, 51, 60, 61, (270)
Oshima, Hiroshi, Jap. Ambassador in Berlin	II, 87-263 <i>passim</i>
	III, 226, 432, 434-482, 503, 520, 522, 542
	IV, 393-413 <i>passim</i> , 472, 498, 499, 511
Osahino, Jap. courier	IV, 314
Oshiro, Moryuki, owner of Oshiro Company, Batavia	III, 630
Oshiro Company	IV, 536
Osmeña, Sergio, Vice-President of the Philippines	III, (510)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Osone, Yoshihiko, Clerk in Singora, Malaya under assumed name of Saburo Goto	II, 323
Osornia, Enrique, Mexican Senator	III, 285
Ota, Jap. Military Attaché, Vladivostok	II, 180, 185
Otaki	IV, 409
Otani, Jap. engineer	III, (891)
Otani, Jap. Colonel	V, 10, (21)
Otowa, Jap. engineer, Bangkok	IV, 547
<i>Otowasan Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 184
Ott, Eugene, German Ambassador to Japan	I, (142) II, 7, 104, 138-140, 142, 144, 160, 173, 181, 187, 219 III, 110, 445, 457, 473, 483, (867), (881) IV, 399, 411, (723)
Ottawa	I, 36, (131) III, 100 IV, 349, 385
Ottawa Conference	IV, 68
Otten, instructor in Manchurian Health Institute	III, 656
Oumansky, Constantine A., Russian Ambassador, in Washington	II, (676)
Oyama, self-exiled Jap. Socialist in Illinois	I, 162
Ozamoto, investigated U.S. radio stations monitoring Jap. broadcasts	III, (441)
Pabst, Jean Charles, Netherlands Envoy to Tokyo	I, (233), (411) II, 268, 299, (1046), (1104) III, 602, 607, 615, 624, 631, 641, 642 IV, (1063) II, 119, (445), (448) III, 282, 288, 290, 304, 310, 316, 322 IV, 85
Pacific Petroleum Co., Mexico	IV, 85
Pact of Paris	II, 250
Pai Chung-hsi, Ch. military commander and member of Ch. Cent. Exec. Yuan	III, 546, (1044)
Padilla, Ezequiel, Mexican Foreign Minister	II, 112, (415) III, 305, 317, 328 IV, 318
Palau Islands	II, 215 III, (442) IV, 48, 73, 76, 538
Palm Oil	II, 270, 289
Pampanga Province, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 161
Panama Air Depot	III, 142
<i>Panama American</i> , Panamanian paper	IV, 265
Pan-American Airways	II, 94 II, 148, 217
Panama (and Panama Canal)	I, 36, 39, (161), (188) II, 64, 69, 94, 103, 113, (228) III, 141, 142, (274), 238-247 <i>passim</i>
Panay Incident	IV, 127-134, 148, 260, 262-288, 312, 323, 331, 343-363 <i>passim</i> , 391 I, 2, (1) II, 81 III, 93
<i>U.S.S. Panay</i> —see Panay Incident	III, 635
Pangkalan-Brandan, Sumatra	II, 246, (503), (696), (914)
Panyushkin, Alexander, Russian Ambassador to Chungking	III, 564
Papen, Franz von, German Ambassador to Turkey	I, (229) II, 156, (674), (699), (736) III, 394 IV, 405, 408

## INDEX

Vol. Sec.

<i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan, 1931-1941</i> , published by U.S. State Dept (Gov. Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1943)	I, 1-29 <i>passim</i> III, 1-132 <i>passim</i> IV, 1-116 <i>passim</i>
Papua, New Guinea	II, 285
Paracale, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 158
Paramount Newsreel	II, 37
Paraguay	IV, 345
Pasteur Institute, Bandoeng, Java	III, 656, 662
<i>Patrovsky</i> , Russian ship	III, 133
Pavelic, Anton, Premier and Foreign Minister of Croatia	II, 149
Paulucci, head of Italian mission to Japan	III, 507
Pavolini, Alessandro	IV, 426
Peace Negotiations—see Britain, Brit. Ger. peace negotiations; China, Chinese-Jap. peace negotiations	
Pearl Button Company	IV, 522
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii	I, 4, (6) II, 97 III, 150 IV, 16A, 70, 110, 120, 136, 140, 148, 149, (7), 248, 333, 347, 411
Pearl Islands, Panama Canal Zone	IV, 128
Peck, Willy R., former U.S. Minister to Thailand	III, 677
Pecos, ship name	IV, 150, 160, 164
Petaiho, Manchuria	III, 162
Peking, China	I, (17) II, 243, 249 IV, 248, 347, 388, 392, 397, 501, 504, 506, 514
Pekowski, Karl, German espionage agent	V, 17
Peng Te-huai, Chinese Communist	II, (914)
<i>Penguin</i> , ship name	IV, 347
Pennink, J.B.D., Dutch Consul General in Japan	III, 612
Pepper, Claude, U.S. Senator	IV, 5
Persia—see Iran	
Persian Gulf	I, 65 III, 28
Peru	I, 30, (161) II, 121 III, 234, 318 IV, 236, 362, 364, 365
Pétain, Philippe, Marshal of France	I, (326) II, 66, 153, 198, 233, (818), (850) III, 515 IV, 477, (721) III, 148
<i>Peters</i> , ship name	II, 191
Petsamo, Finland	III, 215
Philadelphia Christian College	III, 148
Philippine Aerial Taxi Company	I, 22, 28, 31, 39, (41), (46), (142), (233)
Philippine Islands	II, 1, 52, 61, 96, 97, 103, 243, (61), (232), (821), (823), (920) III, 1, 2, 48, 142-148, (52), (126), (213), 248-280 <i>passim</i> , 456
Phillips, William, U.S. Ambassador in Rome	IV, 68, 90, 95, 150-165, 248, 295-306, 310, 347 V, 1, 16
Philippine National Bank	III, (512)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Phnompenh, French Indo-China	III, 506
<i>Phoenix</i> , U.S. cruiser	IV, 208
Phya Sri Sena, Thaise Ambassador to Japan	II, (796)
Pibul—see Luang Pibul Songgram	III, 148
<i>Pictorial Orient</i> , Japanese periodical	III, 676, 679, 688
Piggott, Francis, British Military Attaché, Tokyo	II, (553)
<i>Pink Star</i> , ship name	III, 429
<i>Pintail</i> , U.S. ship	III, (495)
<i>Pisu</i> , ship name	IV, 121
Piya Puricha, Chief of Thaise Propaganda Bureau	III, 148
Platinum	II, (1147)
Platon, Charles, French Admiral and Colonial Minister	III, 365
<i>Platt</i> , Chilean warship	III, 514
Ploesti, petroleum works, Rumania	IV, 449
Phnompenh-Bangkok Railroad	IV, (649)
Poland	III, 468
Pollard, Miss H. E., involved in Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	V, (57)
Polotsk, Russia	I, 22, (307), (325), (372), (386)
Polte Co.	II, 45, 180, 181, 191, 193, (964)
Poorten, H. ter, Dutch Cdr. in Chief of the N.E.I. Army	III, 457
Pope Pius XII—see Vatican	II, (311), (315)
Portes Gil Faction, Mexico	II, 191
Port Costa, California	V, (24)
Portland, Oregon	IV, 523
<i>Portland</i> , U.S. ship	III, (607)
Portsmouth, Treaty of	II, 28
Portugal	I, (375)
Pownall, Sir Henry, British Lt. Gen.	II, 99, 151
Pradit—see Luang Pradit Manudhram	III, 464
Prapat, Sumatra	IV, 401, 509
Pratt, William, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, 1930-33	IV, 383
<i>Pravda</i> , Russian newspaper	III, 635
<i>La Prensa</i> , Argentine newspaper	II, 61, 70, (133), (157), (180)
Presbyterians	IV, 7
<i>President Cleveland</i> , U.S. ship	II, (654)
<i>President Coolidge</i> , U.S. ship	III, 493
<i>President Harrison</i> , U.S. ship	III, 349, (624)
<i>President Madison</i> , U.S. ship	II, 42
<i>President Pierce</i> , U.S. ship	IV, 150
<i>President Taft</i> , U.S. ship	II, 96
<i>President Taylor</i> , U.S. ship	III, (243), 567
Prieto, Indalecion, Spanish ex-Minister, head of Aid to Spanish Refugees	II, 96
Prince Rupert, Canada	IV, 160, 248
Princeton Institute of Higher Study	IV, 150, (455)
Principal Points (Jap. Imperial Policy)	II, 97
Pripet Marshes, Russia	III, 557
Proposal "A"	II, 96
	III, 136, 193, 217
	II, (284)
	I, (166)
	III, (459)
	II, (103)
	II, 191
	IV, 24, 34, (25), (28), (33), (35), (36)

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Proposal "B" -----	IV, 24, 34, 46, 51, 61, 68, 71, 72, 79, 81, (29), (33), (35), (36), (92)
Protestants -----	II, (219)
Prunas, N. R., Director of the Transoceania Bureau, Italian Foreign Office -----	I, (31)
Panama, French -----	II, (564), (594), (705), (988), (990), (993)
Panama Canal -----	III, 589, (941)
Panama Canal, Panamanian -----	IV, 424
Pu Ran-lingh, member Indian Gadar Party and Jap. agent -----	IV, 431
Pucheu, Pierre, French Minister of the Interior -----	IV, 477
Puerto Rico -----	I, (265)
Punjab troops, India -----	III, 238
Puntarenas, Costa Rica -----	II, 123
Purajitto-see Luang Pradit Manudhram -----	IV, 126, 263
Purena, Chief of the Netherlands East Indies Control Board -----	III, 599, 610
Puromu—see Luang Bhrom Yothi -----	
Quakers -----	III, 163
Quartz -----	III, 357
Quebracho -----	IV, 348
Quezon, Manuel, President of the Philippines -----	II, 103
Quezon Bridge, Luzon I., Philippines -----	III, 249-276
Quinine -----	IV, 161
Quislings -----	I, 38
Quito, Ecuador -----	III, 660
Quo Tai Chi, Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain -----	IV, (6)
Quota Limitation Act of 1924 -----	II, (390)
RA Company -----	I, (207)
RAF (British Royal Air Force) -----	II, 243, (502), (888)
Rainier, aided in repatriation of U.S. Missionaries in Korea -----	III, 163
Rakuyo Maru, Jap. ship -----	I, 8
Rangoon, Burma -----	
Rarin, ship name -----	III, 636
Rashid Ali el Gailani, Premier of Iraq -----	I, 30
Rayon (artificial silk) -----	V, (25)
Rayon Distributing Co. -----	I, 61
RCA, U.S. Communications Co. -----	II, (44)
Red River, French Indo-China -----	III, 394
Regarde, Acting Vice Minister, Vichy -----	IV, 403
Rei, ship name -----	III, (365)
Reiehsbank, German Bank -----	III, (633)
Report of the Pearl Harbor Inquiry Board (Justice O. J. Roberts, Chairman) -----	IV, 311

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Republic Daily News, Jap. edited paper	IV, 502
Reuben James, U.S. ship	IV, 47
Reuters, British News Agency	II, (500)
	III, 397, (728), (825), (1015), (1017), (1033)
Reykjavik, Iceland	III, 240
Rhodes, Sir Godfrey, British Director of Transportation in Iran	III, 157
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister	I, 42, 49, 51, (270), (278), (309), (311), (326), (373), (377)
See also under Von Ribbentrop	III, 469, 476, 489, (805), (809), (825)
Rice	IV, 379, 399, 410
	II, 71, 208, 321
	IV, 558, 572
Richards, Axel, British Air Wing Commander	III, 151
Rickmers, German ship	I, (246)
Riedel, Ernst, German Major	V, (29)
Riga, Latvia	V, (48)
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	II, 120, 121 III, 152
	IV, 135, 228, 246, 287, 335, 337, 343, 347, 399-59, 362, 385
	V, 17
Rising Sun Petroleum Company	III, 610, (1114)
Risto Ryti, President of Finland	IV, 303
Riyoji, Jap. official, Singapore	II, (1005)
Rizal, Province, Luzon I., Philippines	III, 416
Roberts, Justice Owen J., Chairman of Pearl Harbor Inquiry Board	IV, 161
Roban, Andre, French Plenipotentiary to French Indo-China	I, 1 II, 207, 306 IV, 450
Rocco, Guido, Chief of foreign newspaper division of the Italian Propaganda Office	III, 505
Rockefeller Hospital, Shanghai	IV, 214
Roehm Incident of 1934	II, (522)
Rofinck, A. H. J., Chief of the East Asia Bureau, N.E.I.	III, 615, 619 IV, 521, 533
Rojibi, special activities agent, Macao	II, 245
Rokuyo Maru, Jap. ship	II, (459)
Rolland, M. G., Mexican Minister of Communications and Finance	IV, 308
Romania	I, (296), (325), (373) II, 171, 180, (659), (722) III, 468
Rome	IV, 396, 398, 399 I, 13, 47, 49 II, 146, 234 III, 42 IV, 504 V, 11, 14
Rommel, German Field Marshal	IV, 403, 411
Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of U.S.	I, 1-68 <i>passim</i> , (1-48) <i>passim</i> II, 2-6, 12, 14, 17, 22-24, 26, 31, 36, 37, 42-45, 48, 61, 68-74, 78, 89, 92, 96, 138, 141, 153, 180 III, 1-130 <i>passim</i> , 159, 176, 180, 194, 200, 350, 391, 458, 496, 506, 671, (663), (949)
	IV, 4-169 <i>passim</i> , (1-6), 191, 208, 264, 389, 410, 432, 436, (872) V, 3, 7
Roosevelt, James	I, 39

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Roosevelt, Theodore	II, 235, 244, (276)
Roosevelt-Konoye Meeting	II, 15
Rosario, Argentina	III, 35, 44, 47, 71, 83, 110
Rose, Regional Director of Kiel	III, 352
Rosenberg, Alfred, German to govern occupied Russia	III, 810
Roshier, French Vice-Minister	III, 437
	IV, 401, 403
	II, (226)
	III, 523, (1008)
	IV, 469
Ross, Miss L., involved in Korean Prayer Meeting Incident	II, (311), (315)
Rostov, Russia	IV, 403, 411
Roth, P.K.H., of the German Economic Ministry	V, (25)
Rowe, involved in evacuation of U.S. Missionaries from Korea	III, (310)
Ruahemi Company	IV, 404
Rubber	I, 11, 43, 54
	II, 144, 183, 200, 204, 208, 268-318 <i>passim</i>
	III, 63, 207, 480, 517-529, 543, 610, 611, 688-703
	IV, 88, 406, 465-7, 471-7, 478-80, 484, 565, 572, 583, 597
	V, 17
Ruhrstahl Company	V, (21)
Ruiz, Washington, former president of Brazil	II, (462)
Russia	I, (201)
and China	II, 240, 246
	IV, 49, 495
and Germany	I, 38, 55, 61, (17), (22), (220), (307), (319), (330)
	II, 32, 35, 36, 39, 42, 43, 45-47, 59, 87, 89, 137-147, 164-196, 240-256
	III, 15, 73, 85, 93, 110, 123
	IV, 7, 57, 399, 401, 403
	V, 2, 8, 12, 17, (48), (52)
and Japan	I, 11, 17, 18, 20, 23, 29, 38, 45, 54- 60, 68, (5), (17), (59), (67), (417)
	II, 17, 18, 36, 39, 41, 46, 87, 90, 164- 180, 185-189, 241, (504)
	III, 25, 27-30, 38, 49, 81, 85, 93, 95, 100, 115
	IV, 29, 49, 62-64, 68, 74, 98, 168, 169
	V, 2, 7, 12, 13, 17
(Russo-Japanese War of 1905)	II, 15, 16
and Switzerland—Soviet-Swiss Commercial Pact	II, (605)
White Russia	II, 181, 183
and United States—U.S. aid and co-operation	I, 1, (22)
	II, 15, 34-45, 79, 89, 108, 191, 240, (101), (613), (658)
	III, 5, 11, 23-25, 28, 29 31, 38, 48, 55, 81, 85, 93, 110, 138
	IV, 7, 68, 85, 168, 169
Ryujo, Japanese carrier	IV, (198)
Sadler, Arthur Hayes, U.S. Rear Admiral, Cdr. 15th Naval District	III, 142
Sagami Arms Factory	V, (24)
Sagami Maru, Jap. ship	II, (226), (427)
Said—see Nuri Pasha es-Said	

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

### *Vol. Sec.*

Saiga, employed in Jap. Consulate, New York	IV, 199
Saigo, Jap. military observer, Germany	II, (753)
Saigon, French Indo-China	II, 215, 248, 273, 319, (544), (798) IV, 503, 509, 528 V, (59)
Saipan I., Marianas	IV, 48, 67, 76
Saito, Jap. fuel negotiator in Batavia	II, 283 III, 617
Saito, candidate for Jap. Secret Service	II, (934), (963)
Saito, watchman in Jap. Embassy, Russia	II, (767)
Saito, Jap. Consul General, Bangkok	IV, 389
Saito, former Jap. Ambassador to U.S.	IV, 8, 36, 74
Sakabihara, Jap. Lt. Col.	IV, (799)
Sakai, Toshiro, Jap. specialist sent to Thailand	IV, 480
Sakamaki, Munetaka, Jap. Admiral in South America	II, (459) III, (469)
Sakamoto, Tatsuki, Jap. Minister to Peru	III, 346, 372 IV, 285, 364
Sakata, Jap. official aboard the <i>Buenos Aires Maru</i>	II, (331)
Sakaya, Jap. Minister to Finland	III, 182
Sakhalin Island	IV, 396, 408 I, (323), (353) II, 168, (640) III, (903), (954) IV, 422 III, 335, (633)
<i>Sakido Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 99
Salazar, Antonio, Premier of Portugal	III, 297
Salina Cruz, Mexican port	III, 262
Salisbury, L. E., Aide to the Philippines High Commissioner	I, (296)
Salonika, Greece	III, 375, 565, 571
Salt	IV, 323
El Salvador	II, (644)
Salzburg, Austria	II, 111
Samijima, member of Jap. legation, Mexico	I, (10)
Samoa	IV, 105, (285) I, (174) II, 93
San Diego, California	III, 601, 631, 646
<i>San Diego Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 161
San Fernando, Luzon I., Philippines	I, 30, (118), (141), (160), (327)
San Francisco	II, 93, 115, (500) III, 77, 118, 132 IV, 170, 172, 179, 220, 253, 290, 307, 310, 314, 333, 351 III, 334
San Francisco Military Affairs Society	IV, 155
San Marcelino, Luzon I., Philippines	I, (174)
San Pedro, California	IV, 140
Sand Island, Hawaii	II, (222)
San Point, Airfield in Washington State	III, 138
Saneyoshi, Masao, official of the Jap. Gasoline Company	I, (36)
Sangkoelirang Mines, Borneo	III, 609
Sano, Jap. Consul in Houston, Texas	IV, (385)
<i>Santa Louisa</i> , ship name	III, 367
Santa Maria, California	III, 137
Santana, Jose, Professor under Jap. observation in Rio de Janeiro	IV, (428)
<i>Sanuki Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (433)
Sao Paulo, Brazil	II, (459), (463) III, 354, 358 IV, (624), (634)

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Saracoglu, Turkish Foreign Minister .....	II, 156, 191, (759)
<i>U.S.S. Saratoga</i> , U.S. aircraft carrier .....	IV, 121
Sari, Iran .....	V, (52)
Saruwatari, Takashichi .....	IV, 585
Sasaki, Jap. Naval Commander .....	III, 184
Sato, Jap. Forestry Expert, N.E.I. ....	II, (1127)
	III, 660
Sato, Jap. radioman .....	V, (55)
Sato, Jisaburo, Jap. Consul and Intelligence Agent, Seattle .....	II, (222), (350)
	III, 134, 137, 221
Sato, Katsuya, Jap. Naval Attache and Consul General, Mexico .....	IV, 121, 122, 124, 170, (385)
Sato, Kensuke, member of the Jap. Foreign Office .....	IV, 176
Sato, employed in the Jap. Consulate in New Orleans .....	IV, (385)
Sato, Secretary in the Jap. Consulate in San Francisco .....	III, 205
	IV, (385)
Satsuma, editor of the Kokumin newspaper .....	III, 193, (1019)
Savoy, France .....	II, (571)
Sawada, Jap. Ambassador to Vichy .....	II, (995)
Sayre, Francis B., U.S. High Commissioner of the Philippines .....	III, 249
Schleier, Rudolph, German Minister in Paris .....	III, (1025)
Schmidt, German merchant in Bangkok .....	III, (898), (1299)
Schmidt, Max W., member of U.S. State Dep't. and Division of Far Eastern Affairs .....	II, 30, 37 III, 63, 115 IV, 101 III, 441 III, 461 III, 183 V, (29) III, 465 I, (325), (327) II, (664), (688) V, (21) IV, 401
Schmidt, Paul .....	III, 16
Schobert, Eugen von, German Gen'l. ....	IV, 465
Schoenfield, Hans, U.S. Minister in Helsinki, Finland .....	IV, (385)
Scholl, Friedrich W., German Lt. Col. ....	III, 610, 673
Scholz, German Lt. Col. ....	II, (692)
Schulenburg, von, German Ambassador to Russia .....	II, 245 III, 158, (404) IV, 401, 403 III, 498 IV, 347 II, (618) III, 240, (427) IV, 347 II, (820)
Schwartz Co. ....	I, 15, 45, (38), (359), (382)
Scotland .....	II, 212, 238, 239, 245, 251, 266, 292, 320, (891)
Scott, Sir David, member of British Defense Organization, Singapore .....	IV, 248, 310, 347, 361, 380, 390, 392, 397, 400, 494, 495, 505, 507, 510, 513-4, 519, 522
Seattle, Washington .....	III, (118), (131) II, 93 III, 16 IV, 121, 122, 124, 170, 174
<i>Seikai Maru</i> , Jap. ship .....	IV, 465
Seki, employed in Jap. Consulate, Honolulu .....	IV, (385)
Seki, official of the Yokohama Specie Bank .....	III, 610, 673
Sekinui, clerk in Jap. Consulate, Kalgan, Manchuria .....	II, (692)
Self-Strength School, Shanghai .....	II, 245
Seoul, capital of Korea .....	III, 158, (404)
Serbia .....	IV, 401, 403 III, 498 IV, 347 II, (618) III, 240, (427) IV, 347 II, (820)
Seretaa, air base near Singapore .....	I, 15, 45, (38), (359), (382)
Serbrennaya, Sakhalin Island .....	II, 212, 238, 239, 245, 251, 266, 292, 320, (891)
<i>Sassa</i> , U.S. ship under Panamanian registry .....	IV, 248, 310, 347, 361, 380, 390, 392, 397, 400, 494, 495, 505, 507, 510, 513-4, 519, 522
Shamen, China .....	IV, 347
Shang Chen, leader of Chinese 12th Route Army .....	II, (820)
Shanghai, China .....	I, 15, 45, (38), (359), (382)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

### *Vol. Sec.*

Shanghai—International Concessions	III, 510 IV, 488, 513
<i>Shanghai Mainichi</i> , newspaper	II, 256
Shanghai Maritime Customs	III, 586
<i>Shanghai Times</i> , newspaper	II, (921)
Shanhaikwan, Manchuria	IV, 419
Shansi Province, China	II, 249
Shantung Province, China	II, 238 III, 162 IV, 38, 65
Shell Oil Corporation	I, 36 III, 369
Shensi Province, China	II, (950)
Shiba, Jap. who made Axis tour	IV, (880)
Shiba, Jap. official sent to Bangkok	IV, 472
Shibusawa, Secretary in Jap. Consulate, Nanking	II, (692)
Shibusaw, Jap. official involved in repatriation of U.S. Missionaries in Korea	III, (365)
Shibuya, Jap. courier	III, (921)
Shiedai, leader in Hindustan Gedar Party	IV, 431
Shigehiro, Atsuo, Jap. Naval Attaché to ABC powers, South America	II, (454) III, 332, 365 IV, 338
Shigemitsu, Memoru, Jap. Ambassador to England	I, 52 II, 124, 154, 175, (405), (483), (881) III, 72, 387 IV, 375, 394
Shigen Chosa, Jap. natural resources research group	IV, 487
Shimada, Jap. Naval Minister	IV, 5
Shimazu, Jap. official in China	II, (828), (968)
Shimizu, secretary in Jap. Embassy, Nanking	IV, (1005)
Shimizu, Jap. student in Rome	III, 503
Shimizu, professor of medicine at Tokyo University	III, 220
Shimizu, Jap. Navy chauffeur killed in Hankow incident	II, 211
Shimoyama, Takuma, Jap. Air Attaché in Berlin	II, 145
Shimpo, Satoru, <i>Domei</i> newman, Batavia	IV, 528
Shinjo, Koakichi, Jap. agent sent to U.S.	III, 161 V, 6
Shinohara, Jap. Diet member touring S.A. with Terasaki	II, (409) III, 76, 336
<i>Shinto Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, (139)
Shiobara, member of Sumitomo Corp.	II, (1065)
Shiozaki, Jap. Minister in Chile	II, (238)
Shiozaki, Jap. on Chinese Development Board	IV, 515 III, 584
Shirai, Jap. in Manila	IV, 305
<i>Shiriyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 103
<i>Shirogano Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 376
Short, U.S. Lt. Gen. Cdr. of Hawaiian Department	IV, 110
<i>Shoyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 181, 189
<i>Shuyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (459)
Showa Trading Co.	III, (901) IV, 404, 531
Siam—see Thailand	I, (320), (339)
Siberia	II, 18, 41, 59, 89, 190, 191, 253, (725), (762) III, 55, 120, 122, 434, 463, 495 V, 6 II, 59 III, 489
Siberian Railroad	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Sicily	I, (326), (376)
<i>Sidney Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 472
Siemens Company	III, 480
Sigezaki, Staff Officer of Jap. First Army	III, 585
<i>Signal</i> , German magazine	III, (822)
Sikhs	II, 123
Silk	II, 28, 90
	III, (183), 166, 308, 315, 333, 353,
	479
	IV, 85, 348, (370)
	V, 52
Silver Shirts	II, 104
Simovitch, Yugoslavian Prime Minister	I, (296)
Siemreap, airport in Fr. In. Ch.	II, (796)
Sin Chang Company, Brit. firm	II, 123
<i>Sinarusuratan</i> , Malayan language Newspaper	III, 613, 619
Sindhu—see Luang Sindhu	
Singapore	I, 1, 6, 8, 11, 16, 39, 61, (10), (41), (139), (233), (307), (328), (369), (376), (382), (384), (395)
	II, 30, 41, 62, 75, 93, 138, 140, 231, 237, 243, 248, 275, 313, (500), (532), (1089)
	III, 148
	IV, 166, 232, 300-1, 347, 366, 370, 81, 387, 502, 509
	V, (54)
Singora, Thailand	II, 215, 316, 323
<i>Sinka Nippo</i> , newspaper	II, 99
Sinkiang Province, China	II, 246
Sino-Japanese War—see China	
Sinokawa, Jap. clerk	IV, 564
Sisophon Mongkol Borey Railraod, Thailand	V, (57)
Sitka, Alaska	III, (44)
Soya Strait	III, 29
Slovenes	III, 437, 498, (838)
Slowie, T. J., secretary for the Federal Communications Commission	IV, (4)
Smetanin, Constantin, Russian Ambassador to Japan	II, 43, 185-190, (504), (619), (708), (728), (732), (737)
	III, 445, 482, 488
	II, (757)
Smolensk, Russia	II, 243
Smythe, Robert Lacy, Chief sec'y of U.S. Embassy, Peking	I, 33, 124, (175)
Socialists	II, (796)
Socstrang, airport site, Fr. In. Ch.	I, 40
Soejima, Jap. Count in N.E.I.	II, 275, 277, 288, (697)
Soerabaja, Java	IV, (1110)
Sohan Singh	II, (219)
Sokolsky, U.S. Isolationist	II, (762)
Somemiya, Jap. courier in Berlin	III, 698
Songkla, Thailand	I, (200)
Soong, T. V., Chinese Minister and banker	II, 240, (134)
	III, 130
	IV, 8, 58, 244, 494
Sophiak Bulgaria	I, (296)
	II, 167, 171, (638)
	IV, 403, 413
Sorge, German newspaper reporter for the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>	IV, 399
South America—see Latin America	
South American Newspaper Bureau	III, 358
South Seas Association	III, 620, 644

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
South Seas Development Company -----	III, 643 IV, 522, 531
South Seas Industrial Company -----	III, 609, 613
South Seas Shipping Company -----	II, 295
Soy beans -----	III, 442, 451 IV, 409, 522
Spain -----	I, 35, 42, 61 II, 151, 183, 191, 258, 263 IV, 399, 402
<i>Spencer Kellogg</i> , ship name -----	IV, 165
Spindler, German representative in Manchuria -----	IV, (821)
Spit, H. J., Vice Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies -----	III, 615 IV, 530
Spratly Islands -----	I, (1) II, 215
<i>St. Claire</i> , U.S. tanker -----	III, 133, 139, 219
<i>St. Louis</i> , U. S. cruiser -----	III, 148
St. Luke's Hospital, Korea -----	IV, 171
Stahmer, Heinrich, German Ambassador to China -----	I, (71), (229), (243) II, 157, (1013) III, 110, 440, 590, 593 IV, 339, 499
Stalin, Josef, Russian President of the Council of Peoples Commissars and Generalissimo -----	I, 47, 55, 57, 60, (22), (345), (368) II, 163, 171, 183, 185, 191, 286, (695), (708), (710) III, 14, 195, 435, 486, 489, 563, (469) IV, 7, 69, 401, 403, 410, (397) V, (35) II, 238 III, (31), 202, 369, (372)
Standard Oil Company -----	IV, 9
Standley, William H., U.S. Admiral -----	I, (37), (38)
Stanton, Edwin F., Chief Consul (U.S.) in Shanghai -----	IV, 144
<i>Star Boat</i> , Hawaiian signal boat -----	II, (503)
Star Chain Newspapers (Jap.) -----	III, 140
<i>Star of Egypt</i> , ship name -----	IV, 367 II, 62, 68, 70 III, 96, 125, (15) IV, 7, 33
Stark, Harold, Chief of Naval Operations at the time of Pearl Harbor -----	I, (233) IV, 524 III, 358 I, 38, 50, (44), (62), (230) II, 183, (535), (536) V, 7
Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, Dr., Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies -----	II, (964) I, (17) IV, 214 I, 26, 27 II, 42, 92 IV, 85 V, (5)
Stimson, Henry, U.S. Secretary of War -----	II, 191, (1003) V, 13 II, (760)
Stockholm, Sweden -----	II, 121 III, 317
<i>Stockholm Tianigen</i> , Swedish paper -----	II, (760)
"Stop" Code—see Code-Japanese -----	
Straits of Magellan -----	
Suarez, Eduardo, Mexican Minister of Finance -----	

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Suban, N.E.I.	III, 635
Subic Bay, Luzon I., Philippines	II, 96
Suez Canal	IV, 160
	I, 11, 35, 42, (33), (326), (369), (375)
	II, 147, 152, (521)
	III, 181
Sueyoshi, Jap. cryptanalyst	III, 465
Suga, employed in Jap. Consulate, Los Angeles	IV, (385)
Sugar	II, 273, 295
	III, 375, 565, 571, 639, 647
Sugimoto, Jap. Communist	IV, (858)
Sugiyama, employed in Jap. Ministry of Communications	IV, 370
Sugiyama, Jap. Army General	III, 131
Suihoku (or Shui-pei), China	II, 246
Sukai, Toshio, Jap. Communications clerk	IV, 569
Sukui, Jap. Consul at Macao	II, (918)
Sulu Archipelago	IV, 159
Suma, Yakichiro, Jap. Minister in Madrid	I, 38
	III, 195, 464
	IV, 368
Sumatra	IV, 531
<i>Sumatra Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 560
Sumida—see Sumita	
Sumino, Chancellor in Jap. Embassy, Moscow	II, (967)
Sumita, Jap. Rear Admiral	II, 66, (166), (850)
Sumita, Jap. in Thailand	V, (54)
Sumita (Sumids) Organization, Jap. Army in Fr. In. Ch.	II, 206
	IV, 445
Sumitomo Company	I, (114)
	II, 277, (183), (213), (1065)
	III, 169
Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen	III, 68
Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic	III, 398
Suner, Ramon, former Spanish Foreign Minister	IV, 399
<i>Suratan</i> , Chinese newspaper, Jap. subsidized	II, 272
Suring, Wilhelm, German plastic Manufacturer	IV, (809)
<i>Suriyotai</i> , Thiese ship	III, 692
Suwa, Jap. who aided in repatriation of U.S. Missionaries in Korea	III, (365)
<i>Suwa Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 398
<i>Suzan Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (935)
Suzuki, Jap. Lt. Col. and Assis't. Military Attaché, Washington	III, 196, 334
Suzuki, Jap. official to be sent to Thailand	III, 709
Suzuki, Juro, member of Jap. Gov't Planning Board	II, 302
Suzuki, Teiichi, Lt. Gen., member of Jap. Cabinet	I, 16
	II, 321
	III, (1047)
	IV, 392
Swatow, China	III, 162
Sweden	I, (371)
	II, 183, (771)
	V, 14
Switzerland	II, 192, 194 (480), (605), (772)
	IV, 234
Syria	I, 35
	II, 75, 76, 153, 154, 156, 183, 205, (601), (792), (821), (855)
	IV, 4, 98, 397, 401
<i>Sydney Maru</i> , Jap ship	II, (343)
<i>Syoyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 132

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Tabriz, Iran	IV, 394
Tachi, Jap. courier	V, (52)
Tachibana, Jap. espionage agent	III, 193
Tachibana Incident	II, 102 (85), (292)
Tacloban, Leyte I., Philippines	III, 184
Taft, former President of the United States	III, 138
Taguchi, Domei employee in N.Y.	IV, 38
	III, (434)
	IV, (461)
Tahira, Jap. Chancellor, Singapore	IV, (336), 593
Tahiti	IV, 60
Taichen Company	III, 630
<i>Taichu Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (947)
<i>Taiei Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (286)
Taiheiyo Company (Jap. name for Pacific Petroleum Company, which see)	II, (445), (448)
Tainan, Formosa	II, 238
Tairyu Unit	IV, (1023)
Taiwa Company	II, (489)
Taiwa, Jap. Military Attaché	IV, (1068)
Taiwan (Formosa)	II, 90, 130, 272, (894)
<i>Taiyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 228, 232
	IV, 196, 289, 292
Taizo Company	II, (489)
Tajiri, Chief of the Investigating Section, Tokyo	IV, (1033)
<i>Takechiko Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 520, 522, 525, 528, 532
Takada, Jap. agent, Batavia	IV, 536
Takada, Minoru, in Jap. Foreign Office	IV, 329
Takagi, Jap. official touring Latin America; later Attaché in Washington	II, (80) III, 334 IV, 239, 249, (385), (414)
Takahashi, Jap. Vice Consul, San Francisco	III, 205 IV, 242, (385)
Takahashi, Jap. translator, Russia	II, (629) IV, (903)
Takaishi, Shingoro, Director of <i>Domei</i> News Agency	I, (144)
Takao, Formosa	II, 216, (946)
<i>Takaoka Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (427)
Takashima, Jap. official in Salvador and Mexico	II, (391)
Takamatsu, brother of Hirohito	III, 120
Takata, member of the Mitsui Co.	III, (593)
Takeda Kobe Company	III, 660, (1151), (1152), (1201)
Takenaka, Jap. Vice-Consul, N.E.I.	II, (1098)
Takita, Jap. Military Assistant	III, (618)
<i>Takuun Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 376
Tampico, Mexico	III, (591)
Tamura, Hiroshi Jap. Military Attache, Bangkok	III, 698, 709, (1322) IV, (1179)
Tamurin Affair	III, 614
Tanabe, Jap. professor	III, 193
Tanabe, Chief of Staff of Jap. Army in North China	III, 585 IV, (1014)
Tanaka, Domestic Commerce Official	IV, 348
Tanaka, Jap. courier	III, (921)
Tanaka, Shinichi, Jap. Maj. Gen.	V, 1
Tandoengbaroe, Sumatra	III, 635
Tang, Jap. secretary to Minister Li in Germany	III, 591 IV, 498
Tange, Jap. Lt. in Manchuria	IV, (856)
Tangerang, Java	III, 653

## INDEX

### *Vol. Sec.*

Tangiers Incident of 1905	II, 51
Taniguchi, Jap. secretary, Thailand	IV, 569, 578
Taniguchi, Ryosuki	IV, 585
Tanner, Chief of British Amalgamated Engineer's Union	III, 396
Taoka, employed by N.Y.K.	IV, 201
Taonan, Manchuria	II, 183 III, 8 IV, 187, 229, 231, 237, 253, 284, 290-292, 320, 321, 329, 330, 361, 363
Tarakan, Borneo	III, 148
Tarallo, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 152
Tarlac Province, Luzon I., Philippines	IV, 155
Tashiro, Jap. Counsellor in Tokyo	III, 9, 583 IV, (951)
Tass, official Russian news agency	II, 176, (654), (657) III, 446
Tatekawa, Yoshitsugu, Jap. Ambassador to Russia	I, 38, 47, (299), (319), (333) II, 141, 166-196 III, 463, 487, 490, 493 IV, 435 V, 7 V, (24)
Tateno, Motasada	II, 100, 103
<i>Tatsuta Maru</i> , Jap. ship	III, 8, 221, 225, 228, 232, 702 IV, 187, 229, 231, 237, 253, 284, 290-292, 320, 321, 329, 330, 361, 363 III, 243
Tatsuma, Jap. Naval courier	III, 55, 194, 502, 506
Taylor, Myron, Special American Envoy to the Vatican	V, 15
Teheran, Iran	III, (841)
Teishi, Jap. Attaché in Turkey	III, 601, 631, 646
<i>Teiyo Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 156, (582)
Tek, Ferid, Turkish Ambassador to Japan	I, 30
Telefunken, German Communications Company	II, 235
Temmen Highway, China	III, 566 IV, 495 IV, 347 IV, (461)
Tengaa, base near Singapore	I, 32
Teranishi, <i>Domei</i> employee, N.Y.	II, 48, 52, 93, 113, (77), (219)
Terasaki, Taro, Director of the American Bureau, Jap. Foreign Office; Brother was Chief of Intelligence and Propaganda in U.S.	III, 18-132 <i>passim</i> , 190, 217, 336, 337, 340, (922) IV, 28, 60, 84, 101, 174, 191-3, 228, 239, 249, 252, (385)
References are to both men	III, 56, 300, 321, 374, 375
<i>Terukawa Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 174, 310, 340 III, 187
<i>Terukuni Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (457)
Teshima, Haruo, Jap. Lt. Col., Military Attaché in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia	II, 238
Texas Oil Company	III, (31), (372)
Thailand	I, 1, 6, 8, 43, 68, (1), (18), (186), (246), (382), (395) II, 30, 38, 41, 86, 90, 123, 208, 209, 215, 227, 243, 250, 261, 301-322 III, 5, 6, 15, 27, 30, 87, 100, 159, 210, 252, 262, 499

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Thailand-Aranya Railroad	IV, 8, 49, 71, 81, 85, 97, 347, 392, 490, 491, 502, 509, 514, 541-620
Thailand Banking Consortium—see also Thailand National Bank	V, 16, (6)
Thailand Broadcasting System	III, 698
Thailand Information Bureau	III, 673
Thailand Industrial and Commercial Company (Tai Sho Un Co.)	IV, 537, 576, 586 I, (415) III, 669 IV, 566
Thailand National Bank	II, 320 III, 682, 683
Thailand Oil Company	III, 694
Thames River, England	II, (283)
Third International	II, 246, (937), (941)
Thomas, U.S. Rear Admiral	I, (209)
Thomsen, German Charge d'Affaires, Washington	III, 163
Thorkelson, N.S., U.S. Congressman from Montana	II, (353)
Tibadaeky, Dutch ship	III, 148
Tibet	II, 235
Tienshui, China	III, 546
Tientsin, China	II, 212, 238 IV, 347
Tilisit, Germany	II, 180
Timanjang, Army Post, Java	III, 653
<i>Times-Herald</i> , Washington paper	IV, 47, 108
<i>Times</i> , London newspaper	IV, (813)
<i>Times and Advertiser</i> , Jap. paper	IV, 197, 202
Timor-Portuguese I., N.E.I.	II, 215
Timoshenko, Semyon, Russian Army General	II, 191 III, 471
Tin	I, 11 II, 144, 208, 268-318 III, 63, 207, 353, 362, 480, 610, 611, 688, (982) IV, 88, 428, 565 III, 654
Tin Ryt Kiti, Chinese Nationalist living in N.E.I.	
Tinsaa, German Consul in Shanghai or Tokyo; formerly in Ecuador but considered too pro-Nazi	II, (586) V, (61)
Tisza River, in Hungary and Yugoslavia	I, 49
Tittman, Harold, U.S. Commercial Attaché in Rome	II, 101 III, 502 IV, 432
Tjimanok, Dutch ship	IV, 367
Tjisalak, Dutch ship	III, 639 IV, 522
<i>To-Indo Nippo</i> , Jap. subsidized newspaper published in Java	III, 613
<i>Tao Kaiun</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 584
<i>Tao Maru</i> , Jap ship	III, 339, 351, 355 IV, 335-338 V, 17
Toa Simpoto, political party in the Philippines	III, 275
Tobruk, Libya	I, (339) IV, 411
<i>Toei Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, (316)
Togo, Shigenori, Jap Foreign Minister October 1941—September 1942	II, (624), (627) III, 129, 202 IV, 10-21, 24, 30-45, 52, 56, 59, 61- 64, 71, 75, 77-80, 90, 96, 114, 125,

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Torpedo Incidents of 1904	136, 138-154, 170-609 <i>passim</i>
Tojo, Eiki, Jap. Prime Minister at time of Pearl Harbor	V, 7
Tokai Maru, Jap. ship	I, 1
Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company	III, 129
Tokyo Information Board	IV, 5, 10, 64, 65, 96-98, 101, 105, 500
Tokyo University	II, (318)
Tolaus (or Toklaus), Mehner, German instructor at Hawaii University	III, 353
Tomayori, reporter in Belgrade for the <i>Giornale d'Italia</i>	III, 480
Tomii, Shui, Jap. Minister in Buenos Aires	III, 477
Tonan Maru, Jap. ship	III, 220
Tonking, French Indo-China	II, 100
Toodori, employed by Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo	II, (615)
Toshiyuki, Takade, aide to Minoru Takada	II, 121, (241), (326), (336), (339)
Tourist Bureau (Jap.)	III, 348-351, 353, 365
Toyama, member of Foreign Trade Promotion Office in Rome	IV, 336, 344, 348, 362
Toyoda, Teijiro, Jap. Foreign Minister, July-October 1941	II, 123
Tozan Agricultural Products Co.	III, 113
Tozan Maru, Jap. ship	III, 652
Trabzon, Turkish port on Black Sea	IV, 329, 331
Trade Discrimination—see Freezing Measures	III, 208, 222, 272, (423)
Transit Daily News	II, (554)
Transradio, Argentine Communications Company	I, 1, 16
Transradio, German-controlled communications company in Chile	II, 55, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 73, 75-78, 83, 87, 92, 121, 132, 161, 195, 229, 232, 318, 322, 323
Transylvania border (Hungary-Rumania)	III, 1-129 <i>passim</i> , 161-714 <i>passim</i>
Tribune, newspaper in Panama	IV, 45, 313, 438
Trinidad	IV, 531
Trinity, U.S. ship	II, (318)
Triomphant, Free French destroyer	II, (699)
Tripartite Pact	IV, 502
Trieste, Free State of	I, 30
Truk	I, 30
Tsingtao, and Davao	IV, 396
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	III, 246, (495)
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	III, 217, 238
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	II, (256)
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	III, 148
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	IV, 157, 164
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	III, 141
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	I, 1, 7, 8, 11, 18-20, 28, 41, 42, 45, 47, 51, 56, 62, 63, (4), (9), (11), (12), (17), (67), (90), (220), (229), (328), (408)
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	II, 1, 4, 5, 15-38, 48, 53, 59, 62, 87, 125, 127, 129, 134, 137-141, 143, 148, 153, 160, 163, 166, 171, 181, 185-190, 195, 215, 241, 258
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	III, 24-132 <i>passim</i> , 237, 330, 345, 381, 433, 436, 455, 472, 476-478, 482, 483, 501, 505, 593, 615, (823)
Tsingtao, and Tamsui	IV, 5, 9, 19, 24, 38, 41, 43, 49, 55, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 79, 81, 90, 98, 113, 119, 397-9, 411, 432, 436, 618
Tripoli, Libya	V, 7
Truk	III, 432
Tsai Ting-kai, Cdr. Chinese 19th Route Army	IV, 48, 67, 76
Tsai Ting-kai, Cdr. Chinese 19th Route Army	III, (1032)

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Tsalapkin, Russian official	II, (619)
Tseng Chung-ming, former member of Chinese Central Executive Yuan	IV, (1022)
Tsingtao, China	II, 251 III, (31), 162, 217, 233 IV, 388, 516
Tsu-wen Soong—see Soong, T. V.	
Tsubokami, Teiji, Jap. Ambassador to Thailand	II, 323 III, 670-714 <i>passim</i> 543-618 <i>passim</i>
Tsuchiya, Jap. courier	IV, 298
Tsugaru Straits	III, 29
Tsukikawa, in Jap. Consulate in Honolulu	IV, (385)
Tsukiyama, Staff Officer of Japanese First Army	III, 585
Tsunoda, Jap. student in Rome	III, 503
Tsuritei Maru, Jap. ship	II, (246)
Tsuru, Jap. businessman in Mexico	II, (446) III, 286, 290
Tsurumi, Jap. courier	IV, (1135)
Tsurumi, Jap. Consul General in Singapore	I, (233) IV, 366, 367, 370
Tsutsui, Kiyoshi, Jap. Minister in Bucharest	IV, 398
Tsutsuji, Jap. official in Nanking	IV, (1005)
Tuchida, member of Jap. First Army	III, 577, 585
Tung Hsiu-cha, Chinese official in Kiangsu Province	II, (891)
Tungsten	II, 301 III, 566 IV, 336, 348 V, 10
Tunisia	I, 35, (376)
Turkey	I, 38, 42, 61, (296), (307), (325), (373), (375) II, 85, 156, 183, 191, 192, (601), (653), (772) III, 394, 403, 411, 422, 423, 451, 453, 475, 507, (949), (990) IV, 120, 234, 397, 401, 412 V, 13, 52 II, 156
Turkish-German Pact	
Turner, Richard K., U.S. Admiral, Director of War Plans Division, Navy Department	II, 62 III, 96, 122, 123, 125
U.S.S. Tutuila, U.S. ship	II, 81, 83, 84 III, 12
Tutuila Incident	III, 252
Tydings-McDuffie Act	II, (69) III, 251
Tzisalak, Dutch ship—see <i>Tjisalak</i>	
U Maung Saw, Premier of Burma	IV, 389
Uasa Incident	III, (404)
Uchida, Jap. in Mexico	III, 326
Uchida, employed in Jap. Consulate, Chicago	IV, (385)
Uchinomiya, Naokata, Jap. Military Attaché in Brazil	III, 355
Uchiyama, Jap. representative in Thailand	II, (1156)
Uchiyama, Iwataro, Jap. Minister to French Indo-China	III, 543 IV, 452, 456, 460, 471, 481, 601
Udeman, Chief clerk in Jap. Consulate, Rangoon	IV, 561
Ueno, Kiichiro, Jap. communications engineer	IV, 176
Ukraine	I, 61, (368) II, 166, 171, 180, 181, 191, (649), (654), (752)

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Umedzu, Yoshijiro, Chief of Kwantung Army; Jap. Minister to Manchuria	III, 434, 437, 448, 489, (838), (925) V, 401 III, 131 IV, 399, 401, 413, 421 I, (156), (190) II, 17, 37, (129), (500) III, 397, (743), (1063) IV, 58, 111, 349, 486, (220), (418), (613)
United Press	I, (30), (174) II, 1, 42
United States—see also America; American	
United States	
Army	III, (682) I, 1, 8, 12, 15, 21, 24, 27, 29, 53, 64, (2), (18), (160) II, 10, 15, 17, 27, 33, 37, 41, 42, 44, 60, 67, 69, 70, 73, 89, 93 III, 21, 30, 43, 81, 82, 137, 169, 177, 188, 222, 234, 238, 251, 350 I, 24, 25, 30, 38, 45 II, 12, 25, 39, 41, 225, 244, 270
and China—see China	
Export and Import Bank	
Government	
(includes individual bureaus)	II, 112, 117, 118 I, 10, 12, 30, 38, 39, 62, (5), (42), (139) II, 41, 89, 92, 93, 95–97 I, 12, (142) II, 5, 17, 36, 120, 138 III, 128
Intelligence	
and Japan—see U.S. Proposals to Japan; Japan and U.S.;	IV, 347
Roosevelt-Konoye Meeting; Proposals A and B	III, 240
Marine Corps	
Maritime Commission	
Mexican Agreement	
Military Preparations—see also U.S. Army; U.S. Navy	II, 112, 117, 118 I, 10, 12, 30, 38, 39, 62, (5), (42), (139) II, 41, 89, 92, 93, 95–97 I, 12, (142) II, 5, 17, 36, 120, 138 III, 128
Neutrality	
Navy	I, 12, 18, 19, 26, 30, 38, 66, (139), (175) II, 42, 46, 59, 68, 93–96, 98 IV, 163, 248, 347
Proposals to Japan—see also Japanese proposals;	
President Roosevelt; Hull; Nomura	II, 136, 138, 140, 141, 160 III, 90
Press—see also individual newspapers	I, 2, 5, 7, 9, 19, 25, 26, 32, (1), (2), (8), (18) II, 13, 17, 37, 42, 48, 62, 91
Public Opinion concerning war	I, 6, 8, 11–13, 18, 26, 38, (1), (4) II, 42
<i>El Universal</i> , Mexican newspaper	III, 320 IV, 312
Universal Leaf Tobacco Company	III, (31)
Universal Oil Products Company	I, 15
(of Chicago)	
University of Chicago	III, (887)
University of Hokkaido	III, 220
University of Jurisprudence, Buenos Aires	III, 349
Updegraff, W. N., Commandant Naval Air Base, Dutch Harbor	III, (298)
Ural Mountains	II, 182 III, 435, 437, 449, 492, (923)
Uruguay	IV, 362
Ushiba, Secretary to Prime Minister Konoye	III, 52, 73, 107, 131 IV, 411

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Ushiba, clerk in Jap. Embassy, London -----	II, (492)
Usui, Jap. attache in South America -----	II, 94 III, 243
Uyama, Jap. Vice-Consul, Shanghai -----	IV, 437
Van Kleffens, E. N., Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs -----	I, (411)
Van Mook, Hubertus J., Director of Economic Affairs, N.E.I. -----	I, (409-411) II, 273, 282, 283, 292, (1037), (1122) III, 610, 616, 624 IV, 422
Van Vlissingen, Dutch financier who desired Ger.-Brit. peace negotiations according to Nomura -----	I, (172)
Van Voorhis, Daniel, U.S. Defense Commander, Panama Canal Zone -----	II, 103
Valparaiso, Chile -----	II, (460) III, 323 V, 66 I, 30, 36
Vancouver, Canada -----	IV, 170, 175, 284, 313, 369, 386
Vanderplass, Dutch member of the Council of the Indies -----	II, (1108)
Vargas, Getulio, President of Brazil -----	II, (462) IV, 362
Varnvai, Thaiese plenipotentiary representative to Tokyo -----	I, 417 III, 714
Vatican -----	I, 49 II, 166, 234, 285, (285) III, 194, 502 IV, 363, 432, 504, 515
Vaxelaire -----	IV, (961)
Venezuela -----	I, (31) II, 121 IV, 323, 334
Vera Cruz, Mexico -----	II, (177)
Vichy -----	I, (253), (326) II, 10, 64-66, 68, 90, 153, 154, 185, 198, 205 III, 173, 233, 447, 509-545 IV, 402, 448, 449, 459
Victoria Point, Burma -----	V, (56)
Vienna, Austria -----	I, 61 II, (772) IV, 402, 405 V, (61) III, 484
Viga (Ulan Bator, or Urga), Mongolia -----	I, (362)
Vishinsky, Andrei, mentioned by Japan as possible successor to Molotov, in 1941 -----	II, 191
Vitebsk, Russia -----	III, 133, 139
<i>Vladimir Mayskovsky</i> , Russian ship -----	I, 319, 320
Vladivostok, Russia -----	II, 180, 183, 191, 196 III, 24, 28, 52, 133, 135, 139, 156, 159, 187, 219, 477, 482, 488, 489, (846), (954) IV, 168, 177, 248, 413, 418, (728)
<i>The Voice of the People</i> , newspaper in Java -----	IV, 536
Volga River -----	II, 191
Von Basse, in German Air Corps -----	II, (571)
Von Bismarck, O. Furst, German Ambassador -----	II, 139
Von Papen, Franz, German Ambassador to Turkey -----	II, 156, 191, (736)
Von Ribbentrop, Joachim, German Foreign Minister (See under Ribbentrop for references to I, III, IV.)	II, 7, 125, 134, 135, 138-142, 148, 157, 161, 173, 174, 179, 182, 184 187, 189-191, 199, 200, 257, 261,

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Von Weizsacker, Ernst, German Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs	I, (296) III, 458, 522 II, 191 III, 448 II, (757)
Voreshilov, Russian General	II, 191
Vyazma, Russia	II, (757)
W.P.A.	II, (219)
Wagner, Frenchman involved in fall of France	IV, 449, 450, 460
Wakasugi, Kaname, Jap. Minister to the United States	I, 2, 24, (2), (3), (17), (77), (144), (280) II, 21, 22, 47, 56, 58, 60, 63, 64, 69, 72, 74, 91, 92, 109 III, 3-58, 115-132, 300, (823) IV, 1, 5, 6, 8, 187 V, 2
Wake, Jap. Colonel	III, 360
Wake, American gunboat	IV, 347
Wake Island	IV, 89, 106, 116, 347
Waki	III, 326
Walker, Frank, U.S. Postmaster General	I, 21, 26 II, 2, 36, 49, 73, 89 III, 5, 11, 16, 21 III, 78, 174
Wallace, Henry A., Vice-President of the U.S.	IV, 89, 106, 116, 347
Walsh, James E., Bishop, Head of Catholic Foreign Mission Society; Promoter of Jap-U.S. relations	II, 100 III, 97
Wang, C. T., former Foreign Minister in China	I, (202) II, (274)
Wang Ching-wei, Chinese president of the Jap-supported Nanking Gov't	I, (17), (22), (41), (46), (47) II, 11, 15, 30, 41, 201, 227, 256-267, (37), (872), (967-969), (1009-1034) III, 80, 511, 563, 573, 578, 585, 592, 596, 619 IV, 85, 101, 498, 504, 507
Wanitto—see Nai Vanich Panananda	I, 17
Wardman Park Hotel, Washington, D.C.	II, 21
Warm Springs, Georgia	IV, 38, 96
Warsaw, Poland	II, (762)
Waspire, British warship	III, 133, 139, 143 IV, 121, 122, 124
U.S.S. <i>Washington</i> , U.S. ship	II, 98 IV, 134
Washington Conference Treaties	IV, 85, 102
Washington <i>Times-Herald</i> , U.S. paper	I, (172) III, 176
See also under <i>Times Herald</i>	IV, 134
Wasp, U.S. aircraft carrier	IV, 242, (385)
Watanabe, Jap. official in Jap. Consulate, New York	III, 367
Watanabe, Jap. courier	II, (376), (380)
Watanabe, Jap. interpreter, Colombia Legation	II, 109
Watanabe, telegraphic clerk, Jap. Embassy, Washington	II, (692)
Watanabe, Jap. sec'y in Nanking Consulate	II, (949)
Watanabe, Chief of Staff, Jap. Army in North China	III, 191, 235
Watanabe, Junichi, Pfc. in Jap. Infantry	III, 191, 235
Watanabe, Ryukichi, father of Junichi Watanabe	III, 191, 235, 569
Watari	II, (934)
Wataru, Jap. commercial attache in Shanghai	IV, 374, 505
Wavell, Sir Archibald, Commander-in-Chief of British Middle Eastern Forces	II, 183, (701) III, 403, 423

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Weaman-see Woermann	
Weber, Paul, German trying to enter Japan from Mexico	III, (583)
Weddell, Alexander, U.S. Ambassador to Spain	III, 195
Wei Tao-ming, Chungking Ambassador to France	II, 260
Weichow, China	II, 197
Weiszaecker, Chief of Political Section of the German Foreign Office	II, 140, 261, (652)
Welles, Sumner, U.S. Undersecretary of State	I, 55, (10)
	II, 27-92 <i>passim</i> , (676)
	III, 3-20, 93-132, 371
	IV, 5-102 <i>passim</i> , 191
	IV, 555
Wendler, Otto, German Fifth Columnist in Thailand	III, 137
West Yellowstone, Washington	IV, 244
Western Transportation Company	I, 30
Western Union Telegraph Company	III, 173
	I, (326)
Weygand, French General, leader of Armies in North Africa	II, (555), (601)
	III, 395
	IV, 435, 477, (731), (796)
Wheeler, Burton, U.S. Senator	II, 234, (39)
White House	III, 76, (11)
White Sulphur Springs	I, 8, 11
Wiehl, Emil, Chief of German Commerce Bureau	III, 35, 45, 114
	II, 50
	I, (246)
	II, 144, 191, (751)
	III, (983)
Wikawa, Tadae, employed by the Co-operative Bank of Japan	II, 10, 11, 18, 22, 24, 27, 28, 30, 37, 48, 49, 71
	III, 8
Willkie, Wendell, candidate for presidency of the United States	I, (17), (92), (98) II, (219), (886)
Willoughby, in High Commissioner's Office, Philippines	IV, 303
Wilson, Woodrow, former U.S. President	III, 16
Winant, John, U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain	II, 22, 234
"Winds" Code—see Code-Japanese	
Windsor, Edward (Duke)	II, 191, (672)
Woermann, Dr. Ernst, German Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs	II, (773), (986) IV, (762), (768), (769), (775) III, 443, 480, (818)
Wohlthat, Helmut von, German Commercial Attaché in Tokyo	IV, 171
Women's Christian College, Korea	IV, 221
Women's College, Tokyo	III, 333, 361, (952)
Wool	IV, 348
World-Over Printing Enterprise	III, 197
Wu Tieh-cheng, member of Chinese Central Executive Yuan	II, (922)
Wyoming, U.S. ship	IV, 145
	IV, 605
Yahara, Lt. Col., Jap Staff Officer in Thailand	V, (60)
<i>Yakut</i> , Russian ship	III, 133
Yamada, Nobuo, Jap. Finance Attaché in Washington	III, 212
Yamada, Miss Wakako	II, (762)
<i>Yamafuji Maru</i> , Jap. ship	I, (393)
Yamagata, Jap. prince	III, 131
Yamagata, Jap. Consul-General in Panama	II, 94, 111-113 IV, 286
	III, 217, 243, 335, 361
Yamagata, Jap. Minister in Santiago, Chile	IV, 286, 360, 362

## INDEX

	Vol. Sec.
Yamagishi, Jap. official in Rome	I, (239)
Yamaguchi, Lt., alias Hajime Yamada, sent to Hanoi	III, (826)
Yamaguchi, Jap. official in Batavia	III, (1305)
Yamaguchi, Jap. official in Fr. In-Ch.	III, 597, 632
Yamaguchi Province, Japan	IV, 547
<i>Yamakiku Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 252
Yamamoto, official of S. Manchurian Railroad	II, (506)
Yamamoto, of the Borneo Trading Co.	II, (692)
Yamamoto, Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief, Jap. Navy	IV, (1046)
Yamamoto, K., Jap. Communist	IV, 16A
Yamamoto, Kumaichi, of Jap. Foreign Office	IV, 416
	I, (80)
	II, 55, 83, 213
	IV, 82-86, 91, 101, 254, 267, 271
	III, 238
Yamamoto, official in Jap Embassy in Washington	IV, 249, 199 (385)
Yamamoto, Yoshio, Jap. clerk	IV, 60
Yamaoka, Jap. engineer (?)	I, (36)
Yamasaki, Jap. courier in U.S.	I, (161), (219)
Yamashita Steamship Company	I, (393)
	III, 694, 712
	IV, 552, 566
Yamashita, Tetsujo, Jap. Lt. Gen.	II, (740), (765)
	V, 12
<i>Yamatsuke Maru</i> , Jap. ship	II, 103
Yamauchi, T., Jap. Lt. in Batavia	IV, 528
Yamazaki, Jap. courier	II, 102
<i>Yamazato Maru</i> , Jap. ship	IV, 336
Yanai, Jap. Minister to Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru	II, 121
	III, 365, 366, 368-370
	IV, 340, 346
Yanashita, K., representative of <i>Nichi-Nichi</i> in French Indo-China	IV, 585
Yang Yu-hsun, director of Chinese National Socialist Party	III, (1048)
Yangku, China	II, (949)
Yano, Jap. official in Hong Kong	IV, 380
Yano, Major, Jap. agent in America	III, 227
	IV, (623)
Yarnell, H.E., U.S. Admiral	II, (927)
Yasuda, member Sumitomo Corp. N.E.I.	II, (1065)
Yasukuni Shrine in New York	III, 191
Yasuwo, Domei employee in New York	IV, (461)
Yatagai, Jap agent in Thailand	III, 700
<i>Yawata Maru</i> , Jap. ship	I, (255)
	II, 124
	III, 574
	II, (478)
Yazawa, pres. Foreigners' Association Venezuela	II, (478)
Yeh Chin-tsan, Chinese editor	IV, (1093)
Yeh Chu-tsang, member Chinese Central Exec. Yuan &	
Kuomintang propagandist	I, (200)
Yen Hsi-shan, mem. Ch. Central Exec. Yuan & cmdr. of Shansi army	III, 577, 585, 595
	IV, 506, 507
Yen Hui-ching, Ch. Ambass. to Russia	I, (203)
	II, (695), (696)
Yenan, China, Communist Capital	II, 246, (696), (912)
Yenching University, China	I, (17)
Yenosawa, involved in Philippine elections	III, (539)
Yimikawa, Jap. banker in Batavia	II, (1124)
Y.M.C.A.	III, 197
Yodokawa, Jap. Minister, Lima, Peru	IV, 365

# THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

## INDEX

	<i>Vol. Sec.</i>
Yokohama, Japan	IV, 176, 183, 220, 284, 292, 303, 371
Yokohama Specie Bank	I, (190)
	II, 194, 320, (183), (661), (777), (781), (1124)
	III, 165-222 <i>passim</i> , 333, 361, 383, 390, 431, 518, 529, 586-683 <i>passim</i> , (372), (515), (557)
	IV, 5, 175, 181, 188, 206, 352, 455, 479, 522-612 <i>passim</i>
Yokosuka, Japan	IV, (90)
Yokota, Jap. Lt. Col. in Berlin and Rome	III, (897)
	V, (20)
Yokota, Jap. sec'y in Bangkok	III, 696
Yokota, sec'y in Jap. Ministry of Communications	IV, 564
Yokoyama, Jap. representative in Hanoi	IV, 487
Yomiuri, Jap. newspaper	III, (1), (241), (994) IV, 313, 575
Yonai, Jap. Admiral	III, 93
Yoshida, Jap. clerk in Germany	IV, 404
Yoshida, Jap. Admiral	III, 52
Yoshida, Jap. Major, in Berlin and in Italy	V, 10
Yoshida, Yoshio, official of the Jap. Fuel Bureau	II, 302
Yoshii, Lt. Col., Military Attaché in London	III, 379 IV, 280, 340
Yoshimizu, Jap. agent in Mexico	II, (228)
Yoshimura, Jap. Assistant Financial Attaché in N.Y. Consulate	II, 80
Yoshinari, Jap. engineer	III, 480
Yoshioka, Jap. official in Tokyo	IV, 174
Yoshioka, Jap. sec'y in Shanghai	II, (928)
Yoshioka, Eita, Jap. supply officer in Washington	III, 161, 326
Yoshitowi, official in Jap. Consulate in Heinking, Manchuria	II, 191, (685), (692), (707) IV, 414
Yoshizawa, K., special Jap. envoy to N.E.I. and later to Fr. In-China	I, (408) II, 268, 282, 288, (512) III, 534, 543, 616 IV, 446-78 <i>passim</i> , (861), (927), (1177)
Yoshizawa, S., Jap. Minister in Ottawa, Canada	I, (180) II, 133 III, 386, 404, 415 IV, 373, 385
Youth Training Centers, Jap. organizations in Brazil	II, 121
"Yu" Company	I, (36), (199)
Yu Hsueh-chung, Governor of Hopeh Province	II, (950) III, 585
Yuge, in Jap. Consulate, Honolulu	IV, (385)
Yugoslavia	I, 42, 47, 49, 61, (283), (329), (339) (367) II, 167, 180, (612) III, 231, (838) V, 17
Yuki, Jap. sec'y in Washington	IV, 254
Yuki, Hideo, Jap. army employee	IV, 569
Yuki, Shiroji, former chief American Bureau, Jap. Foreign Office	IV, 16, 20, 99, 153
Yukimoto, of the South Seas Forestry Company	IV, (1046)
Yukishita, Katsumi, Jap. Naval Attaché to Chile	II, (454) IV, 336
Yukon, Canada	I, (166)
Yulo, Filipino politician	III, (539)
Yumoto, Jap. financial official in Berlin	II, (598) III, 530, (1005)

## INDEX